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Introduction 
Philosophers tend to have the bad habit of detecting complex and mind-bog-
gling problems in contexts that seem dear and obvious in everyday life. Take 
the example of our thinking about physical objects: at every moment of our 
conscious lives we perceive objects in our environment, sometimes we form 
beliefs about them or doubt their existence, sometimes we wish they were 
other than they are, some of them evoke an aesthetic judgment, and so on. 
When we characterize all these activities in terms of their being about or di-
rected towards an object, it might look as if we were just stating a fact so ob-
vious that it is hardly worth mentioning. As soon as we try to describe the 
details of this relation, however, things become increasingly complex and less 
obvious. Some of the objects towards which we are directed do not really 
exist, which might suggest that we are actually directed towards a mental ob-
ject. This view, however, becomes problematic in the case of perception, 
where we are obviously directed towards physical rather than mental objects. 
In this book I will use Husserl's notion of constitution to develop a po-
sition that can address these problems. I hope to achieve two major goals. 
First, I will sketch a picture of the relation between mind and world that ac-
knowledges, but does not overemphasize, the differences between the realm 
of the mental and the realm of the physical. Second, by developing an ac-
count that combines Husserlian phenomenology with analytic philosophy, 
I will show that these two traditions are not two opposite and mutually re-
pellent poles in the history of twentieth century philosophy; they should 
rather be seen as allies when it comes to systematically address problems in 
the philosophy of mind. 
Descartes' distinction between res extensa and res cogitans as two differ-
ent substances had a major influence on philosophy of mind of the twenti-
eth century. Many philosophers rejected this ontological distinction as far 
too strong. Their reaction was to reduce the realm of the mental to the realm 
of the physical or to eliminate it altogether. One of the main factors that 
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caused this reaction was the idea that all scientific disciplines can be reduced 
to more fundamental disciplines, which eventually would allow us to de-
velop a unified theory of everything. This strategy, however, runs the risk of 
ignoring the fundamental differences between the realm of the mental and 
the realm of the physical. 
The main goal of this book is to sketch a picture of the relation between 
mind and world that acknowledges these differences without asserting that 
there are two different kinds of substances. Mind and world are not seen as 
two opposite spheres, but rather as parts of a whole. The basic claim of this 
account is that we constitute the objects towards which we are directed in our 
mental episodes. This does not mean, however, that we create these objects, 
nor does it mean that we interpret something as something else. In perceptual 
experiences, I will argue, we are immediately directed towards objects in our 
environment that exist independently of these experiences. The theory of 
constitution describes how this relation can be established. 
The basic notion of the account that I am going to develop stems from 
Husserl's phenomenology. By using some ofHusserl's results in the context of 
contemporary analytic philosophy of mind I combine two major traditions of 
twentieth century philosophy. In the last three decades, various philosophers 
have pointed out that these two traditions have far more in common than is 
generally thought. It was argued, for example, that Husserl's philosophy, es-
pecially his early writings, has many parallels with Frege's; 1 it was also docu-
mented that there was serious interest in phenomenology among early 
analytic philosophers like Bertrand Russell, Gilbert Ryle, and even among 
some members of the Vienna Circle. 2 These historical studies have provided 
a more accurate perspective on the history of twentieth century philosophy, 
bringing to an end the myth of the big and insuperable gap between analytic 
philosophy and the phenomenological movement. 
In this book I will take a different approach, though. Rather than point-
ing out the historical parallels, I will try to do analytic phenomenology by 
using some ofHusserl's results in the framework of analytic philosophy. I will 
set up this framework on the basis of the Sellarsian/McDowellian distinction 
between the logical space of reasons and the logical space of nature. Once we 
accept this framework we face the difficulty to explain how these two logical 
spaces can be related. I will propose that Husserl's insights can be very fruit-
ful for addressing this question. Even though I will systematically address a 
problem central to the philosophy of mind, this approach, if successful, also 
allows me to pursue a historical goal, namely to demonstrate that these tradi-
tions are not incompatible. I will completely bracket the historical dimension 
of the relation between Sellars and Husserl--even though a quite interesting 
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story could be told about this aspect. 3 My strategy is rather to show how we can 
use Husserl's results to address problems of contemporary analytic philosophy 
of mind and, in this way, to make a strong case for the claim that Husserl's phe-
nomenology is not merely a chapter in the history of philosophy, but that it is 
highly relevant in the context of contemporary philosophy of mind.4 
My interpretation of Husserl is based mainly on his analyses of time 
consciousness and passive synthesis. I do not pretend that by emphasizing 
these aspects of Husserl's thought I can provide an exhaustive interpretation 
of his overall philosophical system. Moreover, I will use some ofHusserl's re-
sults to sketch a theory that stands in tension to the standard interpretations 
of Husserl's work, especially by giving emphasis to the social foundation of 
consciousness. I should, therefore, stress that my goal is not primarily to con-
tribute to Husserl exegesis, but rather to use some of his results in a context 
where the work of this philosopher still does not get the attention it deserves. 
In pursuing this strategy, I run the risk of being criticized for drawing on 
minor aspects ofHusserl's phenomenology or even distorting his views. I be-
lieve, however, that the overall goal justifies this strategy. 
In the first chapter of this book I will introduce the problems that will 
be addressed by the theory of constitution. I will sketch a rough picture of 
how Descartes' distinction between mind and matter-as it was interpreted 
in twentieth century philosophy-has created an unbridgeable gap between 
mind and world. I will show that some of the major tendencies in contempo-
rary philosophy of mind, eliminativism and reductionism, are both based on 
this distinction, and simply react to it in different ways. 
In the next chapter, I will discuss the history of the notion of constitu-
tion. After providing a short overview of the role this notion played in the his-
tory of philosophy I will outline Husserl's and Haugeland's accounts of 
constitution. Husserl's notion underwent some considerable changes over the 
years; I will show how this development was influenced by the changes in his 
overall philosophical position. Haugeland is an interesting example of a con-
temporary philosopher who uses the notion of constitution to explain the re-
lation between mind and world. Finally, I will point out the parallels and 
differences in these two accounts. The contrast of the work of two philoso-
phers of very different backgrounds will allow me to introduce some central 
features of a theory of constitution. 
Then I will develop an account of constitution. I will define mental 
episodes as positions in the logical space of reasons that are directed towards 
objects, which are taken to be positions in the logical space of nature. In 
order to show how these two logical spaces are related, I will argue that we 
constitute the objects towards which we are directed in our mental episodes. 
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I will show that the process of constitution requires a holistic background. 
Husserl's analyses of time consciousness can give us the key to describe the 
relation between this background and an occurrent mental episode. Then I 
will address the question of how we come to perform constitution in the 
first place. I will argue that we establish constitutive commitment by estab-
lishing a first, minimal background, which rests on various factors: our bi-
ological makeup and environment, the passive processes of association, and 
the social group in which we grow up. Finally, I will show that not only the 
objects towards which we are directed, but also mental episodes, in which 
we are directed towards them, are constituted. 
In the remainder of the book I will discuss two of the most important 
consequences of my account of constitution. In chapter four I will elaborate 
on the idea that mental episodes rest on a social foundation. I will argue that 
we learn to constitute mental episodes through social practices and that, as a 
consequence, we cannot have ineffable mental episodes. Then I will show that 
the thesis that mental episodes rest on a social foundation does not imply that 
we cannot study the mind through phenomenological analysis. In the last 
chapter I will discuss whether constitution implies a form of idealism. I will 
adopt an argument presented by Wittgenstein in his later writings, which 
shows that metaphysical realism and idealism are both nonsensical positions. 
The argument, as I present it, leaves room for the (non-Wittgensteinian) 
claim that constitution implies transcendental idealism. I will show that this 
claim rests on the assumption that we can meaningfully distinguish between 
the object as it is in itself and the constituted object. I will conclude the book 
by discussing an ontological position, natural realism, according to which this 
assumption leads to an unnecessary complication, in order to show that ide-
alism is not a necessary consequence of my account of constitution; it can and 
should be avoided. 
Chapter One 
Why Do We Need a Theory 
of Constitution? 
In his Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint Brentano divides all existing phenom-
ena into the psychological and the physical. In order to distinguish these two kinds of 
phenomenon, he offers six criteria for psychological phenomena. The most important 
is undoubtedly the notion of intentionality. 1 "Every mental phenomenon," Brentano 
argues, 
is characterized by what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the in-
tentional (or mental) inexistence of an object, and what we might call, 
though not wholly unambiguously, reference to a content, direction to-
ward an object (which is not to be understood here as meaning a thing), 
or immanent objectivity. (Brentano 1995, 88) 
Brentano was soon criticized for characterizing the intentional object as a 
mental entity. While this characterization might help to explain cases like hal-
lucinations, imaginations of fictional objects, or dreams, where the correspon-
ding object typically does not exist in the physical world, at least not in the 
way represented, it runs into problems when we consider the most common 
cases of perception. When I see a table, for example, it is essential that the ac-
tual table, the physical object, is in front of me. In my perception I am di-
rected towards this physical object, and not towards some mental entity. 
Brentano's account of intentionality, thus, leads to an unnecessary duplication 
of the object, as Husser! points out in his Ideas: 
But if, in this way, we try to separate the actual Object (in the case of 
perception of something external, the perceived physical thing pertain-
ing to Nature) and the intentional Object, including the latter as really 
inherently in the mental process as 'immanent' to the perception, we 
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fall into the difficulty that now two realities ought to stand over against 
one another while only one reality is found to be present and possible. 
I perceive the physical thing, the Object belonging to Nature, the tree 
there in the garden; that and nothing else is the actual Object of the 
perceptual 'intention.' A second immanental tree, or even an 'internal 
image' of the actual tree standing out there before me, is in no way 
given, and to suppose that hypothetically leads to an absurdity. 
(Husser! 1982, 219 [Hua III/1, 207f] 2) 
Because of these problems Brentano eventually changed his account of inten-
tionality. He never succeeded, however, in explaining the problems concern-
ing the ontological status of the intentional object in a satisfactory way. 3 
Husser!, of course, also cannot provide an easy answer to the problems con-
cerning the relation between the act of perception and the perceived object. 
With his phenomenological reduction he brackets the realm of physical ob-
jects and develops a position that he characterizes as transcendental idealism. I 
will discuss Husserl's position in more detail below. 
The difficulties in explaining the relation between a perception and the 
perceived object are not exclusively Brentanian ones. Every philosophical the-
ory of perception that starts out with a distinction between the perceptual ex-
perience, which belongs to the realm of the mental, on the one hand, and 
what is perceived, i.e., the realm of perceivable objects, on the other hand, has 
to give an account of how the former can be about or directed towards the lat-
ter. And very often it is in this part of the theory that problems arise. Yet this 
distinction seems to be a crucial and commonsensical one, the obvious start-
ing point of any theory of perception. 
In the remainder of this chapter I will show that a position that puts 
too much emphasis on this distinction is confronted with serious philo-
sophical problems. Descartes' characterization of the realm of the mental 
and the realm of the physical as two different kinds of substance is a good 
example. By insisting on the ontological difference between res cogitans and 
res extensa, i.e., between the mental and the physical, he is creating a gap 
that is so big that it becomes very difficult to give a satisfactory account of 
how these two kinds of substance can interact. From all we can tell now, 
however, it seems that for Descartes this is not a particularly important 
problem. He insists that this interaction does take place4 and even locates 
it: mind and body interact, according to Descartes, in a special part of the 
brain, the pineal gland. Descartes' primary interest is to distinguish mind 
and body as two kinds of substance. He is therefore less interested in dis-
cussing the particulars of the interaction between the two because this 
"might have been harmful" (Descartes 1991, 218) for his main goal. 
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Many interpreters criticize Descartes for his account of the interac-
tion between mind and body. One of the most common arguments is that 
such an interaction cannot take place because it contradicts the laws of 
physics, most notably the principle of the conservation of energy. The idea 
that physical processes in the brain can act on the mind-and vice versa-is 
incompatible with the idea that the realm of the physical forms a closed sys-
tem where the total amount of energy always stays the same. 
A common strategy for dealing with the problem of interaction is to 
state that it simply does not take place. We find this strategy-as a direct re-
sponse to Descartes-in occasionalism, where all causal interaction is ex-
plained away by the intervention of an almighty being. We find it also, and 
more importantly, in various idealistic and materialistic positions that feel no 
need to explain how the mental and the physical can interact because they 
concentrate exclusively on one side of the gap, describing the whole picture 
solely in terms of the mental or the physical, respectively. The main problem 
that these views have in common, I believe, is that they are a reaction to, or 
better: an overreaction to Descartes' distinction between mind and matter. In 
what follows I will argue that the main motivation for adopting a monistic 
position is the assumption that we have to choose between offering a unified 
account in terms of the mental or the physical, respectively, on the one hand, 
or fall back on Cartesian dualism, on the other; since in contemporary phi-
losophy materialism is much more widespread than idealism, I will concen-
trate mainly on the former. 
The very fact that Descartes' distinction was so successful shows that 
it bears some important insights, arguing, as it does, that there is a funda-
mental difference between the mental and the physical. The problems of 
Descartes' position have their root in the fact that he addresses the ques-
tion from an ontological perspective. In Mind and World John McDowell 
gives a characterization of the difference between the mental and the phys-
ical that can do justice to Descartes' insights, but avoids the ontological 
difficulties connected with his distinction. McDowell addresses the prob-
lem in terms of Wilfrid Sellars' notion of the logical space of reasons and 
that of the logical space of nature, that McDowell coins by analogy with 
the former. 5 The concept of knowledge, Sellars argues, belongs to the log-
ical space of reasons. This "space" is different in kind from other logical 
spaces in that it is constituted by rational relations that are-other than 
causal relations-intrinsically normative. Any attempt to reduce the logi-
cal space of reasons to that of nature "is ... a mistake of a piece with the 
so-called 'naturalistic fallacy' in ethics" (Sellars 1997, 19, §5). McDowell 
characterizes this position in the following way: 
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Sellars's thesis is that the conceptual apparatus we employ when we place 
things in the logical space of reasons is irreducible to any conceptual ap-
paratus that does not serve to place things in the logical space of reasons. 
(McDowell 1998a, 433) 
In the logical space of reasons we place knowledge and other episodes or states 
that have propositional content; they stand in rational relations to other po-
sitions in the same logical space-and only those. In his attack on the Myth 
of the Given Sellars argues that these episodes or states, including those of em-
pirical knowledge, cannot stand in rational relations with non-conceptual 
episodes like sensations, impressions, or sense data. Hence, perceptual judg-
ments cannot be justified by non-conceptual entities. He criticizes various 
forms of empiricism for having presupposed such a relation. Sellars does not 
deny that we have such non-conceptual episodes, insisting, rather, that they 
do not stand in justificatory relations to empirical knowledge; they can only 
cause certain conceptual episodes. 6 
This short characterization shows that Descartes' insights can be ac-
counted for without buying into his ontological distinction.7 In the first 
chapter of Mind and World McDowell points out that Sellars' characterization 
of the difference between the mental and the physical can lead to a different 
kind of problem. If one reduces the relation between non-conceptual sensa-
tions and conceptual episodes to causal ones-a position McDowell attrib-
utes also to Donald Davidson, who he makes the main target of his 
critique8-one can avoid the Myth of the Given, but runs the risk to lose con-
tact to the world: Sellars and Davidson, McDowell argues, cannot explain one 
of the crucial points of the relation between the mental and the physical, 
namely that "experience is a rational constraint on thinking" (McDowell 
1996a, 18). McDowell holds that theories of perception must satisfy a "ra-
tional constraint constraint," as Brandom dubs it.9 He insists on the idea that 
empirical knowledge has to be justified by the objects we perceive through our 
senses. If we define the relation between non-conceptual sensory input and 
conceptual thought as a merely causal one, we pay a high price: we cannot ex-
plain how empirical knowledge is justified. In other words, if we buy into 
Davidson's idea that "nothing can count as a reason for holding a belief except 
another belief" (Davidson 1986, 310) we lose contact with the world. 
Davidson could reply to this critique that on the basis of his theory of inter-
pretation we can conclude that most of our beliefs are veridical. Even if we 
were brains in a mad scientist's vat, Davidson argues, our beliefs would be cor-
rect, nonetheless. He states that if "anything is systematically causing certain 
experiences (or verbal responses), that is what the thoughts and utterances are 
about. This rules out systematic error" (Davidson 1991, 199). He adds that 
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who accepts his position, perceptual externalism, "knows he cannot be sys-
tematically deceived about whether there are such things as cows, people, 
water, stars, and chewing gum" (Davidson 1991, 199). 
This reply, McDowell argues, does not properly address the problem: 
The response does not calm the fear that our picture leaves our thinking 
possibly out of touch with the world outside us. It just gives us a dizzy-
ing sense that our grip on what it is that we believe is not as firm as we 
thought. I think the right conclusion is this: whatever credence we give 
to Davidson's argument that a body of belief is sure to be mostly true, the 
argument starts too late to certify Davidson's position as a genuine escape 
from the oscillation. (McDowell 1996a, 17) 
The problem with Davidson's reply is, according to McDowell, that he tries 
to show that one's beliefs are largely true. Doing so, however, he seems to be 
taking it for granted that mental episodes have content. But, McDowell ar-
gues, "if we do not let intuitions stand in rational relations to them, it is ex-
actly their possession of content that is put in question'' (McDowell 1996a, 
68); hence, Davidson's argument starts too late. 
McDowell concludes that we are left with an oscillation between two 
positions that are equally problematic: either we adopt a position that is prone 
to fall into the Myth of the Given, or we give an account that is based on a 
causal relation between non-conceptual sensations and conceptual thoughts. 
But in the latter case, he argues, we cannot explain why mental episodes have 
content. Thus, we are threatened with losing contact with the real world. 
According to McDowell, the putative gap between mind and world is a puta-
tive gap between conceptual thought (including empirical knowledge) on the 
one side and the non-conceptual world on the other. The challenge for a the-
ory of perception is to explain at what stage in the process of perception con-
cepts are drawn in and in what relation they stand to the non-conceptual 
without falling into the Myth of the Given or Davidson's coherentism. 
In the remainder of his book McDowell tries to show how we can es-
cape this oscillation between the realm of the conceptual and the realm of the 
non-conceptual. Using some Kantian shoptalk he states that "we need a con-
ception of experiences as states or occurrences that are passive but reflect con-
ceptual capacities, capacities that belong to spontaneity, in operation'' 
(McDowell 1996a, 23). Rejecting the idea of an interface between the non-
conceptual world and conceptual thought he adopts a conception of percep-
tual experiences that reflect conceptual capacities by extending the realm of 
the conceptual into nature. Since this move recalls Hegel's philosophy10, 
McDowell expends considerable effort defending his position against the 
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charge of idealism. He tries to give his position a naturalistic spin by taking 
up Aristotle's notion of second nature. For my purposes it is not necessary to 
discuss whether he succeeds in his defense against the charge of idealism. The 
important aspect of Sellars' and McDowell's position is that it provides a char-
acterization of the differences between the realm of the mental and that of the 
physical based on the normative aspect of the former, which allows them to 
recognize the value of Descartes' insights, but avoid the ontological implica-
tions of his distinction. 
On the basis of the Sellarsian/McDowellian distinction between the log-
ical space of reasons and that of nature we can characterize idealistic and ma-
terialistic positions in the following way: a position is materialistic if and only 
if it holds either that the logical space of reasons can be reduced to the logical 
space of nature or that it can be eliminated. It is idealistic if and only if it holds 
either that the logical space of nature can be reduced to the logical space of 
reasons or that it can be eliminated. A logical space can be reduced to another 
logical space if the laws, regularities, relations, or principles that constitute 
that logical space can be explained in terms of those that constitute the other 
logical space. 
Let us take a closer look at the two strategies used to argue for a 
monist position. I will first discuss reductionism, and then turn to elimi-
nativism. In order to argue for reductionism one has to account for all es-
sential particularities of the respective other logical space in terms of the 
one that one favors. What are the particularities of the two logical spaces? 
According to McDowell, the logical space of nature is constituted by nat-
ural laws. These laws describe physical objects and the relations between 
them, i.e., causal relations. The logical space of reasons, on the other hand, 
is constituted by rational relations that hold between conceptual episodes. 
These rational relations are not based on natural laws, but on the laws of 
logic, which essentially contain a normative element. The question 
whether a conclusion actually follows from a certain set of premises is not 
a question that can be decided by observation or on the basis of laws that 
describe causal relations. It can be decided only relative to the axioms and 
derivation rules of a logical system by determining whether they have been 
applied correctly. 
The reductionist strategy of advocating materialism is to show that we 
can reduce rational relations to the laws of nature, a strategy that Sellars, as we 
have seen above, equates with the naturalistic fallacy in ethics. One way to 
perform this reduction is to reduce the laws oflogic to the laws of psychology. 
This position, which was discussed under the title 'psychologism,' was de-
feated successfully by Frege and Husser! a century ago. 11 
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So far, a reduction of the regulations that govern the logical space of rea-
sons to the laws of science has not yet been achieved. Reductionism, however, 
is based on optimism about the future development of science: if not today, 
it is argued, some day in the future we will be able to reduce the mental to the 
physical. This strategy makes it difficult, if not impossible, to show that re-
ductionism is wrong: one would have to show that reducing the space of rea-
sons to that of nature is impossible in principle, for all conceivable scientific 
theories that might be developed some time in the future. 
It might be helpful, however, to consider where the strong urge to per-
form such a reduction comes from. In the last few centuries, especially in the 
twentieth century, science has made enormous progress. In addition, special 
sciences like chemistry could be reduced to more fundamental disciplines like 
physics. These achievements have supported the idea that we can develop one 
general explanatory scheme that can account for everything that can be de-
scribed as physical. The hope is that eventually we will be able to deduce all sci-
entific laws from a handful of very general formulas and maybe some 
additional premises. This idea of a unified theory of everything physical nour-
ished the fear that if we acknowledge the need of a special science that is not 
reducible to physics we would be forced to accept that there is something that 
cannot be described as physical and that is therefore ontologically different. In 
other words, we are forced to subscribe to dualism. Thus, the main motivation 
for reduction of the mental to the physical is the contention that we can choose 
only between reductionism (or eliminativism) and Cartesian dualism. 
This dichotomy, however, seems to be popular only in the context of re-
ductionism of the mental to the physical, but loses much of its appeal if one 
considers the example of the laws oflogic, evolutionary theory, or economics: 
even if one acknowledges that the laws, rules, or regularities of these disci-
plines cannot be reduced to the laws of microphysics-as most scientists do, 
if not explicitly, so at least in their everyday scientific practice-one does not 
need to conclude that admitting the relative autonomy of these disciplines 
from microphysics entails ontological dualism or even pluralism. 
A reductionist position does not need to be materialistic; we could 
also imagine a reduction from the physical to the mental. The advocates of 
such a position would have to show how we can reduce the laws of physics 
to the rational relations that constitute the logical space of reasons. In a cen-
tury like ours that is shaped by a strong belief in the natural sciences, such 
a position seems quite exotic: it betrays the very idea of science, namely that 
there is a world independent of us, the regularities of which we try to de-
scribe with natural laws. The main difficulty faced by this position is to ex-
plain the necessity of causal regularities in the physical world in terms of 
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rational relations. In our mental life we can choose to infer a certain belief 
from a set of other beliefs; we are free to make the move from one position 
in the space of reasons to another one. In nature, on the other hand, the 
same events in the same circumstances always have to cause the same effects, 
and necessarily so. Consequently, the idealistic reductionism would run 
into the same kind of problems as its materialistic version; it would be dif-
ficult to show that the rules that constitute the logical space of reasons can 
account for all particularities of the logical space of nature. 
The other possible strategy used to argue for monism is to eliminate the 
logical space of reasons or of nature, respectively. Materialistic eliminativists, 
in general, share the fear of reductionists that any theory that cannot be re-
duced to physics requires us to adopt some form of dualism. They acknowl-
edge, however, the difficulties of reducing the mental to the physical and 
prefer to eliminate talk about the mental altogether. However, if we take the 
doctrine that there is an essential difference between the two logical spaces se-
riously, it is difficult to see how one of them can be eliminated in an account 
that strives to be comprehensive. The eliminativist would have to show why 
one way of explaining certain phenomena is preferable to any other way. If we 
grant that the descriptions of the rational relations that hold between various 
mental episodes are not simply shortcuts for more complex scientific descrip-
tions, but describe genuine phenomena, we have to acknowledge that the 
eliminativist cannot account for them. Eliminativism, thus, provides a one-
sided view that deliberately avoids seeing the whole picture, a strategy that is 
not only unsatisfying, but also unscientific. 
These considerations show that there are good reasons to believe that 
both idealistic and materialistic positions are insufficient to give a compre-
hensive account of both the realm of the mental and that of the physical. The 
urge to develop a monistic position, is nourished by the assumption that if we 
cannot advance a unified account for mind and body we are forced back to 
the dark old days of dualism; it is, thus, a reaction to Descartes' characteriza-
tion of the ontological differences between mind and body. 
This does not mean that we should downplay the importance of Descartes' 
insight. In addition to the points raised above, there is another motivation to take 
an ontologically innocent version of the distinction between the mental and the 
physical seriously. This motivation is rooted in a feature of perception that Husserl 
talks about at the beginning of his course on passive synthesis: 
External perception is a constant pretension to accomplish something 
that, by its own nature, it is not in a position to accomplish. Thus, it har-
bors an essential contraction, as it were. (Husserl 2001, 39 [Hua XI, 3]) 
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The essential contradiction that Husserl is talking about arises from the fol-
lowing paradox: whenever we perceive an object, we perceive it under a cer-
tain perspective. When I see a table, for example, I have only a part of the 
table, some part of the surface, in my visual field. Nevertheless, I see the table, 
the object as a whole, and not just its surface. Thus, the contradiction of per-
ception is that it pretends to present objects as they are, but in the process of 
perception we seem to have to add something to the sensory input in order to 
perceive objects rather than parts of objects. This line of thought has led some 
philosophers, among them Husserl, to conclude that we are directed towards 
the intentional object under a certain mode of presentation. From here it is only 
a short step to distinguishing the object of experience, i.e., the object as it is 
given to us, from the actual object, the object as it really is. 
The problem with this view is that it makes things even more compli-
cated. Instead of a twofold relation between perception and the object per-
ceived we are now confronted with a threefold one: the object as it appears, the 
object as it really is, and the act of perception. The main difficulties of a posi-
tion that holds this view are the ontological status of the object as it appears 
and its relations to the actual object. Are we directed towards the object as it 
appears or the object itself? To argue that we are directed towards the actual ob-
ject in virtue of the object as it appears does not provide a remedy for our wor-
ries so long as we do not have a clear account of the relation between them. 
What would such an account look like? The object as it appears cannot 
be a mental entity-that would have no explanatory value; we still would 
have to explain the relation between the mental and the physical object. It also 
cannot be identical with the physical object: our relation towards the object 
as it appears would be a relation towards the physical object. Accordingly, we 
would be directed towards the physical object in virtue of our being directed 
towards another physical object, which is an unnecessary complication with-
out any explanatory value. 
If not mental or physical, the mediating object could still be an abstract 
entity, philosophers with Platonistic inclinations would argue, a representation 
of the actual object with respect to the properties that we are directed at in our 
perception, and only those. Since we can perceive physical objects under an in-
finite number of aspects, one would have to postulate that each perceivable ob-
ject has an infinite number of corresponding abstract objects, each of which 
represents one or a small number of aspects of the object. Many philosophers 
do not have problems of accepting a theory along these lines-after all, abstract 
objects do not cost anything, so even postulating an infinite number of them 
seems to be affordable. The main difficulties arise when one aims to explain 
how the relation of reference between the abstract and the physical object can 
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be established, and how we can grasp abstract objects in the first place. Faced 
with these difficulties, the temptation to apply an old, but still most useful tool 
of philosophy, Ockham's razor, becomes irresistible. 
Furthermore, positions that argue that we are directed towards the ac-
tual object in virtue of a mediator (like, in our case, the object as it appears) 
give rise to sceptical doubts. Since we can know objects only as they appear 
and not as they really are, it can be argued, we might be wrong or even sys-
tematically misled in our beliefs about the world. This leads us to another 
problem that can stem from a too strong distinction between object of per-
ception and perceptual experience. We know from particular cases of misper-
ception that our knowledge of external objects does not rest on a secure and 
infallible base. On the other hand it is often argued that the knowledge about 
our own mental life is infallible and cannot possibly be wrong because in this 
case both the act and the object of perception are on the same side of the gap, 
namely the realm of the mental. Descartes can conclude on this basis that the 
cogito ergo sum is the only secure and indubitable knowledge he has, the foun-
dation for all other knowledge. 
Once this priority of the mental is established, we are confronted with an 
asymmetry between knowledge of one's own mental life and that of other in-
dividuals. Descartes talks only about his own mental life when he says that he 
cannot be wrong concerning the fact that he is thinking. We can generalize this 
thought by saying that every thinking person is infallible about his or her own 
thinking. This stands in a sharp contrast to knowledge about the mental lives 
of other individuals which are not directly accessible to us. It also stands in con-
trast to knowledge about physical objects which are equally accessible to all of 
us, given that we are in sufficiently similar observational circumstances. 
It is easy to see how this line of reasoning brings about the problems of 
intersubjectivity and of "other minds." Given that I can have secure and in-
fallible knowledge only about my own thoughts, what justification do I have 
to assume that the people around me have a mental life, too? I can perceive 
only certain movements of their bodies. Their mental lives might be com-
pletely different from mine or they might not even have mental lives, moving 
around like zombies or sophisticated robots. 
This line of reasoning leads eventually to a kind of mental atomism, 
where one takes the world to be inhabited by a number of ego-monads who 
exist independently from each other. In its most radical form it can lead to the 
solipsistic view that only my mind exists. Once a non-solipsistic version of 
this mental atomism is established one can go on to explain how these egos 
form social groups and cultures. The crucial assumption of this view is that 
the formation of a social group and, in consequence, a culture, depends on a 
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number of egos, the existence of which is independent of the existence of the 
group. In other words, individuals could exist even if there were no social 
group, while the existence of the latter presupposes the existence of the for-
mer. This individualistic view is widespread not only among philosophers, it 
is also deeply ingrained in our society's understanding of itself. I do think, 
however, that this position is problematic. 
In order to see the difficulties of this view, let us consider the relation 
between our mental life and language. Various philosophers have argued that 
language is a necessary condition for having mental episodes. Even though 
this position is not generally accepted, I think it is safe to say that at least a 
good part of our mental episodes depends on language; various of the most 
common kinds of mental episode have propositional structure, like beliefs, 
knowledge, etc. Moreover, the formation of a complex social structure or cul-
ture is unthinkable without the development of a language of some sort. 12 
Language, however, is not a faculty that can be achieved by an individual 
alone, it is essentially a social phenomenon. To learn a language means to 
grow up into a social group or-to put it in Wittgensteinian terms-into a 
form oflife. Thus, the acquisition oflanguage depends on one's being part of 
a social group. Since at least a good part of our mental life depends on the ac-
quisition of language, the individualistic assumption that society depends on 
a number of ego-monads becomes questionable. It seems rather that the men-
tal life of an individual depends on her being part of a social structure or cul-
ture, and not vice versa. While more needs to be said on the relation between 
consciousness and our being organized in social groups (I will come back to 
that topic in chapter 4), these difficulties show that an exaggerated individu-
alism can be a consequence from the Cartesian distinction between the men-
tal and the physical in conjunction with the idea of the priority of the mental. 
This short discussion shows that many philosophical worries arise from 
Descartes' strong distinction between the mental and the physical. Although 
it was motivated by important insights, his insistence in the ontological dif-
ference between mind and world created an unbridgeable gap between the 
two realms. Many philosophers accepted Descartes' distinction, but even 
many of those who did not were influenced by it: their denial of the idea that 
there is a difference between the realm of the mental and the realm of the 
physical can be understood as a reaction to Descartes' distinction. 

Chapter Two 
The History of the Notion of 
Constitution: Two Case Studies 
I will now turn to address the problems raised in the preceding chapter by develop-
ing an account of constitution that allows us to acknowledge the essential differ-
ences between the mental and the physical without creating an unbridgeable gap 
between the two. In this chapter I will explain why I adopt the notion of constitu-
tion and where its philosophical roots are. Then I will outline and contrast the ac-
counts of constitution proposed by Husserl and Haugeland. 
WHY CONSTITUTION? WHY HUSSERL? WHY HAUGELAND? 
The words 'constitution' and 'constitutive' have a variety of meanings as they 
are used in contexts as different as law, medicine, or philosophy. In philoso-
phy they were first used by Seneca in the context of the mind-body prob-
lem. 1 The terms become part of the philosophical terminology with 
Boethius' Latin translation of Porphyry's commentary on Aristotle. Hogrebe 
points out that in ancient and medieval philosophy the word 'constitution' 
is used in both logical and ontological contexts.2 In logical contexts, consti-
tutive differences3 are used to characterize definitions of different kinds in 
the Porphyrian tree. In ontological contexts this expression is used to explain 
how objects are made out of or constituted from their constituents, namely 
form and matter. In medieval philosophy the ontological usage of 'constitu-
tion' becomes more general, as not only form and matter but all kinds of part 
are called 'constituents.' The difference between the logical and the ontolog-
ical usage of the word can be found also in the subsequent centuries up to 
the twentieth century. 
The notion of constitution plays a special role in the philosophy of 
Kant, the first philosopher to bring up the so-called 'problem of constitution,' 
i.e., the problem whether we can state a number of rules that set out the 
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frame in which cognitive experiences are empirically possible. Kant calls 
these rules 'constitutive principles.' He argues that they are synthetic a pri-
ori. They involve the use of the categories and are, thus, the conditions of 
the possibility of experience. 
Hogrebe points out that the big breakthrough of the notion of consti-
tution in philosophy comes with Husserl's phenomenology.4 Husser} develops 
this notion quite independently from his philosophical predecessors. 5 
lngarden states that 'constitution' is 
a specifically Husserlian concept which Husserl, in the way he uses it, 
does not owe to the philosophical tradition. (Ingarden 19986, 236 
[my translation])6 
One of the major goals of Husserl's phenomenology is to give an account of 
the essential structures of our conscious activities. Husserl thinks that inten-
tionality is one of the main characteristics of our mental acts, and he develops 
his account of constitution to explain this main feature of our mental life. 
Husserl, of course, was not the last philosopher to work with the notion 
of constitution. Carnap uses it in his book The Logical Structure of the World. 
He adopts the word 'constitution' in its logical meaning. According to 
Carnap, constituting an object or a concept means reducing it to some other, 
more basic objects or concepts. This reduction is performed by constitutional 
definitions. Carnap assumes that there are some basic objects or concepts that 
cannot be further reduced and, thus, are not constituted. 7 He outlines his 
program at the beginning of his book: 
By constitutional system we mean a step-by-step ordering of objects in 
such a way that the objects of each level are constituted from those of the 
lower levels. Because of the transitivity of reducibility, all objects of the 
constitutional system are thus indirectly constituted from objects of the 
first level. These basic objects form the basis of the system. (Carnap 1967, 
6 [italics in the originam8 
In the philosophy of the second half of this century the notion of constitution 
is also used. It was taken up, among others, by Searle, Chomsky, and 
Habermas, who use it in the context of philosophy of language. In addition, 
it has become a technical term in mereology.9 
Very recently, John Haugeland has developed an account of constitu-
tion that puts forth a new understanding of the relation between mind and 
world. Haugeland's theory, strongly influenced by Kant's, is interesting for 
two reasons. First, he tries to give an account of how we can be directed to-
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wards objects in our mental episodes; in other words, like Husserl he uses the 
notion of constitution to explain intentionality. Second, he applies his ac-
count to problems that are raised in contemporary philosophy of mind. 
In what follows I will outline and compare Husserl's and Haugeland's 
notions of constitution. I will first outline the development of Husserl's ac-
count in the context of the development of his overall philosophical position. 
Then I will discuss Haugeland's use of the notion of constitution. Finally I 
will point out that there are notable parallels-as well as disagreements-in 
the work of two philosophers who come from very different backgrounds 
which will show, as I hope, that the notion of constitution can be applied suc-
cessfully to address some of the most central problems of contemporary phi-
losophy of mind. 
HUSSER.CS NOTION OF CONSTITUTION: 
A SHORT OUTLINE OF ITS DEVELOPMENT 
Since the notion of constitution played a central role in Husserl's philosoph-
ical writings throughout his life, it changes with all the major changes in his 
overall philosophical system. Husserl never introduced the notion of consti-
tution in a systematic way; Fink correctly points out that it plays the role of 
an 'operative concept,' i.e., a basic, undefined concept that serves to formu-
late the definitions of other concepts of the theory. 1° For this reason I will out-
line Husserl's notion of constitution in a historical way. 11 
There is a debate among Husser! interpreters whether the notion of con-
stitution is already operative in Husserl's first major publication, the 
Philosophy of Arithmetic. In this book, Husser! explains the origin of basic 
arithmetical notions like 'number,' 'collection,' and 'set' by going back to the 
psychological activities of collecting and counting. One masters arithmetical 
notions by presenting a number of randomly chosen objects in fantasy. Then 
one concentrates, in a higher-order act, on the relation that holds among these 
objects. Since the objects are randomly chosen, these relations are psycholog-
ical rather than physical: the only thing they essentially have in common is 
that they are objects of the same presentation. Abstracting more and more 
from the actual objects, one finally arrives at the concept of 'number.' In 
Formal and Transcendental Logic, some 30 years later, Husser! says in retro-
spect about this strategy that it was already what he later called a phenome-
nological-constitutive investigation. 12 De Boer, however, points out that 
there is a very important difference between the constitution of numbers in 
higher-order acts, as Husser! describes it in Philosophy of Arithmetic, and the 
notion of constitution he develops later: 
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It is true that collective relations are produced by an act (i.e. an act of 
higher order). But this implies for Husserl in PA [i.e., in Philosophy of 
Arithmetic] that these relations do not exist on the side of the object . ... the 
act of higher order has no correlate of its own; there is no object of higher 
order. (de Boer 1978, 119) 
The basic difference between Husserl's account of higher-order acts in 
Philosophy of Arithmetic and the notion of constitution as developed later is 
that in the former there is no object correlating to the act; there are no objects 
like numbers that are perceived in higher-order acts. Rather, they are created 
in these acts as subjective entities. Constitution, as Husserl uses the notion 
later, on the other hand, "implies that the act has a correlate which it consti-
tutes" (de Boer 1978, 119). According to de Boer this marks an essential dif-
ference between these two positions. He concludes that the notion of 
constitution is not yet operative in Philosophy of Arithmetic. 
Bernet, Kern, and Marbach arrive at a slightly different conclusion. 
They argue that we are faced with an "initial, still deficient execution of a phe-
nomenological constitutive analysis" (Bernet e.al. 1993, 17). 13 For my pur-
poses it is not important to settle this question here. It is of interest, however, 
that Husserl holds in his early book that higher-order acts in which we are di-
rected towards mathematical entities do not have corresponding objects in the 
world. They rather create an immanent, mental object. In his later account of 
constitution, on the other hand, he rejects the idea that constituting an object 
means creating it. 
Philosophy of Arithmetic was criticized harshly by Frege for confounding 
logic and psychology. "In reading this work" he writes in his review "I was able 
to gauge the devastation caused by the influx of psychology into logic" (Frege 
1972, 337). Husserl took this critique very seriously. Not only does he turn 
away from a psychologically based understanding of logic, he also formulates 
a profound and detailed critique of psychologism in the first part of his next 
book, the Logical Investigations. 14 While it is debatable whether the notion of 
constitution is already operative in Philosophy of Arithmetic, there can be no 
doubt that it is operative in the Logical Investigations. It is developed in three 
contexts, the constitution of meaning, the constitution of perception, and the 
categorical constitution. 
Sokolowski stresses that Husserl's account of constitution in the Logical 
Investigations is influenced strongly by his distinction between intentional 
form and sensory matter or, as he calls it, the 'matter-form schema.' 15 In this 
period Husserl distinguishes between intentional and non-intentional mo-
ments of the mental acts. The latter are like unstructured, raw sense data, 
which by themselves could not be directed towards an object. Intentionality 
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comes into play only when these moments are apprehended by the intentional 
moments of the act. Husser! does not hold, however, that we do have raw sen-
sations as independent acts on which the full-fledged acts of perception are 
based. Sensory matter and intentional form are moments of one and the same 
act: they could not exist independently from each other. 
Husser! introduced the notion of constitution in the context of mean-
ing. When one reads or hears a word, one is primarily directed towards the 
physical appearance of this word (the ink on the paper or the sound waves, for 
example). One is also directed, however, towards the meaning of the word 
and, in consequence, towards the object to which it refers. By treating the 
marks of ink on the paper as symbols or representations that stand for some-
thing else, we are directed, so to speak, through these symbols towards other 
objects. In these acts the meaning of the word is constituted. 
Husser! then extended this analysis to perception, where we are faced with 
a similar situation. When we look at an object, we see only one side of it under 
a certain perspective, or, to put it in Husserlian terms, we have only an aspect 
[Abschattung] of the object. However, we do see the whole object and not only a 
part of it. The part of the object that we can see stands for the whole object in a 
similar sense as the material form of the word stands for its meaning. We per-
ceive, so to speak, the full object through the aspect. The object is constituted in 
a series of perceptions, each of which gives us only one of its aspects. 
The main application of the notion of constitution is in the context of 
the perception of what Husser! calls 'categorical objects.' Apart from simple 
objects like this table or this book that we perceive in simple perception, we 
can also perceive relations between objects like the fact that the book lies on the 
table, for example. Husser! calls these objects to which we predicate form 'cat-
egorical objects' or 'states of affairs.' We are directed towards these objects in 
acts of categorical perception. Their ontological status is different from that 
of simple objects, for they are based on simple objects, but they come into ex-
istence only when they are constituted, i.e., when the mind uses its predica-
tive power of giving form to the state of affairs. "Thus, this categorical 
formation or creation of the form of the state of affairs means that the state of 
affairs has its form ... not independently of the predicative act. It is rather 
constructed or constituted by it" (Siil5bauer 1995, 263 [my translation]16). 
Once they are constituted, however, they can be identified and recognized. 
Hence, they are created in the process of constitution. 
In the light of his later account and compared to the other contexts 
where Husser! used the notion of constitution in Logical Investigations, the 
constitution in categorical perception is very untypical, for it is the only 
context where the object is created in the process of constitution. With this 
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single exception we can state that it is a cornerstone of Husserl's theory that 
constitution requires an actual object corresponding to the act, the existence 
of which is independent of its being constituted. 
In the following years Husserl extends his notion of constitution to a 
broader realm of objects. Husserl, who did not publish again for a full decade, 
presented this new development in his courses, mainly in the ones on Time 
Consciousness in 190517 and on Thing and Space in 1907.18 He discussed not 
only the constitution of the objects of outer perception, but also the constitu-
tion that takes place in acts of inner perception, i.e., in acts that are directed 
towards other mental acts, as it is the case when I remember the very act of 
seeing the tree before my window (as opposed to remembering the tree). This 
is the first time that Husserl talked not only about the constitution of the ob-
jects of our conscious experiences, but also about the constitution of these ex-
periences themselves. 
One of the basic assumptions ofHusserl's phenomenology of time con-
sciousness is that our mental acts are temporally extended. They consist of 
partial intentions of which Husserl distinguished three kinds: retentions, pri-
mal impressions, and protentions. Retentions are the parts of the act that are 
directed towards the object as it appeared just a moment ago; primal impres-
sions are directed towards the object in its present state; and protentions form 
expectations about the object's future states. When we perceive temporal ob-
jects like melodies, we can perceive only one of their temporal parts at a mo-
ment. Husserl explained the fact that we can perceive temporal objects-and 
not only temporal parts of them-by showing how they are constituted in the 
act of perception. 
Based on this analysis, Husserl could explain various layers of constitu-
tion; he showed not only how temporal objects are constituted in our mental 
acts, but also how these mental acts themselves are constituted. In addition, if 
we shift our attention from the object of the partial intentions to these inten-
tions themselves we realize that they are all part of one and the same conscious-
ness; in other words, they form one stream of consciousness. Thus, the stream 
of consciousness, Husserl argued, is constituted by the totality of these partial 
intentions; and through this structure the stream of consciousness can also be 
said to constitute immanent time, for it is due to this structure that we can ex-
perience time. 19 Consequently, we can find various levels of constitution in 
Husserl's account of time consciousness: the object of the episode, partial inten-
tions, and the time-constituting stream of consciousness. 
(1) The things of experience in objective time ... (2) the constituting ap-
pearance manifolds of various levds, the immanent unities in pre-empirical 
The History of the Notion of Constitution 
time; (3) the absolute, time-constituting stream of consciousness. (Husserl 
1991, 77 [HuaX, 73]) 
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In the context of his phenomenology of inner time consciousness Husserl 
brings up a topic that will become crucial for his later account of constitution, 
namely his critique of the matter-form schema. I will discuss this topic below. 
This period is marked by some major developments ofHusserl's philo-
sophical position. In 190520 he starts to elaborate the phenomenological re-
duction. In our everyday mental life we adopt what Husserl calls the natural 
attitude: we pay full attention to the objects towards which we are directed in 
our mental acts. In this unreflective attitude we (generally) do not question 
their existence, we just take them for granted. By performing the phenome-
nological reduction one changes from the natural to the phenomenological 
attitude. The key idea of the phenomenological reduction is to bracket all 
these unreflecting beliefs in the external world. At the same time one has to 
shift one's attention from the objects of one's experiences to the experiences 
themselves. Let us take the example of some mental act like seeing a tree. In 
the natural attitude our conscious experiences focus on the tree: we might 
form the wish to have a picnic under it, imagine it being struck by a flash and 
burn down, or give a scientific description of it, etc. In the phenomenologi-
cal reduction the tree itself loses importance; the attention shifts to the men-
tal acts in which the tree is given. The task of the phenomenologist is to 
describe these acts, and by doing so to explain how external objects like this 
tree can become the object of our consciousness. The sceptical question of 
whether the tree really exists or not, which might pose a problem for the nat-
ural attitude, is no longer relevant. This does not mean, however, that the phe-
nomenologist denies the existence of the world nor that the world does not 
play a role in phenomenological analysis. On the contrary, it plays an impor-
tant role, but only insofar as it becomes object of our conscious experiences. 21 
The development of the phenomenological reduction, often described as 
Husserl's 'transcendental turn,' the outset of his 'transcendental phenomenol-
ogy,' marks, according to Stroker, "a borderline between two different, al-
though closely related, meanings of the Husserlian concept of constitution'' 
(Stroker 1993, 105). 
It was not until 1913, with the publication of Ideas I, that Husserl pre-
sented his phenomenological reduction in writing. With this book he aimed 
to introduce phenomenology to a broader audience. Since Husserl is intro-
ducing a very original and complex line of thought, he decided not to dis-
cuss some of the topics that became relevant for his account of constitution 
and that he had developed earlier. He did not consider his critique of the 
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matter-form schema that he began to develop in 1907 and does not talk 
about time consciousness, "so as to maintain free of confusion what first be-
comes transparent from the phenomenological standpoint alone" (Husser! 
1931, 236 [Hua III/I, 182]).22 
After the publication of Ideas l the notion of constitution is given an even 
more central position in Husserl's thought. This can be seen from the subtitle of 
the second, posthumously published volume of Ideas-. Studies in the 
Phenomenology of Comtitution. One of the crucial steps in this development is the 
distinction between static and genetic phenomenology that Husser! developed 
from 1917 on. Static phenomenology describes the kind of phenomenology that 
Husser! had previously developed. It takes for granted that we are dealing with 
certain realms of objects, like physical or mathematical objects, and certain kinds 
of mental act, like perceptions or memories, in which these objects are given. The 
task of static phenomenology is to describe the regularities and structures of the 
experiences in which we are directed towards these kinds of object. 
In genetic phenomenology, on the other hand, one asks how it comes 
about that we are dealing with these kinds of object. Rather than assuming 
that there are certain realms of objects, genetic phenomenology explains how 
we constitute them. The question is no longer how we can perceive physical 
objects. It is instead: how does it come about that we constitute the realm of 
physical (or mathematical or etc.) objects? "The object is no longer the guide-
post as it is in static phenomenology. It is rather something that has come to 
be" (Bernet e.al. 1993, 201). 
The aim of genetic phenomenology was to give an account of how we 
constitute the objects towards which we are directed by analyzing the compo-
nents out of which our experiences are built. Husser! did that by going back 
to his analyses of the temporal structure of consciousness, arguing that both 
the mental act and its object are constituted from the partial intentions that 
belong to one's stream of consciousness: retention, protention and primal im-
pressions. Each of these partial intentions is directed toward some object, like 
a tone of a melody. The object itself, the melody, is constituted by the series 
of partial intentions that are directed towards a series of tones. The act of hear-
ing the melody, on the other hand, is also constituted by these partial inten-
tions. It consists of all those partial intentions that are directed towards the 
same object, namely the melody. 
In order to explain why these constitutional processes take place the way 
they do we also have to take the history of the subject into account. Husserl 
argues that whenever someone constitutes an object, this constitution leaves 
a kind of trace. If one constitutes a certain object very often, one forms a habit 
that shapes future constitutions: 
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That a nature, a cultural world, a world of men with their social forms, 
and so forth, exist for me signifies that possibilities of corresponding ex-
periences exist for me, as experiences that I can at any time bring into 
play and continue in a certain synthetic style, whether or not I am at 
present actually experiencing objects belonging to the realm in question . 
. . . This involves a firmly developed habituality, acquired by a certain 
genesis in conformity with eideticlaws. {Husserl 1960, 76 [Hua I, 109f]) 
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Our past mental episodes form a retentional background which in turn ac-
counts for the possibility of having any mental episodes at all. 23 
Husserl's late account of constitution is shaped by his critique of the mat-
ter-form schema that he held in his early writings. We have seen above that in 
his course on time consciousness in 1905 he argued that partial intentions are 
composed of raw data that are apprehended by intentional forms. He held that 
the same matter that is at one moment apprehended in a primal impression as 
present will be apprehended at the next moment in a retention as past. 
Between 1907 and 1909 he started to criticize this schema. His main ar-
gument against the schema was that it presupposes that there is a constant 
sensory content that is apprehended by different forms. He pointed out that 
an impression of sound, for example, can only be apprehended as present. In 
the next moment there is no longer the impression of the sound that is just 
apprehended in a different way, but a consciousness of having had an impres-
sion. "In short, there is a radical alteration, an alteration that can never be de-
scribed in the way in which we describe the changes in sensations that lead 
again to sensations .... One must not materialize the contents of conscious-
ness" (Husserl 1991, 336 [HuaX, 324]). 
In later writings, Husserl generalized this point in his critique of sense-
datum theories. He never explicitly rejected the assumption that there are raw 
sense data that play a central role in the constitution of objects. He did claim, 
however, that all parts of consciousness are constituted. Husserl stated that 
"[c]onsciousness consists in nothing but consciousness, and even sensation 
and phantasma is consciousness" (Hua XXIII, 265 [my translation] 24), which 
means that there cannot be any raw data directly given to consciousness. In 
his study on the phenomenology of association, Holenstein shows that even 
though Husserl never explicitly drew that conclusion, there are clear passages 
that show that he overcame the matter-form schema also in the context of the 
constitution of objects. 25 
In the context of genetic phenomenology Husserl also developed his 
transcendental idealism. Since Husserl tried to explain the various realms of 
objects by constitutional processes that are performed by the subject, it seems 
that he implied that the existence of these objects presupposes the existence of 
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a subject that constitutes them. The question of whether Husserl was an ide-
alist or a realist is the subject of extensive debate which cannot be settled here. 
In more general terms I will discuss in chapter 5 whether constitution entails 
a form of idealism. 
In his later phenomenology Husserl holds that there are several levels of 
constitution. Barry Smith characterizes these levels in the following way: 
1.) normal intuitive spatio-temporal nature, the earth and natural things 
and stuff, both organic and inorganic, having real qualities and states and 
giving rise to sensations and also to practical motivations of various sorts; 
2.) people and animals, moving and behaving in determinate ways, at 
rest, thinking, working, speaking, writing; 
3.) artifacts, goods, implements, cultural objects, which presuppose de-
liberate, intelligent activity on the part of man; 
4.) values and goals affecting our behaviour and at the same time giving 
sense and structure to our activities over time; 
5.) morals and customs, languages, various social units and socially con-
stituted entities with their particular norms and conventions. (Smith 
1995, 415) 
Each of these levels is based on the lower ones in the sense that we could not 
constitute the higher levels if we had not constituted the lower ones. This does 
not mean that there is a causal connection between these levels, in which the 
lower levels bring about the higher ones, as Holenstein points out. 26 For my 
purposes, the basic processes of constitution are of central importance. 
Husserl developed the distinction between active and passive genesis in 
the context of genetic phenomenology by arguing that in the former the ego 
is involved while in the latter it is not. 27 The first level of constitution is, ac-
cording to Husserl, passive. We constitute the spatio-temporal world with its 
basic elements (physical objects, etc.) only due to the temporal structure of 
consciousness and laws of association. These features do not involve the ego. 
The constitution of cultural objects, abstract entities, etc., on the other hand, 
cannot be reduced to these basic processes. It does involve an ego that actively 
constitutes it. Both active and passive constitution can create a habit and 
shape future constitution. "Not only passive formations of unity but also ac-
tively produced configurations of sense become habitual acquisitions of the 
subject" (Bernet e.al. 1993, 202). 
In Husserl's last texts, kinesthetic experiences play a more and more central 
role in passive constitution. Together with the temporal structure of conscious-
ness and association they are seen as one of the three levels of passivity. 
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In conclusion we can state that according to Husserl's theory of consti-
tution, we constitute the objects towards which we are directed in our men-
tal acts. This does not mean, however, that we are creating the object when we 
constitute it. Husserl rather argues that the constituted object exists inde-
pendently of the act in which it is constituted-with the exception of objects 
towards which we are directed in categorical perception. Through his analy-
sis of the temporal structure of our mental acts Husserl realizes that not only 
the objects, but also the mental acts in which we are directed towards them 
are constituted. In addition, he argues that every process of constitution leaves 
a trace as every mental episode becomes part of a retentional background 
without which we could not have mental episodes in the first place. 
The historical discussion of the development of Husserl's theory shows 
how closely his notion of constitution is intertwined with his overall phenom-
enological position. In order to better see how this notion can be used to ad-
dress questions relevant to contemporary philosophy of mind, I will now turn 
to analyze how the idea of constitution was developed by a contemporary 
philosopher, namely by John Haugeland. 
HAUGELAND'S 'CONSTITUTIVE STANDARDS' 
Haugeland introduces his notion of constitution with an argument 
against causal theories of perception that was first developed by Dretske. 
According to these theories we perceive objects as objects because our per-
ception is caused by them. I see a bicycle, for example, because there is an 
actual bicycle in front of me that causes my visual experience. Dretske crit-
icizes this argument.28 He notes that the object cannot cause the experience 
directly, but only over several steps of a causal chain. When I see a bicycle, 
the light that comes from the sun is reflected by the bicycle and has to travel 
through the air until it hits my eyes, where it causes certain neurophysiolog-
ical processes that finally cause the visual experience of the bicycle. The ob-
ject itself is only one of many causal antecedents of the perception. Now 
Dretske raises the question: what allows us to single out this specific part of 
the causal chain as the object of the experience? Causal theories cannot ex-
plain why one of the causal antecedents should play a more special role than 
the other ones. 
Dretske's contention is that in order to single out the object of the ex-
perience we have to put our emphasis not only on the causal chain that brings 
about the experience but also on the informational relationships between the 
experience and its object. The basic idea is that a state of affairs can carry in-
formation about its causal antecedents. However, informational relationships 
differ in two important respects from the causal ones. 
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First, a state of affairs can carry information about one of its distant 
causal antecedents without carrying information about proximal ones. This is 
the case when a state of affairs can cause another one in various different ways. 
Let us consider the example of a friend who sends me an email message every 
week. He writes them on a program that runs on his server and, when he is 
done, dicks the send-button; the message is sent to my server. It is not sent 
directly, though, it has to pass through several other computers and possibly 
a satellite before it arrives at its destination. There is a wide variety of paths 
from my friend's server to mine, and two messages do not have to take the 
same path to travel from one server another. In fact, they typically take differ-
ent paths. In other words, receiving a message from my friend can be caused 
by different kinds of causal chain (some of them involving a satellite, some 
not). The fact that there is an email from friend in my mailbox does therefore 
carry information about a distal cause (his composing the massage on his 
server) without carrying information about a more proximal one (the partic-
ular path the massage takes from his server to mine). 
Second, if a state of affairs carries information about one of its causal an-
tecedents, it can at the same time carry information about the causal an-
tecedents of this latter state of affairs. When I hear that the doorbell is ringing, 
for example, my sensory experience does not only carry the information that 
the doorbell is ringing, but also that somebody pressed the doorbutton. The expe-
rience, thus, carries information not only about its object, but also about 
causal antecedents of its object. The information that the doorbell is ringing, 
however, has a special status because we get the information that somebody 
pressed the doorbutton via this information and not vice versa. Thus, the ex-
perience gives a primary representation of the ringing of the bell, but not of the 
pressing of the doorbutton. 
With these two characteristics of informational relationships we can, ac-
cording to Dretske, explain why the object of experience plays a special role 
in the causal chain. He states that 
the object of the experience in question (what it is we see, hear, smell and 
taste) is that object (or set of objects) whose properties the experience 
represents in a primary way. (Dretske 1981, 162) 
This means that the object of the experience is the most proximal of the 
causal antecedents about which the experience carries information. When I 
see a red table, for example, the experience cannot carry information about 
any of the causal antecedents that are more proximal than the red table. 
Otherwise, the more proximal cause, e.g., some neurological process, would 
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be the object of the experience. In order to show why physical objects and 
not some neurophysiological processes are the objects of our experiences, 
Dretske has to show that one and the same physical object can cause one 
and the same experience in different ways. He argues this point by noting 
that I can see the same red table at one point in bright daylight and later in 
dim candlelight. In both cases I have the same experience, I see a red table, 
but the neurological stimulation differs dramatically. Similarly, when I walk 
around the table I see it from different perspectives. The image projected on 
the retina changes continuously, but I always perceive the table as rectangu-
lar. In these cases, the same kind of object causes the same kind of experi-
ence via different kinds of stimulation of the nervous system. 
In his article "Objective Perception'' Haugeland discusses Dretske's ar-
gument. He shares the concern about causal theories of perception, but criti-
cizes Dretske's solution of the problem. We have seen that Dretske has to show 
that an experience cannot carry information about any of its causal an-
tecedents that are more proximal than its object. To support this claim, 
Haugeland argues, it is not enough to show that the experience can be caused 
by different kinds of stimulus, for the question arises of how we determine 
whether two stimuli are of different kind; "and whether two instances differ 
in kind depends on which kinds are being considered" (Haugeland 1998a, 
245). Haugeland points out that Dretske's argument depends on the negative 
claim that there is no single kind of stimulus that mediated all and only the 
constant perceivings, otherwise that kind of stimulus would be the object of 
our perceptual experiences. In other words, Dretske does not only have to 
show that "there are respects in which the stimuli differ, ... he must argue 
that there is no respect in which these stimuli (and only these) are all alike" 
(Haugeland 1998a, 254). And, Haugeland continues, it seems to be impossi-
ble to formulate such an argument, because "it seems that there must be such 
kinds, if sensory perception is possible at all" (Haugeland 1998a, 246). If it is 
possible that we perceive the table from various perspectives, in different light 
conditions, etc., all these perceptions must have something in common that 
allows us to recognize them as perceptions of the same object, which means 
that there must be a projectible classification and thus a kind that all and only 
those causes would instantiate it.29 In consequence, according to Dretske's ac-
count the kind of stimulus, and not the red table, would be the object of our 
experiences. This shows that we cannot single out the object of experience in 
the causal chain on the basis of informational relations as defined by Dretske. 
Haugeland proposes an interesting idea to solve Dretske's problem. In 
order to perceive objects as objects, he argues, one has to be committed to con-
stitutive standards. The object of one's experience, then, is determined not 
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only by the causal antecedents of the experience, but also by the constitutive 
standards to which one is committed. He illustrates this point with his fa-
vorite example, the perception of chess pieces and moves. The material ap-
pearance of chess pieces can vary immensely. One can play chess with wooden 
figures on a board or-like Dr.B. in Stefan Zweig's novel The Royal Game-
with little pieces of bread, some of them colored with dust, on a chequered 
bed cover. Chess pieces can even take the form of patterns on a computer 
screen. Whether we perceive something as a chess piece or not does not de-
pend on its physical form, nor on its material properties, but on the function 
that is assigned to it according to the rules of chess. Similarly, a move of these 
pieces qualifies as a chess move if it accords with the rules of the game, or at 
least (in the case of a mistake) if the player who makes the move generally con-
forms to these rules and is ready to correct an error when one is pointed out. 
Chess rules, then, are constitutive standards for the perception of chess pieces. 
In other words, if one does not know the basic rules of chess, one cannot per-
ceive chess pieces, one cannot see a rook, for example. 
Chess perception is a convincing example because it shows nicely how 
commitment to constitutive standards, namely the rules of chess, enables us 
to perceive a certain sort of objects and events, i.e., chess pieces and moves. 
The problem with this example is, however, that it suggests that this holds 
only in cases where one perceives something, a piece of wood, a bread crumb, 
etc., as something else, namely as a chess piece. Haugeland stresses, however, 
that every experience that is about an object presupposes constitutive stan-
dards. When we look at the same object and you see a rook while I see a nicely 
shaped piece of wood, for example, the difference is not that you have consti-
tutive standards while I do not. In order to see an object, we both have to be 
committed to constitutive standards. The difference between your and my vi-
sual experience is that your constitutive standards include the rules of chess, 
while mine do not. "What the perception is of is that which the constitutive 
standards govern" (Haugeland 1998a, 253). 
The example of chess perception is special also in the sense that its 
constitutive standards, the rules of chess, can be fully spelled out. This is not 
true, however, for all of our constitutive standards, nor is it a necessary con-
dition for having them. Haugeland states that even in the case of chess per-
ception it is sufficient to have "some grasp or understanding of the game of 
chess" (Haugeland 1998a, 248). For understanding the game of chess one 
does not have to be able to fully spell out the rules of the game. In fact, 
many people who play chess are probably not able to do so. Nor is reading 
a rulebook sufficient for understanding the game. In many cases we have ex-
periences of objects relative to constitutive standards which cannot be 
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spelled out as easily as chess rules (if they can be spelled out at all), for ex-
ample when we see rocks, sticks, or clouds. Consequently, being committed 
to certain constitutive standards cannot be equated with holding a certain 
set of beliefs. 30 
On the basis of his account of constitutive standards Haugeland can 
solve Dretske's problem. When I perceive a chess piece, it is essential that my 
perception is actually caused by this chess piece. But how can I single out the 
chess piece in the chain of causal antecedents of my chess perception? We do 
that, according to Haugeland, on the basis of the constitutive standards that 
we are committed to. In case I have a doubt whether I have actually seen a 
rook or rather a bishop that I have misperceived as a rook, Haugeland argues, 
the constitutive standards determine where I have to double-check. Let us, for 
example, assume that due to a strange perspective and lighting, the retinal pat-
terns that are caused by the rook resemble those that are typically caused by a 
bishop under normal perceptual circumstances (good light, optimal perspec-
tive, etc.). Should we say in this case that I correctly perceive the retinal pat-
terns of a bishop or rather that I misperceive the rook? Haugeland answers 
that clearly the latter is the case because according to our constitutive stan-
dards of chess it is not the retinal pattern but the object on the board that mat-
ters. In other words, constitutive standards of chess are about chess pieces 
rather than retinal patterns. 
Haugeland's response to Dretske's problem shows clearly where the nor-
mative element of the mental comes in. Haugeland states that 
the norms governing the perceptions as such, and in virtue of which they 
can be objective, are inseparable from the standards governing, and indeed, 
constituting, the chess phenomena as such. (Haugeland 1998a, 254) 
In a later article "Truth and Rule Following" Haugeland addresses the ques-
tion of what it means to be committed to constitutive standards, giving a 
more detailed account of constitution that he develops in close analogy to the 
notion of rule following. He distinguishes four aspects of constitution: con-
stitutive regulations, constitutive standards, constitutive skills, and existential 
or constitutive commitment. These are mere aspects of the process of consti-
tution. Unlike Husserl's layers of constitution they do not allow for distinc-
tions in the realm of constituted objects. Let me elaborate each in turn. 
Constitutive regulations are pretty much like the rules of a game, regu-
lations that set out what the agents or players may or may not, must or must 
not do. If we take chess as an example, the constitutive regulations settle what 
moves are legal and when the players are entitled to make them, etc. 
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Constitutive standards, on the other hand, govern not only the actions of 
the players, but all phenomena that occur within a game. They not only deter-
mine what moves are legal, but also how the game has to be set up. These stan-
dards specify what can and what cannot happen in the game and so determine 
the various positions and figures of that game. In the case of chess the constitu-
tive standards define what a rook is or what castling is, and so on. 
The third aspect of constitution, constitutive skills, are "resilient 
abilit[ies] to tell whether the phenomena governed by some constitutive stan-
dards are, in fact, in accord with the constitutive standards" (Haugeland 
1998b, 323). While, as I have noted above, chess players need not be able to 
spell out the constitutive standards of a game in order to play it, they have to 
be in possession of the constitutive skills that are required by the game. A 
player has to be able to recognize illegal moves, correct them, and insist on 
their illegality if performed by the other player. Apart from constitutive skills 
we also have, according to Haugeland, mundane skills that are different from 
the former, though interdependent with them. Mundane skills "are the re-
silient abilities to recognize, manipulate, and otherwise cope within the game, 
including other players, as required and permitted by the rules-in effect, the 
ability to engage in the play" (Haugeland 1998b, 323). 
Finally, the most basic of the four aspects of constitution is constitutive 
commitment which Haugeland describes as "a dedicated or even devoted way 
ofliving: a determination to carry on'' (Haugeland 1998b, 341). It is a com-
mitment to hold constitutive standards, apply constitutive skills and behave 
according to constitutive regulations. Haugeland argues that constitutive 
commitment is a governing rule the authority of which "comes from nowhere 
other than itself, and it is brought to bear in no way other than by its own ex-
ercise" (Haugeland 1998b, 341). Constitutive commitment, thus, is an atti-
tude to apply rules, a basic rule that cannot be further reduced to other rules. 
On the basis of the distinction between these aspects Haugeland sets out 
his account of constitution. How can he explain that we are directed towards ob-
jects? The most basic element of constitution is constitutive commitment, i.e., 
the commitment to perform constitution in the first place. The objects of per-
ception are constituted according to the constitutive standards that we hold. 
Chess objects, for example, are constituted because the rules of chess are part of 
the constitutive standards held by the person who perceives them. Consequently, 
if the rules of chess had never been invented, chess objects would not exist. 
Constitutive standards can be applied only on the basis of constitutive skills. In 
other words, chess players have to be able to see whether a certain move is a legal 
chess move or not. Finally, the constitutive regulations determine what options 
a player has, what moves she can make and so on. 
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Haugeland argues, as we have seen above, that the objects of perception 
are constituted according to constitutive standards. What does that entail 
about the ontological status of these objects? Haugeland answers this question 
in a deliberately provocative way. "To constitute is to bring into being" 
(Haugeland 1998b, 325). He argues, however, that this does not mean that 
'constituting an object' means 'creating it,' nor does it mean 'interpreting 
something as an object.' Constitution, Haugeland states, rather means 'letting 
be.' He clarifies this slogan by defining objects as loci of potential incompat-
ibilities in a constituted domain.31 But what exactly are loci of potential in-
compatibilities? When we look at the chess game, for example, our mundane 
skills allow us to perceive chess pieces and moves. We can perceive castles and 
diagonal moves on the chessboard. The constitutive standards of chess, how-
ever, do not allow us to move castles diagonally. They can only be moved 
along the vertical and horizontal lines of the board. Consequently, moving the 
castle diagonally, though conceivable, is incompatible with the constitutive 
standards of the game. It is, as Haugeland puts it, in the excluded zone. 32 
Castles and diagonal moves, thus, are loci where the incompatibilities with 
the constitutive standards can arise. In consequence, they are objective phe-
nomena of the chess game. 
Another example of an incompatibility in a constituted domain is a 
physical object that does not behave as predicted by the laws of physics. In 
that case, the behavior of the physical object that is perceived on the basis of 
our mundane skills is incompatible with the constitutive standards that gov-
ern the perception of physical objects. This incompatibility might lead to a 
change in the constitutive standards, i.e., the laws of physics. The physical ob-
ject is constituted as an object because this incompatibility can arise. 
Constitutive standards and the wne they exclude give sense to a distinc-
tive sort of potential incompatibility among particular mundane exer-
cises. Constituted objective phenomena are the loci of these potential 
incompatibilities. Such loci are what constitution lets phenomena be-
namely, as we shall see, empirical objects. (Haugeland 19986, 33 7) 
We can discover these incompatibilities only due to our constitutive 
skills which are co-constituted with the object. Once an incompatibility has 
been detected, there are several ways to react. If the phenomenon we perceive 
on the basis of our constitutive standards is an illegal chess move, for exam-
ple, we have to correct the phenomenon by insisting on the constitutive stan-
dards. If, on the other hand, we perceive a physical phenomenon that is 
incompatible with the constitutive standards, we have two options: (z) we 
can either have a better look or adjust our instruments of measurement, i.e., 
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we can improve our constitutive skills; (ii) in some cases we will have to 
change or improve the constitutive standards, e.g., the laws of physics. 
Haugeland's account of constitution provides interesting ideas; I think, 
however, that there is a problem with his characterization of constitutive com-
mitment. As I have pointed out above, Haugeland's distinction between the 
four aspects of constitution is closely related to the notion of rule following. 
His preferred examples are games, mainly chess and baseball. But this strategy 
leads to the following problem. IfHaugeland's characterization of constitutive 
commitment is right, constitution is something that we can, but do not have 
to perform. He states that it takes "self-discipline and resolute persistence" 
(Haugeland 1998b, 341) to perform constitution. Does that mean that I can 
decide whether I want to have constitutive commitment or not? Can I decide 
to give up constitutive commitment for a two week holiday after a stressful pe-
riod and then take it up again, like a chess game? I think that Haugeland does 
not point out clearly enough that once we are trained to have a certain consti-
tutive commitment, we can no longer step outside it. We might change our 
constitutive standards, improve our constitutive skills, or etc., but it is impos-
sible to give up constitutive commitment, nor does it take any effort or self-
discipline to perform it. I will come back to that problem below. 
SOME CENTRAL FEATURES OF CONSTITUTION: 
CONTRASTING HUSSERL AND HAUGELAND 
Having outlined Husserl's and Haugeland's account of constitution I will 
now address the question of what we can learn from them by contrasting 
their positions. The basic differences between Husserl's and Haugeland's 
notion of constitution stem from their overall philosophical position. 
Husserl's notion of constitution has to be understood within the context of 
phenomenology, a position that works with a strict method, the phenom-
enological reduction, and a clear goal, the description of the essential ele-
ments of conscious phenomena from a first person point of view. Husserl 
uses the notion of constitution as an operational concept, i.e., a basic con-
cept that is not defined and that serves to define the other concepts of the 
theory. Haugeland, on the other hand, does not share this methodological 
framework. Even though his account is influenced by Heidegger, it is not 
phenomenological in a narrow sense. Haugeland does not apply the phe-
nomenological reduction, nor does he describe the essential elements of 
mental acts from a first person point of view. His position reflects the dis-
cussion of contemporary philosophy of mind, which results in his adop-
tion of holism and the analogy between constitution and rule following. 
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Unlike Husserl, Haugeland attempts to give a clear characterization of the 
process of constitution by defining the four aspects of constitution. 
The central part of both accounts is the constitution of the objects of 
our mental states and episodes. Both philosophers state clearly that 'constitut-
ing an object' does not mean 'creating it.' In other words, objects do not pop 
into existence in the process of constitution. 34 It is important not to confuse 
constitution and creation because that would lead to a very crude form of ide-
alism that neither philosopher would accept. Nonetheless, the charge of ide-
alism has been or can be brought up with respect to Husserl's position. The 
fact that Husserl characterizes his own position as tramcendental idealism 
seems to be a clear sign that it has idealistic tendencies. Yet, in a letter from 
1934 he writes: 
No ordinary 'realist' has ever been as realistic and as concrete as I, the 
phenomenological 'idealist' (a word which by the way I no longer use) 
(Husserl 1994, 16 [my translation])35 
The question of whether Husserl really was a realist or an idealist is still the 
subject of extensive debate among Husserl exegetes. One can find advocates 
for every conceivable position: it is argued that Husserl is an idealist36, that 
he is a realist37, that he is neutral with respect to this question38, and even 
that this question cannot be asked meaningfully in the context of 
Husserlian phenomenology. 39 I cannot settle this exegetical question here. 
It is interesting to see, however, that the charge of idealism has been dis-
cussed with respect to Husserl and Kant, two philosophers who make exten-
sive use of the notion of constitution, which might suggest that there are 
some systematic relations between constitution and (transcendental) ideal-
ism. Haugeland's realist account of constitution, however, shows clearly that 
an account of constitution does not necessarily involve a form of idealism. 
I will come back to this question in chapter 5. 
Husserl and Haugeland also agree that constitution does not mean in-
terpreting something as something else. Both Husserl and Haugeland would 
argue that there cannot be a realm of basic objects that are not constituted and 
which are interpreted as something else in the process of constitution. 
According to Haugeland, the thesis that constitution is interpretation of 
something that is not constituted as something else "is philosophically self-de-
feating" (Haugeland 1998b, 326). He explains: 
If all constitution were mere counting-as, it would always presuppose, 
hence never contribute to, an account of objectivity-which would for-
feit the point. (Haugeland 1998b, 327) 
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In addition, one would have to explain how we can possibly perceive these 
basic objects-be it atoms, sticks, or etc.-that are then going to be inter-
preted as something else, e.g., as rooks or tables. 
The two philosophers would also reject the thesis that constituting an 
object means reducing it to some other, more basic object. This project, pro-
posed by Carnap in The Logical Structure of the World, assumes that all objects 
can be reduced by constitutional definition to some basic objects that cannot 
be further reduced. Neither Husserl nor Haugeland discuss Carnap's notion 
of constitution. The idea of reducing objects to other objects of a more basic 
level by constitutional definition is not compatible with either of their ac-
counts for it presupposes that there are basic objects that form the basis of the 
system and, thus, are not constituted (in the sense that they cannot be reduced 
to other objects by constitutional definition). In addition, the idea of consti-
tutional definition is foreign to both accounts. 
We have seen that for both philosophers constitution is not creation, 
nor counting-as or reducing-to. So what is constitution for them and what are 
objects constituted from? As I have discussed, Haugeland answers this ques-
tion with the slogan 'constitution is letting be.' He defines objective phenom-
ena in a formal way, namely as 'loci of potential incompatibilities in a 
constituted domain.' Haugeland does not explain what objects are consti-
tuted from. According to his account, we can conceive objects only relative to 
constitutive standards. This account does not allow for explaining what a 
table is in terms of the parts that it is composed of, its atomic structure, for 
example. Seeing something as a table or as a bunch of atoms means only ap-
plying different constitutive standards. According to Haugeland we cannot 
conceive that there is some raw, unstructured matter, i.e., matter that is not 
constituted, that every object is composed 0£ 
Husserl's account of constitution, as we have seen, explains how we 
can group a series of moments of the stream of consciousness together and 
thus have one act of perception of one and the same object. According to 
Husserl, there are various strata of constitution, some of which can be ex-
plained in terms of more basic ones, as we have seen in the example of his 
analyses of time consciousness and the constitution of temporal phenom-
ena. Like Haugeland he argues, however, that one cannot arrive at the most 
basic stratum that is composed of phenomena that are not constituted. No 
matter how far down we can go in our analyses, we will always find phe-
nomena that are themselves constituted. The question of how the consti-
tuted object is related to the 'real object' in the physical world is not 
relevant for Husserl; he works within the phenomenological reduction and 
thus brackets the realm of the outer world. 
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According to Husserl's account, not only the objects that we are directed 
at in our mental acts, but also these mental acts themselves, are constituted. 
When I see a table, for example, not only the table, but also the mental act of 
seeing it is constituted. Conscious phenomena, as we have seen above, are 
constituted by their partial intentions (retentions, protentions, and primal 
impressions). This move is quite interesting undermining as it does the 
Cartesian idea that thoughts or mental activities are the basic elements of our 
mental life that cannot be further analyzed. 
Haugeland does not talk about the constitution of mental phenomena, 
but his account can cover this aspect. All he needs to argue is that there are 
constitutive standards for the realm of the mental. These might be the rules 
of folk psychology like 'you can see an object only if this object is actually in 
front of you' or 'if you believe that Paris is the capital of France you cannot at 
the same time believe that Vienna is the capital of France.' According to these 
rules, there are potential incompatibilities like 'I see a table' and 'There is no 
table in front of me'; or 'I believe that Paris is the capital of France' and 'I be-
lieve that Vienna is the capital of France,' uttered by the same person, one sen-
tence right after the other. The loci of these potential incompatibilities are the 
mental phenomena 'seeing some object' or 'believing that something is the 
case.' Thus, they are objective phenomena with respect to the constitutive 
standards of mental phenomena. In consequence, every change in the consti-
tutive standards that govern the realm of the mental brings about a change in 
our mental lives. 
Another element that we find only in Husserl's account is that every 
constitution that is performed leaves traces. If we constitute a certain object 
or kind of object very often, we form a disposition to perform this constitu-
tion in the future. With this idea Husserl can account for what we might call 
the conservative character of constitution, i.e., for the fact that we tend to go 
on constituting the same (kinds of) objects unless there are strong reasons for 
a change. The more common a certain way of seeing things is, the stronger 
the reasons for a change have to be. It is, thus, much more unlikely that one 
would give up the constitution of everyday objects like chairs than that of ob-
jects posited by scientific theories like neutrinos. 
Haugeland shows no interest in questions of the nature of these habits 
or 'traces.' Since his position is based primarily on skillful behavior, and not, 
like Husserl's, on conscious acts, he could easily account for this conservative 
aspect of constitution. In addition, Haugeland states the conditions for when 
and how we have to make changes in our constitutive standards or in the con-
stitutive domain. These changes involve considerable reasoning and probably 
higher-order constitutive standards; Haugeland's theory in this point seems to 
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be more oriented towards our scientific understanding of the world than our 
everyday experiences. Changes in constitutive standards can also take place in 
mental lives that are not complex enough to reason scientifically at a high level 
of abstraction and in very simple and basic mental phenomena.40 In these 
cases we do not need to reason to effect changes; they do not require any in-
tellectual activity. Haugeland's approach, thus, seems to require a strategy that 
is far too complex. 
In conclusion, we can state that both philosophers talk about the con-
stitution of the objects of our mental states. Husserl brings in an additional 
element by arguing that our mental states are also constituted. Haugeland 
does not talk about the constitution of mental phenomena, but with his the-
ory he can account for that aspect of constitution. I have pointed out that the 
charge of idealism has been brought up with respect to Husserl's position (as 
well as Kant's), which shows that there might be an affinity between the two 
notions; but Haugeland's realist account of constitution shows clearly that 
constitution does not amount to an endorsement of a form of idealism. 
Finally, Husserl argues that every constitution that is performed leaves a trace 
which explains the conservative character of constitution. 
The contrast of the accounts of Husserl and Haugeland shows, I believe, 
how an account of constitution can address problems that are at the center of 
contemporary discussions in philosophy of mind. It can explain how our per-
ceptual experiences can have empirical content that is determined not only by 
their causal relation to the environment but also by the holistic background of 
the person who has these experiences. With this second aspect it can also shed 
some light on the thesis of the social aspect of consciousness: the constitutive 
standards necessary for our perception of objects are intersubjective standards 
in the sense that they can be communicated through language and are based 
on our social practices. In addition, if we take Husserl's idea of the constitution 
of our own mental episodes seriously, we see that even the very fact that we 
have mental episodes such as perceptual experiences depends on our interac-
tions with our social and physical environment. In the remaining chapters of 
this book I will outline an account of constitution along these lines. 
Chapter Three 
Towards a Theory of Constitution 
In the preceding chapters I have argued that the distinction between the mental and 
the physical, if it is given too much weight, can lead to serious philosophical prob-
lems. I have claimed that a theory of constitution can give us an alternative view of 
the relation between mind and world that avoids these difficulties. 
I will now turn to sketch an account of constitution that can provide an 
understanding of the relation between mind and world that acknowledges, but 
does not overemphasize, the differences between these two realms. I will argue 
that in the case of perception mental episodes stand not only in a causal, but 
also in a direct, intentional relation to the perceived object. The notion of in-
tentionality is taken to be a basic notion that cannot be further analyzed. In 
consequence, the account of constitution that I will develop does not explain 
why we are directed towards objects, but, if successful, will describe how this 
relation is established. It will do so by taking into account Husserl's point that 
not only the objects of our mental episodes are constituted, but so are these 
mental episodes themselves. On this basis I will argue-and here I am not fol-
lowing Husserl any longer-that one could not have mental episodes if one 
were not part of a social group of thinking beings. In short, my strategy is to 
adopt the notion of constitution in order to advance a perspective on the rela-
tion between mind and world that follows Putnarn's slogan 
... let the metaphor be this: the mind and the world jointly make up the 
mind and the world. (Putnam 1981, xi) 
THE FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE REALM OF 
THE MENTAL AND THE REALM OF THE PHYSICAL 
The need for an account of the relation between mind and world comes 
from an understanding that these two realms are fundamentally different. 
Sellars acknowledges this difference when he argues: 
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Now the idea that epistemic facts can be analyzed without remainder -
even 'in principle' - into non-epistemic facts, whether phenomenal or be-
havioral, public or private, with no matter how lavish a sprinkling of sub-
junctives and hypotheticals is, I believe, a radical mistake - a mistake of a 
piece with the 'naturalistic fallacy' in ethics. (Sellars 1997, 19, §5) 
The naturalistic fallacy in ethics is the attempt to derive normative conclu-
sions from purely descriptive premises. By mentioning that fallacy, Sellars im-
plies that sentences that express epistemic facts cannot be derived from 
descriptions of physical facts. Epistemic facts and the logical space of reasons, 
thus, involve some basic property that cannot be reduced to any physical 
property. What is this property that makes the logical space of reasons unique? 
One could argue with Brentano that mental phenomena are special 
because they, and only they, are intentionally directed towards other phe-
nomena. The notion of intentionality, like the notion of good in ethics, one 
could say, cannot be reduced to any notion of the realm of the physical. The 
problem with this line of reasoning is, however, that we can find intention-
ality not only in the realm of the mental. Linguistic entities, written sen-
tences that consist of ink traces on paper, for example, can represent objects 
or states of affairs as well; in other words, they are intentional, too. Thus, 
the Brentanist has to show that only mental phenomena have original inten-
tionality from which all other forms of intentionality are derived. Though 
this strategy is a live option, it needs to be supported by a strong argument, 
especially since it has been attacked by a number of philosophers-among 
them Wilfrid Sellars. 1 
As I outlined in chapter one, Sellars argues rather that the logical space 
of reasons is based on rational relations between conceptual contents. Thus, 
there are two respects in which it is different from the logical space of nature. 
First, the logical space of reasons is the realm of the conceptual and second, 
the various positions in that space are justified by or justify other positions 
within that space. Neither of these points holds for the realm of the physical. 
The positions in the logical space of nature are neither conceptual nor do they 
stand in rational relations to one another. Rather, they stand exclusively in re-
lations of cause and effect that can be described by strict scientific laws, i.e., 
by laws that hold necessarily. 
This does not hold for the logical space of reasons. As we have seen in 
chapter one, the relations between various positions in that space are not 
physically necessary, but rather normative ones. Making an inference from 
one position in the space of reasons to another one depends on a correct ap-
plication of the rules of logic. In other words, it can be questioned whether 
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we are actually entitled to perform such an inference or not. In the realm of 
the physical, on the other hand, the question of whether there is a causal con-
nection between two physical events does not depend on the correct applica-
tion of the laws of physics. These laws rather describe the relations that hold 
in the realm of the physical. 
In addition, many of the positions in the logical space of reasons are 
about the world. When we believe that something is the case, for example, the 
belief can be true or false, depending on how the world actually is. And, again, 
while it makes sense to ask whether a belief is correct or not, it does not make 
sense to ask whether a physical phenomenon is correct. 
Thus, the Sellarsian statement that reductionism commits a fallacy that 
is of a piece with the naturalistic fallacy in ethics can be explained in the fol-
lowing way: the logical space of reasons, in contrast to the logical space of na-
ture, is governed by normative rules. One cannot develop an account of the 
logical space of reasons in terms of the laws of physics without losing one of 
its essential aspects, the normative element. Therefore, Sellars is justified in 
insisting that there is a fundamental difference between the realm of the men-
tal and the realm of the physical. 
Sellars' anti-reductionist argument has influenced many philosophers-
even though Sellars' influence was hardly acknowledged2; it has, however, also 
been criticized by various philosophers. It has been argued that even though there 
is a difference between the two logical spaces, a reduction might be possible. One 
day, when neuroscience will have made major developments, it is argued, it will 
be able to account for that normative element in purely scientific terms. Once 
this is achieved, we will have a better understanding of the normative aspect of 
the realm of the mental. Paul Churchland, for example, writes: 
Eliminative materialism thus does not imply the end of our normative 
concerns. It implies only that they will have to be reconstituted at a more 
revealing level of understanding, the level that a matured neuroscience 
will provide. (Churchland 1981, 84) 
The problem with this line of reasoning is that it is based on faith in the fu-
ture development of science. Since Churchland cannot tell us what this future 
neuroscience will look like nor how it can reconstitute normativity at a more 
revealing level, it is difficult to show that he is wrong (as well as it is difficult 
for him to convince us that he is right). It is quite interesting, however, that 
in the three arguments for this optimistic scenario that he develops in his ar-
ticle "Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes," he does not 
seem to take the problem very seriously. His first argument is that 
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the fact that the regularities ascribed by the intentional core of FP [Folk 
Psychology] are predicated on certain logical relations among propositions 
is not by itself grounds for claiming anything essentially normative about 
FP. To draw a relevant parallel, the fact that the regularities ascribed by 
the classical gas law are predicated on arithmetical relations between 
numbers does not imply anything essentially normative about the classi-
cal gas laws. (Churchland 1981, 82) 
This argument is based on a confusion of two different levels, namely that 
of the description of relations and that of the relations described. There is 
no doubt that there are rational relations between various descriptions of 
scientific facts. These relations can even be expressed in the language of 
mathematics or logic. The relations described in science, however, are 
causal, and not rational. The relations of the logical space of reasons, on 
the other hand, are rational. Sellars' argument is that the relations in the 
logical space of reasons are rational not because there are rational relations 
between the descriptions of the various positions in that logical space, but 
between the positions that are described. The normative element, thus, is 
intrinsic to the logical space of reasons; Churchland is wrong when he 
states that it enters "because we happen to value most of the patterns as-
cribed by FP" (Churchland 1981, 83). 
Churchland's second argument is that "the laws ofFP ascribe to us only 
a very minimal and truncated rationality, not an ideal rationality as some have 
suggested" (Churchland 1981, 83). Folk Psychology can never reach that 
ideal because we "have no clear and finished conception of ideal rationality" 
( Churchland 1981, 83). If we replace Folk Psychology with an exact science, 
we might be able to eliminate the explanatory failures of the former that stem 
from its inaccuracies. With this point, however, Churchland can show only 
that Folk Psychology-as we know it today-falls short of an ideal rational-
ity. He does not show that Folk Psychology cannot be improved, nor does he 
explain why it should even strive for this ideal. After all, we might not be per-
fectly rational beings. In addition, even if Churchland could prove that Folk 
Psychology is an imperfect theory, it would not follow that eliminative mate-
rialism is correct; he would still have to show that rational relations can be re-
duced to relations posited by neuroscience. Churchland's second argument, 
thus, begs the question. 
Finally, Churchland argues that 
even if our current conception of rationality- and more generally, of cog-
nitive virtue - is largely constituted within the sentential/propositional 
framework ofFP, there is no guarantee that this framework is adequate to 
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the deeper and more accurate account of cognitive virtue which is dearly 
needed. (Churchland 1981, 83) 
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Here, again, Churchland shows only that the resources of Folk Psychology 
might not be adequate to describe in a satisfactory way the rational relations that 
hold in the logical space of reasons. He does not show, however, that they can 
be reduced to causal relations that hold in the logical space of nature. Most im-
portantly, he does not show that a matured neuroscience can do the job. 
With this short discussion of Churchland's arguments I want to illus-
trate that reductive strategies are often based on blind faith in the future de-
velopment of science. Reductionist philosophers admit that their strategy, as 
Fodor puts it, 
is bald and insufficiently detailed: but ironing out its wrinkles is what 
perceptual psychologists are paid to do, and my impression is that they're 
getting along with the job pretty well. (Fodor 1995, 10) 
Even though it is difficult, if not impossible, to show that this conviction is 
wrong, or, at least, too optimistic, I hope it has become clear that at least 
Churchland's arguments do not provide convincing reasons for accepting it. 
If we add that to the fact that Sellars has shown that there is a fundamental 
difference between the two logical spaces, I think we should remain suspicious 
of these strategies-at least until reductionists can provide a positive proof 
that we can actually reduce the rational relations that constitute the logical 
space of reasons to merely causal relations that hold in the logical space of na-
ture; a task that is at least as hopeless as the negative proof that the reduction-
ist strategy cannot be successfully carried out in principle. 
Given this dialectical situation, I think that Sellars' arguments are strong 
enough to accept the fundamental difference between the realm of the men-
tal and the realm of the physical. Accepting this difference does not imply the 
claim that there must be an ontological difference, or, to put it in McCulloch's 
terms, does not force us to embrace the Real Distinction between mind and 
body3, as a short consideration of Donald Davidson's position will show. 
For Davidson, the world consists primarily of events, some of which we 
pick out describing them as mental events; others are described as physical 
ones. In his defense of anomalous monism4 Davidson has argued, however, 
that even though we can describe events in different ways, there is, ontologi-
cally speaking, only one kind of event; one and the same event can be de-
scribed both as a mental and as a physical event5: it is a physical event when 
we use the language of physics to talk about it, it is a mental event when we 
describe it with psychological vocabulary. Both physical and mental idioms 
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make sense only within a larger theory, though. The meaning of these terms 
depends on the constitutive principles that hold in the respective scheme of 
description. Davidson accepts Sellars' point that the constitutive principles of 
physics are radically different from the ones that govern our talking about psy-
chology, for the latter-and only those-are governed by the principles of ra-
tionality, they are, in other words, characterized by an intrinsic normative 
element. Due to this difference, we cannot identify types of physical events 
with types of mental events, for what counts as a type of event depends on the 
language we use when describing them. Nonetheless, Davidson insists that, 
ontologically speaking, there is only one kind of event. 6 We can identify to-
kens of physical events with tokens of mental events, since one and the same 
event can be described in both ways; which shows that his position can be 
properly called monism. 
Davidson's argument, however, does not necessarily entail monism. To 
derive this position from the distinction between the logical space of reasons 
and that of nature, one needs some additional premises that are not generally 
accepted, like the principle of the nomological character of causality, i.e., the 
idea that where there is causality, there must be a law.7 If one drops this prin-
ciple and replaces it with some arguments for the ontological difference be-
tween the mental and the physical, one arrives at an equally tenable position 
of substance dualism (given, of course, that the arguments for substance du-
alism are convincing). This shows that the Sellarsian distinction between the 
space of reasons and that of nature is ontologically neutral; it commits us nei-
ther to dualism nor to monism and is thus able to account for the differences 
between the mental and the physical without embracing Descartes' ontologi-
cal distinction. 
CAUSAL THEORIES AND HOLISTIC BACKGROUND 
So far I have emphasized the differences between the realms of the mental and 
that of the physical, now I want to draw my attention to the question of how 
the two can be related. If we accept with Brentano that mental phenomena 
can be intentionally directed towards physical phenomena, the question arises 
how this relation can bridge the gap between the space of reasons and that of 
nature. Before I develop a positive answer to this question by developing an 
account of constitution, I show that causal theories cannot give a satisfactory 
account of this relation. 
Most contemporary theories of perception acknowledge rightly that 
there is a causal relation between a perceptual experience and the perceived 
object. There are, however, several arguments that show that causal accounts 
cannot fully explain the content of our perceptual experiences. In this section 
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I will draw on arguments from Sellars and Husserl. We have seen above that 
Dretske argues that causal accounts cannot explain how we can single out the 
perceived object in the chain of causal antecedents of the experience. 8 
According to Sellars, the causal chain that brings about the experience 
is situated in the logical space of nature. The mental episode it causes, how-
ever, belongs to the logical space of reasons, standing in rational relations of 
justification to other mental episodes. The content and kind of the mental 
episode are, according to Sellars, determined not by the causal impact of the 
world, but rather by these rational relations to other mental episodes. Let me 
illustrate Sellars' point with two examples. One and the same causal impact 
on my sense organs might cause a mental episode that is about a house or 
about a facade, depending on my background knowledge; one and the same 
pattern of ink on paper might be perceived as a decorative pattern or as words, 
depending on whether the person who sees them knows to read them or not. 
In both examples I have exactly the same causal impact on my sense organs, 
but different mental episodes that are brought about. This shows that the con-
tent of the experience is not (fully) determined by the causal chain that brings 
up the experience. 
The same conclusion follows from Husserl's point that in perceptual ex-
periences we are directed towards objects like tables, chairs, etc. even though 
only some aspect of them, a certain part of their surface, is given in our visual 
field. Husserl, as I have pointed out above, states that there seems to be a con-
tradiction in the nature of perception because it pretends "to accomplish some-
thing that, by its very nature, it is not in a position to accomplish'' (Husserl 
2001, 39 [Hua XI, 3]). In fact, merely causal accounts that regard the causal 
chain from the perceived object to the stimulation of the sense organ cannot ex-
plain why we perceive tables rather than parts of table-surfaces, given that the 
light waves that cause a visual experience of a table, for example, are reflected by 
a part of the surface only and not by the table as a whole.9 
These three arguments show that we need something in addition to a 
merely causal account that explains the structure and content of our expe-
rience by focusing exclusively on the causal chain that brings up the experi-
ence. The philosophers whose arguments I have outlined do not agree, 
however, on what it is that we need in addition to or-in Husserl's case-
instead of such an account. Dretske suggests that what is missing "is an ap-
preciation of the way the informational relationships operate to determine 
what it is that we perceive" (Dretske 1981, 157). Sellars argues for a holis-
tic understanding of the logical space of reasons in which each position is 
determined by its rational relations to other positions. Husserl, finally, de-
velops a theory of constitution that explains how an object is constituted 
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from the partial intentions of the perceptual experience which are them-
selves constituted. While Dretske argues that informational relations exist 
in the world, Sellars enriches and Husserl replaces the causal accounts with 
theories that are restricted to the realm of the mental. 
Dretske's account, I think, has two problems. First, as Haugeland has 
pointed out, even with his account of informational relations Dretske cannot 
explain how we can single out the object of perception from the long chain of 
causal antecedents of the experience. 10 Second, Dretske's contention that in-
formational relations are part of the physical world is a strong ontological as-
sumption. In terms of ontological simplicity, Sellars' and Husserl's positions 
are favorable since they do not force us to any ontological commitment, but 
simply try to explain how the mind works. 
Sellars and Husserl address the question of how the content of mental 
episodes is determined in different ways. Nonetheless, their views have several 
aspects in common. For my purposes, however, historical considerations con-
cerning the similarities and differences of these two approaches are of only pe-
ripheral interest; consequently I will not contrast their positions, but rather 
accept the conclusion of their arguments that causal accounts are not sufficient 
to explain perception of objects (let alone mental episodes of other kinds). 
I will now turn to the question of what we need in addition to causal ac-
counts to determine the content of mental episodes. Let me start with consid-
ering the example of two persons who stand before the same construction. 
One of them, who has never been there before, sees a whole house, while the 
other person, who has often seen the construction in the past and walked 
around it etc., sees a facade. The difference in the content of their experience 
cannot be explained by differences in the causal chain from the object to their 
sensory organs. Ideally this causal impact is exactly the same for both: they see 
the facade from the same position under the same circumstances. The differ-
ence is that the person who sees the facade has a much richer background of 
past experiences about the object perceived than the one who sees the whole 
house. This example shows nicely that the content of an experience does not 
depend only on the chain of causes that bring about the sensory stimulus, but 
also on a holistic background of other mental episodes. 
In his texts on the background hypothesis11 Searle argues that the 
background not only enriches or alters the content of an experience, but that 
it is a necessary condition for its having content. In other words, not only 
the person who sees the facade rather than the whole house has a back-
ground. Both experiences require a background, which in our example, 
however, differ in relevant respects. Searle admits that he knows "of no 
demonstrative arguments that would prove the existence of the 
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Background" (Searle 1983, 144), but he motivates the assumption that there 
is one with the examples of understanding the literal meaning of a word, un-
derstanding a metaphor, and physical skills like skiing, all of which, accord-
ing to Searle, require a background. 12 
Sellars develops an argument for a similar thesis. He points out that per-
ceptual experiences not only justify other positions in the logical space of rea-
sons, but they are also justified by them; the rational relations go in both ways. 
If I reject the framework of traditional empiricism, it is not because I 
want to say that empirical knowledge has no foundation .... There is 
clearly some point to the picture of human knowledge as resting on a level 
of propositions - observation reports - which do not rest on other 
propositions in the same way as other propositions rest on them. On the 
other hand, I do wish to insist that the metaphor of 'foundation' is mis-
leading in that it keeps us from seeing that if there is a logical dimension 
in which other empirical propositions rest on observation reports, there 
is another logical dimension in which the latter rest on the former. 
(Sellars 1997, 78, §38) 
Sellars argues that the minimal requirement for experiencing that some-
thing is green is having the concept 'green' and knowing "the appropriate fact 
of the form X is a reliable symptom for Y, namely that (and again I oversim-
plify) utterances of 'This is green' are reliable indicators of the presence of 
green objects in standard conditions of perception" (Sellars 1997, 76f, §37). 
According to Sellars, perceptual experiences contain propositional claims. 13 
Since these experiences stand in rational relations to other positions in the 
space of reasons, they must have conceptual structure. I will adopt Sellars' use 
of the notion of perceptual experience as a conceptual entity. 
We have seen that both Sellars and Searle argue that the content of an 
experience is determined by a holistic background. It remains to show how 
this background can perform its task, how it can actually shape the content of 
the perceptual experience. Searle does not discuss this problem; he seems to 
be satisfied with pointing out that we cannot explain the content of the expe-
rience without making use of the background hypothesis. 
Sellars' formulation of there being a 'logical dimension' in which ob-
servation reports depend on other empirical descriptions suggests that there 
is a logical relationship, some kind of inference from the background to the 
current experience. These inferences do not always have to be actively 
drawn, as the case of perceptual experiences shows, where the content of the 
experience involuntarily impinges on us. In order to stress the fact that these 
relations do not have to be active, I will use the term 'rational relations' 
48 The Constitution Of Consciousness 
rather than 'inferences.' I will discuss the notion of rational relation in more 
detail in the next chapter. 
With his notion of constitution, Husserl gives a very detailed account of 
the relation between mental episodes and their holistic background. In the 
next section I will show how Husser! addressed this problem in his phenom-
enological analyses and outline an account of constitution of objects along 
Husserlian lines. My interpretation is based mainly on his analyses of time 
consciousness and passive synthesis. Husserl's overall philosophical position 
developed over the years and underwent several changes. As I have indicated, 
the interpretation I am proposing is not a standard interpretation. It does not 
try to cover all aspects of Husserl's thought, but concentrates on what he 
wrote on a specific topic, time consciousness and passive synthesis, in a cer-
tain time period. 14 In some aspects of the account of constitution that I am 
going to sketch I will clearly go beyond Husser!. My main purpose is not to 
give a comprehensive interpretation of Husserl's work, but to show how a spe-
cific aspect of his thought can give us an interesting perspective on the rela-
tion between the mental and the physical. 
CONSTITUTING OBJECTS 
The main thesis I want to develop is that the intentional relation between 
mental episodes and objects is based on the fact that we constitute the objects 
towards which we are directed. This does not mean that we create objects in 
the process of constitution. In the case of perceptual experiences, a theory of 
constitution complements causal accounts; perceptual experiences are caused 
by the objects that they constitute. Before I go on to show how constitution 
and a causal account complement each other I will discuss the question of 
whether constituting an object can be characterized as interpreting something 
as something else. 
It might be tempting to think that constituting an object means interpret-
ing raw sense data as objects. A causal account might explain how these raw data 
are delivered to the mind, and a theory of constitution could show how we ap-
prehend these data and interpret them as objects. The example of seeing a house 
vs. seeing a facade, that I have used above, might even support this idea: in both 
cases, one might argue, we have the same raw material that is interpreted differ-
ently. This strategy recalls empiricism as well as Husserl's early distinction be-
tween sensory data and the intentional form of an act. This characterization of 
constitution, however, would presuppose that we can interpret raw data in a way 
that allows them to bring about (conceptually structured) contents of percep-
tual experiences; they would provide reasons that justify the experience. A posi-
tion along these lines would, thus, fall into the Myth of the Given. 
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Husserl rejects the thesis that constitution is interpretation of raw data 
in his later work. While he claimed in his early publications that perceptual 
experiences are composed of two components, non-intentional matter and in-
tentional form, he states later: "when descriptive theory of consciousness be-
gins radically, it has before it no such data and wholes, except perhaps as 
prejudices" (Husserl 1960, 38 [Hua I, 77]). I have discussed briefly Husserl's 
arguments against the matter-form schema above. 15 
The thesis that constitution is interpretation can also be understood in 
a different way. In the process of constitution, one might argue, we interpret 
some objects as something else. Haugeland has shown that this position 
is philosophically self-defeating .... The project is to understand the ob-
jecthood of objects-their standing as criteria for objective skills-in 
terms of their constitutedness. But counting-as presupposes the object-
hood of the objects that are to be counted as something else, and merely 
adds onto those objects some new relative features (relative to whatever 
they are counted as). (Haugeland 1998b, 326) 
Accounts that characterize constituting as interpreting some object as some-
thing else face the difficulty to explain how we can perceive the basic objects, 
figurines, atoms, rocks, or whatever they might be, as objects. Moreover, they 
aim to explain what objects are by relying on our being acquainted with some 
(basic) objects already. 
So far I have claimed that constituting an object does not mean creating 
it, nor does it mean interpreting something as something else. In addition, I 
have shown that the constitution of objects requires a holistic background. 
The question, now, is how a holistic background can shape the content of the 
occurrent mental episode. This question seems particularly pressing in the 
case of perceptual experiences because they are essentially passive. We cannot 
actively determine their content; rather, it impinges on us. 
The passivity of constitution can be understood in two ways.16 First, 
constitution is passive in that it depends on the environment of the perceiver. 
If the perceptual experience in question is caused by an elm tree, for example, 
the perceiver cannot decide to constitute a palm tree instead. In the case of 
perceptual experiences constitution is passive in that it is restricted by the ob-
jects that cause the perceptual experience. In this context, 'passive' is used in 
the sense of 'receptive.' Second, it is passive in the sense that we do not have 
to actively perform constitution. In other words, constitution does not re-
quire any effort. If one looks at an elm tree, for example, one does not have 
to decide to perform constitution in order to have a perceptual experience of 
that tree. In this context, the word 'passive' means 'inactive.' 
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Constitution in perceptual experiences is passive in either sense, it is re-
ceptive and inactive, as the examples that I have used in the preceding para-
graph show. This is not true for all mental episodes, however. Ifl wish to have 
a yellow bicycle, for example, the object of my episode is constituted passively 
in the sense of inactive; I do not have to make an effort to constitute a bicy-
cle, I can draw on my previous experiences about bicycles. It is not passive in 
the sense of receptive, though. In order to wish to have a yellow bicycle I do 
not have to perceive one; the constitution of the object is not necessarily trig-
gered by an object that is perceived at the same moment. 
In some mental episodes, constitution is not passive in both senses. This 
is the case in episodes where one is directed towards a new kind of object, for 
example when a scientist postulates a new kind of particle or when a science 
fiction author invents a planet that is populated by a form of intelligent life. 
They do not have experiences of these kinds of entity to draw on in the 
process of constitution; in consequence, it is not passive in the sense of inac-
tive. In addition, they do not perceive the objects they postulate or describe; 
constitution is therefore not passive in the sense of receptive. 
Let us now turn back to the question of how a holistic background can 
shape the content of mental episodes, especially of those that are passive in 
both senses, receptive and inactive. The answer to this question, I think, lies 
in Husserl's analyses of time consciousness. Husserl's basic contention is that 
mental acts are temporally extended. 17 This is most obvious in the case of the 
perception of temporal objects, like hearing a melody. At any moment we can 
hear only one temporal part of the melody, a tone, for example. Nonetheless, 
we hear a melody, i.e., we have a mental episode that is directed towards the 
melody as a whole rather than a succession of mental episodes that are di-
rected towards single tones. This shows that like the perceived object, the act 
of perception also has to be temporally extended. 
Husserl argues that the constitution of the object of the experience de-
pends on the succession of partial intentions in which we are directed towards 
this object. According to Husserl, there are three kinds of partial intention, re-
tentions, protentions, and primal impressions. Primal impressions are directed 
towards the present temporal phase of the object, the very tone of the melody 
that I am hearing in this moment, for example. Retentions are directed towards 
the tones towards which I was directed in a primal impression just a moment 
ago, and protentions are expectations directed towards the tones that I will be 
directed at in my primal impressions in the next moments. Retentions and pro-
tentions are very different in structure: while the former are directed towards 
what was actually experienced a moment ago, the content of the latter is not as 
dearly determined. The more one is familiar with a certain object, the more 
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detailed are one's protentions. When I hear a melody that I have never heard be-
fore, I only expect to hear some other tone, while in the case of my favorite song 
I am expecting a very specific tone. In order to underline this aspect, Husserl 
also uses the term 'horiwn' to characterize protentions. 
Husser! carefully analyzes the structure of partial intentions and their 
modification, their "sinking into the past," as it were. 18 For my purposes it is 
not crucial to review all these analyses in detail. It is important, however, to see 
that Husserl's phenomenological analyses of mental episodes show that they are 
not basic, atomic units of our mental life. They are rather composed of various 
parts which, in turn, could be further analyzed. According to Husser! there is 
no 'lowest level' that we could reach, there are only practical limitations: the 
analyses become more and more difficult with every level one goes down. In 
what follows, I will adopt Husserl's notion of retention to describe how the ho-
listic background can shape the content of an actual mental episode. 
When Husser! developed this notion in his early texts on time-con-
sciousness he was clearly influenced by Brentano's notion of original associa-
tion or proteraesthesis. 19 Retentions are a form of memory that retains what 
one was aware of just a moment ago. The retention does not present the tone 
as a present tone, as primal impressions do, but-in a manner of speaking-
transforms it into a "past tone." At every moment, a primal impression gets 
transformed into a retention and the other retentions get pushed back into 
the past, so to speak. With each of these transformations, a retention becomes 
less and less lively until it eventually "disappears into obscurity, into an empty 
retentional consciousness" (Husser! 1991, 27 [HuaX, 26]). Husser! illustrates 
the retentional modification with the following diagrams:20 
The horizontal lines represent the progress of time. A, P, and E are tem-
poral phases of the mental episode, A probably stands for the beginning 
[Anfong], E for the end [Ende], and P for a temporal phase [Phase] of the men-
tal episode. The diagonal lines represent retentions that "sink into the past." 
Fig. 1 shows the sinking of the retentions that are part of the occurrent men-
tal episode. Fig. 2 shows that even after the episode is over, there is still a se-
ries of retentions that are directed towards this episode-and, similarly, that 
having a protention is different from expecting something. The retentional 
modification of the mental episodes is represented by the vertical lines. 
Husser!, as well as Brentano, insists that having a retention is in a crucial 
way different from remembering something. Retentions are partial intentions; 
they are parts of mental acts, while remembering something is a mental act on 
its own that, like every other mental act, is partly composed of retentions. 
Moreover, retentions are directed towards the immediate past. One can re-
member events, on the other hand, that one has experienced a long time ago. 
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According to Husserl's theory of time consciousness, every mental 
episode undergoes retentional modification where it becomes less and less 
lively until it arrives at the zero-point of liveliness. In his early texts on time 
consciousness, Husserl argues that retentions eventually disappear from con-
sciousness. 21 In later texts, however, he holds that mental episodes that under-
went retentional modification and have, thus, reached the zero-point of 
liveliness, do not completely disappear. They rather form a background for all 
future mental episodes; they are, thus, "not nothing," as Husserl puts it in 
course notes that he has written in the early 1920s: 
Every concrete datum of the sphere of the living present sinks, as we 
know, into the phenomenal past, succumbs to retentional transforma-
tion and thereby necessary leads into the region of affective nullity into 
which it is incorporated and in which it is not nothing. (Husser! 2001, 
216 [HuaXI, 167])22 
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A few lines later Husserl points out that every mental episode requires a back-
ground that consists of past episodes that have sunk in their retentional mod-
ification to the zero point of liveliness: 
according to what has been said, a background or subsoil of non-vivac-
ity, of affective ineffectiveness (nil) belongs to every present [i.e., to every 
occurrent mental episode]. (Husser! 2001, 217 [Hua XI, 168]) 
Husserl concludes this section with a statement that this retentional back-
ground that is formed by all our past mental episodes is void of liveliness, 
structure and clarity. In other words, we are not continuously aware of this 
background as part of our experience, it needs some phenomenological analy-
sis to show its existence. 
One may well say that within the zero-stage, all special affections have 
passed over into a general stage, all special consciousness have passed over 
into a general undifferentiated affection; all special consciousness have 
passed over into the one, general, persistently available background-con-
sciousness of our past, the consciousness of the completely unarticulated, 
completely indistinct horizon of the past, which brings to a close the liv-
ing, moving retentional past. (Husser! 2001, 220 [Hua XI, 171]) 
In conclusion, Husserl argues that some moments of our mental episodes that 
he calls 'retentions' keep us aware of the immediate past. With every moment, 
each of them loses clarity and liveliness. In his early writings on time con-
sciousness, Husserl holds that after a certain period, when retentions have be-
come very unclear and nebulous due to their continuous modification, they 
disappear altogether. In later texts, however, he argues that they never actually 
disappear; they rather become part of a holistic background23 which is neces-
sary for having mental episodes in the first place. 
With this account of a retentional background Husserl provides a use-
ful instrument for describing how a holistic background can determine the 
content of a mental episode. In order to do so, however, we have to take a look 
back at Husserl's analysis of the basic level of constitution. I have pointed out 
above that, according to Husserl, mental episodes consist of several moments 
or partial intentions, like retentions, protentions, and primal impressions. 
The flow of consciousness is understood as a series of primal impressions that 
are continuously transformed into retentions. This retentional modification 
is understood as a purely formal process, which abstracts from the content of 
the partial intentions. 
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When Husserl claims that mental episodes are temporally extended he 
characterizes them as a series of partial intentions. Now the question arises 
how a series of partial intentions can form a mental episode. What determines 
whether a specific primal impression still belongs to the mental episode that 
I am just having or rather marks the beginning of a new one? The temporal 
modification does not suffice to group partial intentions together into a men-
tal episode because it is purely formal and abstracts completely from the con-
tent:24 every primal impression undergoes retentional modification, no 
matter what it is about. 
According to Husserl, these unities of partial intentions that form the 
mental episode are established by association. "The most primitive elements 
[ Gegebenheiten] of consciousness constitute themselves as associative fusions 
which can affect the I due to their contrast to a different background" 
(Holenstein 1972, 112 [my translation]25). Consequently, these unities are a 
"function of the three laws of association: similarity, contrast, and contiguity" 
(Holenstein 1972, 49f [my translation]26). Accordingly, a series of primal im-
pressions that form a temporal sequence and the content of which stays con-
stant (or undergoes only gradual changes) are grouped together, while an 
abrupt change, a contrast, marks the beginning of a new unity. Let me illus-
trate this point with an example. When I look at a tree, I have a series of pri-
mal impressions that have the same (or very similar, I am of course simplifying 
here) content. After some time, I might turn my eyes and look at the roses 
that grow next to the tree. In this moment, there is a sudden change in the 
content of the primal impression that is followed by a new series of primal im-
pressions that have roughly the same content. Accordingly, the primal impres-
sions I had during my looking at the tree form a unity, and so do the ones I 
have now, looking at the roses. The sudden change between these two series 
marks the end of the first unity of primal impressions and the beginning of 
the next. The processes of establishing these unities are passive in the sense of 
inactive; they do not require any effort. Before I go on to show that these uni-
ties play a central role in the constitution of objects I will discuss their struc-
ture in more detail. In doing so I will address the question of whether Husserl 
is committed to the Myth of the Given. 
Husserl characterizes these unities as sense data [Empfindungsdaten]. 
He also suggests that they evoke processes of association that are based on 
similarity, continuity, and contrast. To put it in Sellarsian terms, they stand 
in rational relations to other positions in the space of reasons. Hence, 
Husserl seems to argue that sense data stand in rational relations to posi-
tions in the logical space of reasons and, consequently, to fall into the Myth 
of the Given. Before accusing him of committing this fallacy, however, we 
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have to take a closer look on his notion of sense data, and its development 
over the years. 
Holenstein shows that Husser! uses the terms 'sense data,' 'hyletic data,' 
'affection,' 'impression,' etc., in an ambiguous way27, he uses them for raw 
sense data that are part of the logical space of nature as well as for mental 
episodes that are positions in the logical space of reasons. In his early writings, 
Husser! claims that there are raw, unstructured, and non-intentional sense 
data that are part of the mental act. In this phase of his work he clearly ap-
peals to the Myth of the Given. Between 1907 and 1909, however, he starts to 
criticize the matter-form schema in the context of his analyses of time con-
sciousness. 28 In his later philosophy, Husser! extends this point to a more gen-
eral critique of sense datum theories, although he never arrives at the point of 
explicitly rejecting the notion of raw sense data in the context of the consti-
tution of objects. 29 
In his study on Husserl's notion of association, Holenstein shows that 
Husser! actually develops an alternative to the notion of raw sense data in his 
discussion of the unities of partial intentions. 30 He states, however, that 
Husser! was not aware of this development. Hence, according to Holenstein, 
Husser! in fact rejects the notion of raw, unstructured, and non-intentional 
sense data, even though he never explicitly draws this conclusion. This change 
in Husserl's position finds its expression in the use of terminology. In his later 
works, Husser! increasingly uses the word 'affection' rather than 'sense 
datum.' In analogy to this terminology I will call the unities of partial inten-
tions that are formed by association 'affective unities,' adopting an expression 
that Husser! uses at some places. 
In his late philosophy, Husser! presents two main arguments that show 
that affective unities are different from raw sense data.31 First, they are con-
stituted; they have temporal structure and, thus, consist of a series of partial 
intentions. In consequence, they are not ready-made objects that are given to 
consciousness. Second, sense data are supposed to be immediately given, af-
fective unities are not; we can know about them only through reflective analy-
sis. According to Holenstein, these two arguments show that Husser! actually 
gave up the notion of raw sense data. 
The main difference between raw sense data and affective unities is that 
only the latter have intentional structure. This does not mean, however, that 
they are directed towards full-blown objects. They are intentional because 
they are unities of partial intentions that are grouped together according to 
the 'laws of association.' Holenstein argues that consequently affective uni-
ties have a certain 'gestalt-structure'.32 "Without making it explicit, Husser! 
replaces in his phenomenology of association the notion of sense data with 
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gestalt-psychological notions" (Holenstein 1972, 114 [my translation] 33). 
The intentionality of affective unities is pre-objective, though. In a late, hith-
erto unpublished manuscript, Husser! distinguishes between "primal associ-
ation [Urassoziation] of non-objects, of intentional unities (pre-objective) 
and later affections of apperceived unities and eventually of object-uni-
ties."34 The constitution of affective unities is a necessary prerequisite for the 
constitution of objects. 
In conclusion, even though Husser! uses words like 'sense data' for af-
fective unities in his later writings, he is not prone to fall into the Myth of 
the Given. If we have a closer look at the structure of affective unities and 
the role they play in Husserl's later philosophy, it becomes clear that they 
belong in the space of reasons. If this interpretation is correct, Husser! (in 
the reconstruction of Holenstein) clearly rejects the idea that there are raw, 
unstructured sense data that justify mental episodes, even though he never 
explicitly says so. 
Let us now come back to the question of how affective unities figure in 
the constitution of objects. We have seen that these unities are intentional in a 
pre-objective sense. Husserl states that they are indispensable for the constitu-
tion of objects: "Affective unities must constitute themselves, so that in subjec-
tivity a world of objects can be constituted" (Husser! 2001, 210 [Hua XI, 
162]).35 In addition to affective unities, the constitution of objects also de-
pends on the retentional background which functions as a "reservoir of ob-
jects. "36 In order to draw on the retentional background, affective unities have 
to establish a connection to past experiences in which we have constituted the 
same object. This can be achieved in virtue of association, which picks out past 
episodes that involved affective unities sufficiently similar to the occurrent 
ones. The problem, now, is that the notion of sufficient similarity is rather 
vague, since any two affective unities are similar in an indefinite number of re-
spects. 37 In consequence, this account does not explain why we constitute cer-
tain kinds of object rather than others; why, to use Quine's famous example, 
we constitute rabbits rather than undetached rabbit parts. The relevant respects 
in which two affective unities have to be similar are determined by association. 
It is impossible to explain why the similarity of certain respects of affective uni-
ties is relevant in the process of association while others are not. Thus, 'associ-
ation' is a basic notion in the account of constitution that I am proposing that 
cannot be further analyzed or explained in other terms. Even though this strat-
egy does not allow us to explain why a certain respect of similarity is relevant, 
it is sufficient to describe how we actually perform the constitution of objects. 
A consequence of this aspect of the proposed account is that we can-
not distinguish between relevant and irrelevant or, to put it more drastically, 
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between correct and incorrect respects of similarity; we are rather constrained 
to describe which respects of similarity are considered relevant by the persons 
who perform constitution. This leaves us with the possibility that persons 
whose process of association involves respects of similarity that are very differ-
ent from ours constitute different kinds of object. If we admit that constitu-
tion depends in part on the social group in which one lives, we could come to 
conclude that different cultures might constitute different kinds of object. 
Which kinds of respect of similarity are considered relevant is, however, also 
determined by our evolutionary history and by the fact that all human beings 
encounter the same kinds of object. Therefore we can expect that there are no 
radical differences in the kinds of object that are constituted by human beings 
of different cultures. 
Once one has established the connection between the present affective 
unity and the retentional background, one constitutes not only the object, 
but also the mental episode in which we are directed towards this object. This 
requires that one has established what Haugeland calls 'constitutive commit-
ment,' i.e., the habit of constituting objects under these circumstances. I will 
discuss this aspect of constitution in more detail in the next section; now I will 
turn to the question of how we can adopt Husserl's theory in order to give an 
account of the relation between mind and world. I should mention that with 
this move I am going beyond Husserlian phenomenology. Husserl's main 
methodological principle, the phenomenological reduction, requires one's 
bracketing of all beliefs in the physical world. The relation between mind and 
world, therefore, is out of reach for the phenomenologist. 
My strategy is to place the Husserlian account of constitution into the 
Sellarsian/McDowellian framework that is based on the distinction between 
the logical space of reasons and the logical space of nature by arguing that 
there can be two kinds of relation between physical objects and mental 
episodes, namely causal38 and intentional ones. Husserl's account of constitu-
tion explains how we can be directed towards objects in our mental episodes. 
In perceptual experiences, one constitutes the objects that are perceived, i.e., 
physical objects in the environment of the perceiver. The account of constitu-
tion does not propose that mental images are created that represent physical 
objects in our environment. It rather establishes a direct connection to these 
objects, namely the intentional relation between a perceptual experience and 
the object perceived. We can say, with McDowell: "there are no images ... in 
the phenomenology of vision: it is the relevant tract of the environment that 
is present to consciousness, not an image of it" (McDowell 1994, 191). 
Like Husserl, I think that 'intentionality' is a basic notion that cannot be 
further reduced to any other notions. Most importantly, it cannot be reduced 
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to merely causal processes on the neurophysiological level. The causal relation 
between object and mental experience can be described with the laws of sci-
ence, it belongs to the logical space of nature and, thus, cannot account for 
the pre-objective intentionality of partial intentions, nor for the intentional-
ity of mental episodes, both of which belong to the space of reasons. This does 
not mean that the causal relation is completely irrelevant for our having men-
tal episodes. As I have pointed out above, we could not have perceptual expe-
riences if they were not caused by the objects perceived. The causal relation, 
however, cannot explain the fact that mental episodes are directed towards ob-
jects. As McDowell puts it, merely causal accounts, as they are developed in 
cognitive science, offer "what may be an enabling explanation of conscious-
ness, but not a constitutive one" (McDowell 1994, 203). 
The claim that intentionality is a direct relation between perceptual ex-
periences and the physical objects presupposes that all objects towards which 
we can be directed in perception, like tables, roses, clouds, etc. exist in the ac-
tual world. There are, thus, strong parallels between the account of constitu-
tion that I am proposing and the position that Putnam calls 'natural realism.' 
He describes this position in the following way: 
A natural realist, in my sense, does hold that the objects of normal, 
'veridical' perception are usually 'external' things .... The natural realist 
... holds that successful perception is just a seeing, or hearing, or feel-
ing, etc., of things 'out there,' and not a mere affectation of a person's 
subjectivity by those things. (Putnam 1994, 454) 
Putnam states that in perception we stand in direct, cognitive contact to the 
objects perceived. According to this view, we do not perceive raw, unstruc-
tured matter-that would be an appeal to the Myth of the Given-but objects 
like rocks, computers, and bicycles, etc., that are part of the physical world. 
Putnam lists a series of philosophers who, according to him, have shared 
this position; he names James, Wittgenstein, Austin, and, interestingly 
enough, Husserl. I think, however, that the interpretation ofHusserl as a nat-
ural realist is far-fetched. Due to the phenomenological reduction, Husserl 
cannot make any assumptions about the ontological status of the intentional 
object in the context of phenomenology. In addition, Putnam gives very little 
textual evidence, he quotes only one ofHusserl's books, the Crisis of European 
Sciences. 39 He does not mention the fact that Husser! describes his own posi-
tion as 'transcendental idealism,' does not discuss Husserl's phenomenologi-
cal method, nor does he acknowledge that there is an extensive discussion 
concerning the question of whether Husser} was a realist or an idealist. 
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Even though there are serious doubts about going so far as claiming 
that Husserl actually was a natural realist, I will adopt a realist position 
when further developing my account of constitution. After all, I have al-
ready made a step beyond Husserlian phenomenology by discussing this 
very problem. 
We are now in a position to address Dretske's problem.40 Dretske criti-
cizes causal theories by pointing out that they cannot single out the object of 
our experience from the long chain of causes that eventually brings up the ex-
perience. He argues that the object of experience is determined by informa-
tional relationships between the object and the experience. According to the 
account that I am proposing, on the other hand, we do not have to single out 
the object of experience from a long list of causal antecedents; rather our ex-
periences are immediately directed towards their objects. In consequence, I 
can share Dretske's concern about causal theories without having to assume 
that there are informational relations in the world. 
Furthermore, the account of constitution that I am proposing can do 
without the distinction between actual and intentional object. When we are 
directed towards an object, it is always given under a certain aspect which de-
pends not only on perceptual conditions like perspective, lightning etc., but 
also on the retentional background of the perceiver. Let us consider an exam-
ple of a perceptual experience. When I see my PowerBook, the constitution 
of the object towards which I am directed, the laptop I am currently using, in-
volves computer-related experiences I had in the past. Imagine that we find a 
way to send this computer back in time, let's say to the 1950s. If someone 
looks at the PowerBook, she cannot see a portable computer, because she has 
no computer-related experiences to draw on in the process of constitution. 
She rather sees a machine of a certain color and shape that has a keyboard and 
a screen. We can go even further back in time, let's say to the early 1800s. In 
that period people will not even see a machine that has a keyboard and a 
screen, neither having been invented then. Their experience will be about a 
grayish object of rectangular shape, etc. 
In all these cases, the perceivers are directed towards the same object; the 
differences in their retentional backgrounds determine under which aspect 
the object is perceived. This example shows that there is not one single 'cor-
rect' way of constituting the object. There are many ways to get it wrong, 
though; one cannot constitute a book when one really looks at a computer, 
etc. In that case, one would merely have a misperception. In his Dewey 
Lectures, Putnam makes a similar point, describing an example that was pre-
sented by William James:41 
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[!ames] employs the example of someone choosing how to describe some 
beans that have been cast on a table. The beans could be described in an 
almost endless variety of ways, depending on the interests of the describer, 
and each of the right descriptions will fit the beans-minus-the-describer, 
and yet also reflect the interest of the describer. (Putnam 1994, 447) 
If we replace the words 'describe' by 'constitute,' 'the interests of the describer' 
by 'the retentional background of the perceiver,' and 'describer' by 'the person 
who performs the constitution' in the second sentence of the quotation, we 
arrive at a description of the position that I am arguing for. The sentence, 
then, would read: "The beans could be constituted in an almost endless vari-
ety of ways, depending on the retentional background of the perceiver, and 
each of the right constitutions will fit the beans-minus-the-person who per-
forms the constitution, and yet also reflect the retentional background of the 
perceiver." There are many ways to describe the beans, consequently there is 
not a single correct description. That does not mean, of course, that we can 
say about the beans whatever we want; some descriptions just get things 
wrong. And similarly in the constitution of objects: one and the same object 
can be constituted quite differently in two veridical perceptions, nonetheless 
we can distinguish between veridical perceptions and misperceptions due to 
the normative element of perception. 
Due to the methodological principles of phenomenology, the relation 
between physical objects and mental episodes lies out of reach of the phenom-
enologist. With the discussion in the last few paragraphs I have dearly broken 
these principles and, as Husserl would put it, fallen back into the natural at-
titude. I hope the discussion has shown that it can be nonetheless very fruit-
ful to adopt Husserl's account of constitution for describing the relation 
between physical objects and mental episodes. There are, I believe, two major 
points that make this strategy interesting. First, it provides an account that is 
not prone to fall into the Myth of the Given, nor does it run into the problems 
of coherentism that, as McDowell has argued, cannot account for the fact that 
our mental episodes have content. Second, it aims to describe how a holistic 
background can shape the content of an occurrent mental episode. 
So far I have discussed mainly the constitution of objects of perceptual 
experiences. The account I have outlined, however, can easily be generalized 
to other mental episodes like remembering, imagining, wishing, dreaming, 
and so on. They all draw on the reservoir of objects that is provided by the re-
tentional background. The constitution of objects in these experiences does 
not involve a causal relation between a physical object and the episode, but 
only rational relations to other positions in the logical space of reasons. 
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Mental episodes that do not stand in a direct relation to a physical object, 
like my wish to own a yellow bicycle, are parasitic on perceptual experi-
ences: I can constitute the object only because I had perceptual experiences 
of bicycles and of yellow things in the past. The discussion of the develop-
ment of constitutive commitment and the constitution of mental episodes 
in the next two sections will give a better understanding of the priority of 
perceptual experiences. 
DEVELOPING CONSTITUTIVE COMMITMENT 
In the second chapter I showed that Haugeland distinguishes four aspects of 
constitution, the most basic of which is constitutive commitment. He does 
not explain, however, how we come to develop constitutive commitment; and 
Husser! also does not discuss how we come to perform constitution. In this 
section I will address this question. 
The hypothesis that every mental experience requires a holistic reten-
tional background might be challenged by an infinite regress argument. The 
background, I have argued, consists of mental episodes that underwent reten-
tional modification. These mental episodes, however, required another back-
ground that consisted of other mental episodes that underwent retentional 
modification themselves, and so on ad infinitum. 
This regress is not unavoidable, though. It can be argued that the creation 
of a first, minimal background does not require past experiences, but does "in-
volve a long history of acquiring piecemeal habits of response to various objects 
at various circumstances" ( Sellars 1997, 44f, § 19). 42 Husserl argues that we can-
not think of a 'first mental episode,' i.e., one that does not require any back-
ground but will provide a background for future mental episodes. He states "not 
only that every Now [i.e., every occurrent mental episode] leaves a trail of reten-
tions; we cannot conceive of a Now that does not already have retentions" 
(Husser! 2001, 467 [Hua XI, 378)). The beginning of one's having mental 
episodes, he continues, is only thinkable as part of a process, but not as the be-
ginning of a process. And, using strong metaphors, he says that before the be-
ginning of our mental lives there has to be something, an emptiness, an 
undifferentiated, silent dozing. Husser! continues by stating that "transcenden-
tal life and transcendental ego cannot be born; only the human being in the 
world can be born" (Husser! 2001, 469 [HuaXI, 379)). 
According to Husserl, thus, we cannot conceive of a first mental episode 
that does not yet have a background, since every mental episode requires a 
background that consists of past mental episodes that underwent retentional 
modification. The beginning of our mental life is seen as a slow awakening 
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from an undifferentiated, silent dozing rather than a sudden start that takes 
place in a specific moment, like birth. In another place, Husserl argues that 
children have to learn to have mental episodes. He states: "With good reason 
it is said that in infancy we had to learn to see physical things, and that such 
modes of consciousness of them had to precede all other genetically" (Husserl 
1960, 79 [Hua I, 112]). Husserl does not discuss how we learn to have men-
tal episodes, nor does he explain how we are to imagine this period of undif-
ferentiated dozing and how the awakening comes about. 
I believe that Husserl's expression of a dark, unstructured period of doz-
ing, or better, the slow process of awakening from such a period of dozing, can 
be a useful metaphor. It can be understood as the period where one has to de-
velop constitutive commitment. In order to do so, one has to establish a first 
minimal background that enables us to have our first mental episodes. With 
every additional episode, this background becomes richer until we can talk of 
a full-blown mental life. But how can a first minimal background evolve from 
an undifferentiated state of dozing? 
In the period of awakening from the state of dozing one does not have 
mental episodes. One does have, however, the potentiality to establish consti-
tutive commitment. We can explain this potentiality by claiming that one 
does already have primal impressions that are intentional (in a pre-objective 
sense) and undergo retentional modification. At this level, the passive 
processes of association are already operative and group together partial inten-
tions to affective unities in the way described in the preceding section. 
However, since one does not have a retentional background yet, there is no 
constitution of objects or mental episodes. In other words, one does not ex-
perience objects at this stage of the development. We can respond to primal 
impressions and affective unities differentially, though, for they are inten-
tional and, thus, have some form of content. 
During the process of growing up we are trained by our social group to 
react to certain of these affective unities in systematic ways. The process of 
learning these patterns of behavior depends on various factors. For one, it de-
pends on the physical environment and the biological makeup of our sense 
organs, the latter determining what aspects of the objects in the environment 
can cause primal impressions. It also depends on the laws of association that 
determine what affective unities can be formed. Finally, it depends on the so-
cial group in which we grow up, which enforces a certain kind ofbehavior in 
reaction to associative unities. 
For the development of the mental life of human beings, the most im-
portant aspect of learning a pattern ofbehavior is the acquisition of language, 
the most subtle and most complex of our social practices. During the phase of 
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developing constitutive commitment, all the moves one can make in the logi-
cal space of reasons are based on association. All moves, therefore, are passive; 
one does not yet actively perform them. In the process of growing up, we are 
trained to use words to react to affective unities. We learn that various affective 
unities can be named by the same word. Hence, the acquisition of language 
presupposes that we can detect that affective unities are similar in some rele-
vant respects. Language, then, goes on to teach us what respects of similarity 
are relevant in our culture. In addition, the acquisition of language is impor-
tant in another respect. The language we learn has a certain structure. By learn-
ing what grammatical role nouns, adjectives and verbs, play in our language, 
we learn, roughly speaking, to constitute objects, predicates and events. Thus, 
by acquiring a language we are trained to see the world in a certain way. The 
structure oflanguage does not come from nowhere. It has evolved in a long his-
tory of human beings interacting with the world. This evolutionary history can 
indicate some constraints on what kinds of similarity can be relevant in the 
process of constitution; it cannot, however, explain why in our development 
we constitute the kinds of object we do and not other ones. 
In sum, we are trained to develop a pattern of behavior in reacting to 
affective unities that allows us to understand what respects of similarity be-
tween affective unities are relevant in our culture. This pattern enables us to 
constitute objects. We could say, thus, that this pattern functions as a first, 
minimal background; and even though this background cannot account for 
the complexity of our mental lives, it does provide a background rich enough 
for some basic mental episodes which undergo retentional modification and 
eventually become part of the background. With every additional episode 
that undergoes retentional modification, the background becomes more and 
more fine-grained and thus gradually reaches the complexity and structure 
necessary for explaining the mental life of a full-grown human being. Since 
we establish this first background in interaction with our environment, per-
ceptual experiences play a privileged role in the process of establishing con-
stitutive commitment. As Husserl points out, perceptual experiences 
"precede all other [kinds of mental episode] genetically" (Husserl 1960, 79 
[Hua I, 112]). In the next section I will show how we come to constitute 
other kinds of mental episode. 
We have seen that the establishment of a first, minimal background 
can be explained without referring to mental episodes. The only kind of ra-
tional relation that is involved in this process is association, which is a 
purely passive process at this level. At this point we do have, one could say, 
a retentional background of pre-objective associative unities that underwent 
retentional modification. 
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A similar line of reasoning (that, of course, does not involve the idea of 
a retentional background) can be found in Sellars who also argues that in 
order to set up a first, minimal background we do not have to have mental 
episodes yet: 
Thus, while Jones' ability to give inductive reasons today is built on a long 
history of acquiring and manifesting verbal habits in perceptual situations, 
and, in particular, the occurrence of verbal episodes, e.g. 'This is green,' 
which is superficially like those which are later properly said to express ob-
servational knowledge, it does not require that any episode in this prior 
time be characterizeable as expressing knowledge. (Sdlars 1997, 77, §37) 
Since one does not have a background that is necessary for having mental 
episodes in the period of setting up this first, minimal background, the state 
one is in can be no more than a slow awakening from a state of dozing in 
which we do not yet have mental episodes. This state, however, is a necessary 
prerequisite for our mental life, since it is in this state that a minimal back-
ground is set up. 
This outline of the development of a first, minimal background or es-
tablishing constitutive commitment entails that one does not actively choose 
to develop this commitment, but that it is rather enforced on us by our bio-
logical makeup and the social group in which we grow up. We have seen in 
the second chapter that Haugeland characterizes constitutive commitment as 
"a dedicated or even devoted way of living: a determination to carry on'' 
(Haugeland 1998b, 341). I think, as I have pointed out above, that this char-
acterization does not express the fact that we do not have the choice of estab-
lishing this commitment, nor can we decide whether we want to go on with 
it or not. Once one has developed a certain retentional background, it might 
be changed or refined by future experiences, but one cannot give it up alto-
gether, at least not by active choice; we are, in a manner of speaking, trapped 
and forced to carry on.43 
I am aware that this sketch of establishing constitutive commitment is 
very crude and superficial. It is not my goal, however, to work out an account 
of developmental psychology. My goal was merely to show that the account 
of constitution presented above does not fall into an infinite regress. 
THE CONSTITUTION OF MENTAL EPISODES 
So far I have argued that we constitute the objects towards which we are di-
rected in our mental episodes. Now I want to go on to show that not only the 
objects, but also the mental episodes themselves are constituted. This move is 
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not new, nor original. As I have pointed out above, Husserl already claims that 
we constitute conscious phenomena. 
I have described the constitution of objects in terms of associative 
processes that have affective unities as their subjects. According to this ac-
count affective unities are intentional (in a pre-objective sense). In virtue of 
association, they establish a connection to the retentional background, which 
is a central part of the process of constitution. Now I will go on to argue that 
in addition to their role in the constitution of objects, affective unities also 
constitute sensory fields. 
The extension and merger to field-forms is analyzed [by Husser~ as a spe-
cial kind of intentional constitution, as passive association. 'Sense data' 
extend and melt into unities because it obviously belongs to their nature 
as affection to refer intentionally beyond themselves. (Holenstein 1972, 
103 [my translation]44) 
Holenstein uses scare quotes for the expression 'sense data to remind us that 
he is not talking about raw data but rather about intentional unities.45 
I have argued above that when we establish constitutive commitment 
we learn to detect relevant similarities between affective unities. One of them 
is the similarity between affective unities that belong to the same sensory field. 
In consequence, when we develop constitutive commitment we not only start 
to constitute objects, we constitute them in different ways as seen objects, 
heard objects, felt objects, etc. These different ways of constituting objects ac-
count for the different kinds of perceptual experience like seeing, hearing, or 
touching something, and so on. Thus, we learn that there are various kinds of 
position in the logical space of reasons. 
From here it is only a small step to understand that we can make moves 
from one position to another. At a certain moment one might realize, for ex-
ample, that when one sees a green apple and then touches it, one will feel a 
smooth, solid surface. Thus, one learns that one can make a move from a cer-
tain kind of visual experience to a certain kind of tactile experience. This move 
is closely connected with bodily movements, suggesting that the body plays a 
central role in the development of constitutive commitment. In addition, the 
temporal modification accounts for the fact that we can move from being di-
rected towards the present aspect of the object to being directed towards a past 
aspect of the object-we learn to remember past experiences. 
In the process of learning to constitute various kinds of mental episode 
one also has to learn to constitute objects that do not stand in a direct causal 
relation to the episode, as it happens in episodes like wishing or imagining 
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something. The process of learning to move to these positions requires en-
forcement from the social group in which one grows up, especially through 
the acquisition oflanguage. We learn, for example to constitute empirical be-
liefs by being trained to react to certain kinds of affective unity with the ut-
terance "There is an apple!", and similarly for other affective unities and other 
positions in the language-game. By the time one has grasped a fuller under-
standing of the language-game, one understands that this utterance is actually 
justified by a perceptual experience. In addition, one learns that it is an ex-
pression of an empirical belief which is a position in the logical space of rea-
sons that is justified by perceptual experiences and that stands in other 
rational relations to other positions in that logical space-most importantly, 
it can be corrected if it is false.46 In this way one learns to move in the space 
of reasons, which shows that it is the acquisition of language that allows us to 
learn what counts as a reason. 
Through this process one acquires a large repertoire of positions. Other 
than just seeing an apple and believing that it is there one can desire or re-
member it. While the constitution of the object of the empirical belief draws 
on a perceptual experience that takes place at the same time, the episodes of 
remembering or desiring draw on one or more past experiences. With time, 
and with further competence in language, one learns to vary the way in which 
one is directed towards the object; eventually one can move to even more 
complex positions like feeling sympathy, doing calculations, etc. These exam-
ples show that by developing constitutive commitment, one starts not only to 
constitute objects, but also the mental episodes in which we are directed to-
wards these objects. 
I do not want to suggest that one can literally acquire positions in the log-
ical space of reasons one by one. In order to have mental episodes, one has to have 
a full battery of positions and know in which rational relation they stand to other 
positions in the logical space of reasons, i.e., which moves one can make. This 
does not mean that in order to have a mental episode, one has to have a full and 
stable knowledge about all positions and possible moves that, once it is estab-
lished, will always remain the same. The retentional background is rather subject 
to continuous change. With growing experiences, our concepts become richer. 
This goes hand in hand with discovering that there are new moves that can be le-
gitimately made and new positions that can be taken. When I learn that apples 
are edible, for example, I realize that I can make the move from believing that 
there is an apple to believing that there is an edible object. 
Moreover, when the concepts become richer, there are changes in the re-
tentional background which, in turn, bring up changes in the way we constitute 
certain objects in our perceptual experiences. When I see an apple now, after 
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having learnt that apples are edible, I do not see any longer merely a green, solid 
object; I rather see an edible, green, solid object. As Sellars points out, percep-
tual experiences not only justify other positions in the logical space of reasons, 
there is also a logical dimension in which the former rest on the latter.47 
This aspect can also explain how we can come to constitute new objects. 
After a period of training one might start to perceive objects that one could not 
see before. Let's take the example of a doctor and a patient who are analyzing 
the pictures of an ultrasound scan. On the screen, where the patient can see only 
different shades of gray without clear boundaries, the doctor actually sees a pic-
torial representation of the kidney, the liver, etc. Both look at the same screen, 
but only the doctor can see the organs. She does not see gray shades and then in-
terpret them as pictures of kidneys, etc., but rather has a visual experience of a 
(pictorial representation of a) kidney. Similarly, a trained chess player can see at 
one glance whether white is in a good position or not, while it takes an average 
person a lot of time and hard thinking to find out. Also in this example, the dif-
ference between the chess expert and the laymen is that the former sees the ac-
tual position where the latter only sees a group of chess figurines. These 
examples show how changes in the retentional background can lead to changes 
in the way we constitute objects, which demonstrates the importance of educa-
tion-understood in a broad sense as enrichment of one's culture that includes 
both an initiation to certain kinds of practice as well as a development of new 
practices: by making certain kinds of experience in a systematic manner, we en-
rich our retentional background with the effect that we learn to perceive objects 
we could not perceive before; and to arrive at kinds of position in the space of 
reasons that were out of reach before. 

Chapter Four 
The Social Foundation of the Mind 
The social aspect of constitution is an element that clearly does not play a central role 
in Husserl's account of constitution. What is more important, it seems to stand in op-
position to Husserl's overall philosophical position, which is based on the first person 
authority over one's own mental episodes. There might, thus, be a tension between the 
Husserlian elements and the social aspect of constitution, which play a central role in 
the account sketched above, which is why I will discuss this dimension in more depth 
in this chapter. 
IN WHAT SENSE ARE MENTAL EPISODES SOCIAL? 
I have argued above that we learn to constitute different kinds of mental 
episode in a process of social formation. This claim presupposes, of course, 
that we can draw a distinction between the content and the kind of a mental 
episode, a distinction that is mirrored by the one between the illocutionary 
force and propositional content of a speech act. Accordingly, we can also dis-
tinguish between rational relations in the space of reasons that hold in virtue 
of the content and those that hold in virtue of the mental kind of the episode. 
An example of the former is the move from believing that there is an apple on 
my plate to believing that there is an edible object on my plate; an example of 
the latter is the move from seeing that there is an apple to believing that there 
is an apple. 
Mental kinds are characterized by the rational relations of mental 
episodes to other positions in the logical space of reasons that do not hold in 
virtue of the content of that episode. In order to acquire new mental kinds one 
has to learn which moves one can make to and from these positions in virtue 
of their being of a certain mental kind. Apart from some basic mental episodes 
one learns about these possible moves through social practices, mainly by 
learning how the word that describes a specific mental kind is used in language. 
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In order to constitute the episode of holding an empirical belief, for example, 
one has to understand that this is the kind of position that is justified by em-
pirical experiences. Similarly, an act of remembering is, roughly speaking, a po-
sition that is justified by perceptual experiences one had in the past. 
There might be a temptation to assume that one has had various kinds 
of mental episode already before one learns about their rational relations in 
the logical space of reasons. When someone learns that holding an empiri-
cal belief is a mental episode that is justified by a perceptual experience, she 
does not learn to constitute it, one might argue; she rather learns that the 
kind of mental episode that she already had before counts as "holding an 
empirical belief"; similarly it might be argued that one can see objects, i.e. 
one can have visual experiences before learning the rational relations that 
hold between visual experiences and other positions in the logical space of 
reasons. This line of reasoning is clearly based on the Cartesian assumption 
that one can have mental episodes and, in addition, can have full introspec-
tive knowledge concerning one's occurrent mental episodes, even if one 
does not know anything about their rational relations to other mental 
episodes, or, to bring it more to the point, even if one does not master ra-
tional relations at all. It might even be argued that there are some episodes 
about which one can have full introspective knowledge without being able 
to describe or communicate them at all, and that only artists, composers, or 
poets can come close to expressing the inexpressible. 
This view stands in sharp contrast to the account of constitution that I 
am proposing, which has no place for mental episodes that cannot be ex-
pressed in language or manifested in other social practices. Since mental kinds 
are defined by their rational relations to other positions in the space of rea-
sons, one can experience an episode of a certain kind only if one has at least a 
rough understanding of what moves one can make to and from this episode 
in virtue of its being an episode of this kind. Similarly for the content of the 
episode: in order to have an experience of a certain object, one has to have at 
least a rough understanding of which moves one is entitled to make in virtue 
of the content of experience. In order to acquire this knowledge, these rational 
relations have to be manifested in language or other social practices. Hence, 
it is possible in principle to describe the kind and the content of mental 
episodes by showing their rational relations to other positions in the logical 
space of reasons or by referring to the social practices through which we have 
mastered these relations. 
The fact that our being able to constitute certain kinds of mental 
episode depends on social practices entails an interesting consequence: if our 
social practices were different, so would be our mental lives. Let us imagine 
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an isolated community in a hidden and secluded valley deep in the Alps which 
has never been in contact with any person from outside the community. Let 
us assume further that the community's language and social practices are quite 
different from ours. If it is correct that the acquisition of mental kinds de-
pends on social practices, these people must have experiences at least some of 
which are different in kind from the ones we have. 
I think that this assumption is quite reasonable; I do want to empha-
size, however, that the conceivable differences cannot be as radical as it 
might at first seem. Due to the similarities of our biological makeup-we 
are all equipped with the same sense organs-we should expect that also 
the members of our imaginary Alpine tribe distinguish between seeing, 
hearing, smelling, and feeling something. In addition, some mental kinds 
emerge from one of the basic aspects of language, namely describing the 
world. Exclamations like "There is an apple!" and their respective counter-
parts in other languages express mental episodes that are justified by per-
ceptual experiences. If we admit that every language of a certain 
complexity must involve illocutionary acts that serve to describe the world, 
it is very likely that we will also find the notion of holding empirical be-
liefs in all language communities. The mental lives of all human beings will 
therefore include at least various kinds of perceptual experience and 
episodes like holding empirical beliefs. 
It is, however, possible that language communities differ with respect to 
other, more complex mental kinds. There might be a community that does 
not know episodes like being jealous, performing mathematical calculations, 
or doubting something, for example. The point is not that there might be 
people who merely do not have a word for jealousy, calculations, or doubt in 
their vocabulary, but rather that they never actually experience these kinds of 
mental episode. This means, of course, that their social practices differ from 
ours in some relevant respects. I do not want to argue that they can have a 
conceptual scheme, a way to see the world so radically different from ours that 
we cannot translate it into our scheme. Given that people from this commu-
nity come in touch with our culture and learn to speak our language, they will 
be able to understand "jealousy," "doubt," and "calculation'' and might, even-
tually, even doubt, have the experience of being jealous, and perform calcula-
tions.1 As long as the members of this community do not get in touch with 
members of our community, however, their mental lives will not include these 
kinds of experience. 
This argumentation heavily relies on the claim that all mental episodes 
can be expressed in language or at least be manifested in social practices. It is 
often argued, however, that we have experiences that cannot be described at 
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all. When Dante comes to describe the highest spheres of paradise in the 
Divine Comedy, for example, he writes: 
From that point on, what I could see was greater/than speech can show: 
at such a sight, it fails - /and memory fails when faced with such excess. 
(Dante Alighieri 1982, 292, [Par. XXXIII, 55]) 
Dante reports that during his visit to paradise he had visual experiences that 
were so particular that the means oflanguage do not suffice to describe them, 
nor can memory cope with them. 
One way to resolve this tension is to distinguish between feelings or sen-
sations on the one hand, and experiences on the other. 2 Feelings and sensa-
tions are impacts on the nervous system that, ideally, can be fully explained 
and predicted by scientific laws and, therefore, are standings in the logical 
space of nature. Experiences, on the other hand, are constituted mental 
episodes that stand in rational relations to other mental episodes, which 
means that they must be conceptually structured. They are positions in the 
logical space of reasons and, thus, cannot be explained by the laws of science, 
but follow the rules of rationality. While experiences are directed towards 
something as an object, sensations are not intentional. In some cases mental 
episodes are caused by feelings, like perceptual experiences that are caused by 
sensory stimulation. This does not mean, however, that feelings become a part 
of the experiences, as McDowell points out: 
The fundamental point is the distinction between foundations and 
(mere) causal antecedents: non-conceptual pain (in pre-linguistic in-
fants) is a causal antecedent of the ability to have conceptual pain 
episodes, not a continuing ingredient in them which grounds the con-
ceptual structures involved. (McDowell 1989, 288) 
Thus, we can distinguish the feeling of pain from the experience of pain, for 
example. In order to experience pain, one has to know its rational relations to 
other positions in the logical space of reasons; in other words, one has to have 
constitutive commitment. One has to know that from experiencing pain one 
can move to believing that one is injured and wishing to see a doctor, for ex-
ample. The experience of pain is caused by a feeling of pain. Once constitu-
tive commitment is established, however, one cannot have a mere feeling of 
pain, but one automatically constitutes the pain-experience, for one cannot 
give up constitutive commitment, as I have argued above. 
An organism that has not established constitutive commitment, on the 
other hand, can feel pain simply if it has a nervous system that is complex 
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enough to process a certain kind of stimulus. This stimulus might even cause 
the reflex to move away from the source of the pain. This movement, however, 
is not an intentional action, but a mere stimulus-response pattern that can be 
fully described in terms of scientific laws. It is, thus, not a move in the logical 
space of reasons. While it might be difficult, if not impossible, to describe the 
feeling of pain, there must be some social practice on the basis of which we can 
express the experience of pain; otherwise we could not constitute it in the first 
place. If there is no word for a specific experience in our language, one could 
still describe it in virtue ofits rational relations to other mental episodes, in this 
way also mystical experiences like the one Dante speaks about must be describ-
able. Similarly, the goal of poetry cannot be to describe the indescribable, but 
rather that which is difficult to express with words. 
Thus, when Dante writes "How incomplete is speech, how weak, when 
set/against my thought" (Dante Alighieri 1982, 196 [Par. XXXIII, 121f]) he 
merely points out that he had experiences that are difficult to describe, but de-
scribing them cannot be impossible in principle. In fact, after pointing out the 
difficulties of expressing what he has seen, Dante goes on to describe the in-
effable, i.e., his experience of God, using a geometrical metaphor of three cir-
cles of different colors that are of the same dimension. 
In sum, I am proposing that experiencing different kinds of mental 
episode depends on a process of acquiring various positions in the logical 
space of reasons which, in turn, depends on mastering the rational relations 
that hold between these positions. Since we learn about these relations by 
growing up in a social group and adopting social practices, having mental 
episodes essentially depends on growing up in a social group. If one were miss-
ing that social foundation, one could still have neurological reactions that 
some might be inclined to call feelings or sensations. In order to have experi-
ences, however, one has to be able to perform moves in the logical space of 
reasons, which requires one's adaptation of social practices. 
WHAT KINDS OF RATIONAL REIATION ARE THERE? 
I have argued that mental episodes are positions in the logical space of reasons 
that are defined by their rational relations to other positions. So far I have not 
discussed, however, what kinds of rational relation hold between mental 
episodes. Using the term 'rational relation,' I want to stress that these rela-
tions-unlike causal relations--cannot be described on the basis of scientific 
laws. Sellars, who originally developed the metaphor of the space of reasons, 
often talks about the relations between different positions in that space in terms 
of justification and inference. This might suggest that positions in the space of 
reasons are judgments that justify and are justified by other judgments, with the 
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obvious exceptions of perception or language entry transitions, and action or 
language exit transitions, which play a special role in this logical space. 3 
Perceptual experiences are not inferred from other positions in the logical space 
of reasons; according to Sellars they are justified by reliability conditions.4 
Perception is, thus, a transition from something that is not a position in the log-
ical space of reasons to a position in that space. Intentional actions, on the other 
hand, are transitions from a position in the space of reasons to a bodily move-
ment that is not a position in that space. 
All other positions in the logical space of reasons justify and are justified 
by other positions. This does not mean, however, that we need to make a log-
ically valid inference to move from one position in the space of reasons to an-
other. Sellars has a very broad notion of inference, distinguishing between 
formal or logically valid inferences on the one hand, and material inferences 
on the other. The latter are direct inferences of statements like q>a to lj.ia that 
are valid due to the meaning of the terms involved. Accordingly, the proposi-
tions "The streets will be wet" directly follows from the proposition "It is rain-
ing"; Sellars contradicts the claim that this inference is an enthymeme, which 
could be turned into a valid inference only by adding the missing premise "If 
it is raining, the streets will be wet."5 
Sellars' move hints at the fact that a formal logical understanding of jus-
tification and inference cannot cope with the wide variety of rational relations 
that can hold in the logical space of reasons. One might even have to go one 
step beyond Sellars' notion of inference to describe all the moves that we are 
entitled to make. It might be too restrictive, for example, to equate possible 
moves in the space of reasons with valid inferences from true propositions to 
other true propositions, 6 for that might exclude phenomena like creativity or 
fantasy from the range of possible moves. 
Let me illustrate this point with two examples. First, one can move to the 
mental episode of (i) imagining a pink elephant from the positions of (ii) see-
ing (or remembering) an elephant and (iii) seeing (or remembering) something 
that is pink. The move from these two positions to the first requires us to apply 
the predicate of (iit) to the subject of (ii). In addition, positions of imagining 
are not true or false; we are thus required to transform the two judgments into 
a kind of position that does not have a truth-value. To put it less formally, we 
have to modify the mental kind and merge the contents of the two positions 
to move to the third. Now, we could say that the episode of imagining a pink 
elephant is justified by the other two episodes. I think, however, that this char-
acterization does not well describe our actual move. The point is not that (i) is 
justified (in the strict, logical sense), but that we could not move to this posi-
tion had we not had an experience that was about an elephant and one about 
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something that was pink. Imagining a pink elephant, thus, does not require us 
to make a valid inference-not even a material inference, for we do not move 
from true propositions to another true proposition-but rather to make a 
move that is better described in terms of fantasy or creative thinking. 
Second, in the preceding section I have pointed out that episodes of re-
membering something are justified (in the strict sense) by past perceptual ex-
periences. If we only think in terms of logical justification, this should be 
sufficient to characterize this mental kind. It is, however, not enough to show 
how we actually move to positions of this kind. We move to episodes of re-
membering something from other experiences which strictly speaking do not 
justify them. Listening to a song, for example, might remind me of the day 
when I first met my partner. In what follows, I might remember the dress she 
was wearing, the first words she said to me, etc. The episode of remembering 
is justified (in the strict sense) by the fact that I had certain experiences in the 
past. The actual move I perform to the episode of remembering that moment, 
on the other hand, is made from the mental episodes of hearing the melody. 
These examples show that the relations that hold in the logical space of 
reasons go far beyond valid inferences; they also include moves that are best de-
scribed as association, creative thinking, or fantasy, etc. Nonetheless, all the po-
sitions in the space of reasons are part of a rationalizing account that shows why 
it is reasonable to make the actual moves we do. Moving from hearing a melody 
to remembering the first time I met my partner, for example, can be accounted 
for by the fact that I heard that very melody when I first saw my partner. 
I cannot give a full list of all the kinds of move one can make in the space 
of reasons. There are, however, some characteristics that can help to distin-
guish various groups of moves. The above examples have shown that there are 
moves that change the 'direction of fit,'7 like the move we make from percep-
tual experiences to episodes of imagining or wishing something. The former 
have, to use Searle's terminology, a world to mind direction of fit, i.e., they 
can be true or false; the episode of imagining something has the null direction 
of fit, it does not have a truth value, nor can it be fulfilled by the world. 
Wishing something, finally, has the mind to world direction of fit; if my wish 
does not accord with how things are in the world, I have to change the world, 
and not my wish. 
In addition, we can distinguish between moves that require a certain ef-
fort, like making logical inferences or imagining something, and moves that 
do not, like an association that brings about an episode of remembering some-
thing. The latter kind of move includes passive processes that Husser! calls 
'passive synthesis' and 'association' and that, according to him, establish the 
first level of constitution. These passive processes of association also take a 
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central place in the account of constitution that I have outlined in the third 
chapter; they bring about affective unities and establish the associative con-
nections between these unities and the retentional background. 
The fact that we do not have to make an effort to establish these passive 
relations does not imply that they are causal relations. It is in our power to 
change these passive processes; we can constitute different objects even 
though the causal chain that leads to the experience stays the same. Due to 
what above I have called the conservative character of constitution it is not 
easy to bring about these changes, and in general one needs a good reason to 
do so; our habits that guide the process of constitution are very strong. There 
are some examples, however, where we can make these changes quite easily. 
When one comes to a city for the first time, for example, one tends to see 
houses. If one is told that this is not an actual city, but only a group of facades 
built for the sole purpose of shooting movies here, one switches to constitut-
ing facades rather than houses, even though the visual experiences are caused 
by the same objects. There are even some cases where we can switch back and 
forth between constituting two different objects. This can be the case when 
we look at a picture puzzle like the duck-rabbit (fig. 3):8 once one has discov-
ered the ambiguity of the picture, one can switch back and forth from consti-
tuting a visual experience of a picture of a duck to constituting a visual 
experience of a picture of a rabbit. 
Figure 3 
PERCEPTUAL EXPERIENCE VS. THE SOCIAL DIMENSION 
OF THE LOGICAL SPACE OF REASONS: THE BRANDOM-
MCDOWELL DEBATE 
In recent years Robert Brandom and John McDowell have engaged in a de-
bate concerning the social dimension of the logical space of reasons. 9 One of 
the central topics of this exchange was Brandom's critique that McDowell's 
notion of prejudgmental perceptual experience reflects a residual individual-
ism in his position. Since the notion of perceptual experience as prejudgmen-
tal episodes also takes a central place in the account of constitution that I am 
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proposing, I will now go on to discuss whether there is a tension between this 
notion and the social aspect of the space of reasons. I will first outline the de-
bate between the two philosophers and then apply it to the notion of percep-
tual experience that I am working with. This discussion will show that my 
account of constitution does not imply individualism. 
The debate begins with an argument by McDowell against a deforma-
tion of the Sellarsian picture of standings in the logical space of reasons which 
consists in an "interiorization of the space of reasons, a withdrawal of it from 
the external world. This happens when we suppose that we ought to be able 
to achieve flawless standings in the space of reasons by our own unaided re-
sources, without needing the world doing us any favors" (McDowell 1995, 
877). McDowell argues against positions like Davidson's coherentism, ac-
cording to which there is only a causal, but not a rational relation between 
mental and physical events. He criticizes these positions by pointing out that 
the only way in which we can make sense of positions in the space of reasons 
is by acknowledging that some of them are justified by facts. He holds that 
there is a "direct figuring of manifest fact in the space of reasons" (McDowell 
1995, 890, fn. 24). Consequently, the world is part of the logical space of rea-
sons, which is, as McDowell notes, identical with "the space of concepts" 
(McDowell 1995, 888). 
In his reply to McDowell, Brandom states that he is in general agree-
ment with McDowell's argument but thinks that it should be supplemented 
with a stronger emphasis on "a crucial dimension of the space of reasons that 
McDowell never mentions: its essentially social articulation" (Brandom 1995, 
895). He argues that McDowell is individualizing the space of reasons, a de-
formation as bad as its interiorization. According to Brandom, there is a resid-
ual individualism in McDowell's position that has its roots in his notion of 
perceptual experience that he defines as a "comcious experience that is prejudg-
mental, but nonetheless through and through conceptually contentful" 
(Brandom 1998, 369). Brandom holds that there is a gap between 
McDowell's diagnosis and the therapy he recommends which becomes visible 
in his "move from the need for rational constraint by the world . .. to rational 
constraint by experience" (Brandom 1996, 255). McDowell's individualism 
consists in his view that one's perceptual judgments are justified by one's own 
perceptual experiences. Insisting on that notion of perceptual experience, 
McDowell is "overlooking other alternatives" (Brandom 1998, 374) that 
could solve the problems that concern him. 
One of the alternatives that Brandom has in mind is his own account 
that defines standings in the space of reasons in terms of commitments and 
entitlements to these commitments. Occupying a position in the space of 
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reasons, Brandom suggests, is "staking a claim, that is, undertaking a com-
mitment of the sort that might be expressed by making a claim or assertion" 
(Brandom 1995, 898). One has to be entitled to undertake such a commit-
ment. In addition, a commitment can inherit or derive its entitlement from 
another one. "Together this means that commitments can both serve as a 
stand in need of reasons" (Brandom 1995, 898). 
According to Brandom, knowledge "incorporates and depends on the 
social difference of perspective between attributing a commitment (to an-
other) and undertaking a commitment (oneself)" (Brandom 1996, 904). In 
the case of non-inferential knowledge, the knower might be unable to give 
justification for committing to a judgment. The justification for my position 
can come from another person who attributes the commitment to me. 
According to Brandom, there "is an inferential connection between a suitably 
noninferentially acquired commitment attributed to you and a corresponding 
commitment that I undertake. It is treating your commitment as a (defeasi-
ble) reason for my own" (Brandom 1995, 906). Non-inferential knowledge, 
thus, is justified by the fact that reliability conditions are met, a fact that is at-
tributed to the knower by the interpreter. While McDowell holds that every 
knower can arrive on her own at perceptual knowledge, Brandom argues that 
in order to know one depends on an interpreter who justifies one's knowledge. 
The externalist epistemologist who takes reliability to warrant the attri-
bution of knowledge in the absence of justification relies precisely on this 
essentially interpersonal pattern of inference .... although it is enough 
that the subject of knowledge be reliable to be entitled to a belief (with-
out having to be able to cite that reliability as a reason for it), the attrib-
utor of knowledge has to be able to cite that reliability as such a reason. 
(Brandom 1995, 906) 
According to Brandom, positions in the space of reasons are judgments that 
stand in justificatory relations to other judgments or facts. Some of these rela-
tions, however, are interpersonal. I might hold a position that I cannot justify 
myself, but that could be justified by someone else. The fact that I am reliable 
with respect to observational judgments in specified circumstances, which is 
attributed to me by an interpreter, makes them likely to be true in those cir-
cumstances. Brandom concludes that this position meets the rational con-
straint constraint: "That reliability (in specified circumstances) as a reporter is 
likelihood of truth (in those circumstances) of reports ensures that the connec-
tion envisaged by reliabilists between reported facts and reports of them is not 
merely causal, but also rational" (Brandom 1996, 251f). With this strong em-
phasis on the social aspect of the logical space of reasons Brandom claims that 
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he can do without the notion of prejudgmental perceptual experiences that jus-
tify perceptual judgments and still hold the principle that there must be a ra-
tional relation between mind and world. With this theory of a perspectival 
interplay, Brandom states, he avoids McDowell's residual individualism. 
McDowell criticizes Brandom's conception of the social space of rea-
sons; he doubts that Brandom actually succeeds in demonstrating that there 
is a rational relation between facts and observational reports. "From the 
point of view of the responder, the response Brandom wants to be entitled 
to see as an observational report degenerates, just because of the picture's ex-
ternalism, into a blind reaction to she knows not what" (McDowell 1996b, 
294). That is, the observation report is not justified by the facts, but is only 
a blind reaction. Moreover, the observer does not even know what she is re-
acting to. Brandom's position "eliminates the perceivable facts from what 
was supposed to be the perspective of the perceiver" (McDowell 1997, 161) 
and consequently fails to show that there is a rational relation between facts 
and observation reports. 
Brandom replies to this critique by pointing out that the rational con-
nection is established by the interpreter who can provide the justification for 
the observer's statement. McDowell counters that this does not suffice toes-
tablish a rational relation between facts and observation reports because, ac-
cording to Brandom's theory, neither the observer nor the interpreter can 
stand in direct rational relations to facts. He states "that the supposed inter-
preter's observational hold on reality is in turn made unintelligible by the pic-
ture's externalism" (McDowell 1996b, 295). He argues that at least some 
observers have to stand in direct rational relations to facts, which can be 
achieved only through perceptual experiences. Thus, one cannot replace the 
notion of perceptual experience with the social dimension of the space of rea-
sons to establish that rational relation. In other words, Brandom cannot meet 
the rational constraint constraint which, however, is part of conceptualism, 
the view that the space of reasons extends into the actual world, which, ac-
cording to Brandom, is "a defining point for Pittsburgh neo-Hegelians" 
(Brandom 1996, 259) 10• 
In his reply, Brandom rejects the conclusion of McDowell's argument. 
According to his account, the interpreter does not have to stand in direct, rational 
contact to the world in order to attribute the meeting of the reliability conditions 
to the perceiver. "Those who keep deontic score take interlocutors to be entitkd 
only to those noninferential reports that arise by exercise of (what they take to 
be) reliable reporting capacities" (Brandom 1997, 191). It is sufficient for the in-
terpreter to know that I am trained in making a kind of non-inferential report, 
in order to attribute commitment to the perceiver. Brandom goes on: 
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Fmm the point of view of such a scorekeeper, I may be entitled to my 
claim that the potsherd in front of me is Toltec rather than Mayan ifI in 
fact have become reliable in distinguishing them - even if I am still so 
uncertain of my newly learned skill in this regard that I am not disposed 
to claim such reliability as a justification of my noninferentially acquired 
beliefs. (Brandom 1997, 191) 
It is, thus, sufficient that the interpreter knows that I am in general reliable in dis-
tinguishing Toltec from Mayan potsherds to justify my non-inferential belie£ 
Finally, McDowell rejects Brandom's critique that his notion of perceptual 
experience is the result of residual individualism. He states that "the very idea of 
a thinker is unintelligible except in the context of the idea of initiation into a 
shared language, conceived as a repository of tradition" (McDowell 1996b, 
295£). The notion of perceptual experience, thus, is anti-individualistic; it ac-
knowledges that there is a social dimension of the logical space of reasons. 
The root of the disagreement between Brandom and McDowell is 
their respective views concerning justification of perceptual judgments and 
the extent of the social dimension of the space of reasons. While McDowell 
argues that every single perceptual judgment has to be justified by a percep-
tual experience that stands in direct rational relations to the world, 
Brandom claims that I can hold perceptual judgments without being able 
to justify them, as long as there is somebody who interprets my judgment 
and is able to justify it for me. McDowell suggests that their disagreements 
are based on different conceptions of justification. "Brandom assumes, and, 
amazingly, takes me to assume, that justification that rules out falsity can-
not be had for empirical claims" (McDowell, 2002, 98). While Brandom 
seems to suggest that we can be entitled to claims that are false, as it is the 
case in perceptual error, McDowell insist that "in the best case the subject 
can have an entitlement consisting in the fact that she sees that there is a can-
dle in front of her" (2002, 99). If there is no actual candle in front of the 
person, but only the mirror image of a candle, she is not entitled (in 
McDowell's sense) to the claim that there is a candle. He admits that "some 
notion of entitlement might have application in ... [this] mirror case. It 
might be rational (doxastically blameless) for that subject ... to claim that 
there is a candle in front of her" (2002, 99). His own strict notion of enti-
tlement, which he claims to be closer to Sellars' intentions, is "a notion for 
which entitlement and truth do not come apart" (2002, 99). 
This discussion has some interesting implications for the account of con-
stitution that I am proposing. Like McDowell, I use the notion of prejudgmen-
tal perceptual experience and think that once constitutive commitment is 
established, one does not need an interpreter to justify a perceptual judgment. 
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I have argued that perceptual experiences stand in direct, intentional relations 
to the objects that are perceived. Brandom could object that this characteriza-
tion of perceptual experiences amounts to individualizing the space of reasons 
and, as in his critique of McDowell's position, he could argue that this individ-
ualization is a symptom of a residual individualism. 
I do not think that this critique is justified. Brandom is right when he 
points out that the space of reasons is a shared space11 ; one position in that 
space can be occupied by several persons at the same time, as it were. 
Nevertheless, this social conception of the space of reasons does not imply 
that my perceptual judgments can be justified only through an interpreter 
who justifies the fact that I am meeting the reliability conditions. I think that 
Brandom does not put enough emphasis on the fact that in order to have ob-
servational knowledge one has to stand in direct contact with objects in one's 
environment. Individuals have perceptual experiences, each of them standing 
in direct contact with its object. The relation between experience and object 
is based on a particular causal chain, it is an impact from a particular object 
on a particular person's sense organs. 
I have argued above that we can establish constitutive commitment 
only on a social basis. Once one has established constitutive commitment, 
however, one does not need an interpreter to constitute the object and the 
perceptual experience, which, in turn, can justify perceptual judgments. 
This transition is made by the person who stands in a causal relation to the 
object perceived. In some respects, therefore, occupying a specific position 
in the space of reasons is an individual achievement. The fact that one is 
able to occupy positions in the space of reasons, on the other hand, is pos-
sible only because one shares social practices with the group, in which one 
grows up, and because perceptual experiences are caused by the perceived 
object. 12 The account that I am proposing is, thus, characterized by a 
strong anti-individualistic element. 
Burge characterizes individualism as a position according to which "the 
nature and individuation of an individual's mental kinds are 'in principle' in-
dependent of the nature and individuation of all aspects of the individual's en-
vironment" (Burge 1986, 117). Individualism, then, is a position according 
to which the content and kind of a mental episode are independent of the in-
dividual's physical and social environment. The fact that individuals have per-
ceptual experiences and that they can occupy this kind of position in the 
logical space of reasons without the help of an interpreter does not imply that 
my position is individualistic according to Burge's definition. Brandom might 
still argue that the assumption that a person can stand in direct contact with 
objects in her environment is the result of a different form of individualism 
82 The Constitution Of Consciousness 
that he calls 'residual individualism.' In that case, however, he has to show 
what exactly he means by 'residual individualism' and, most importantly, why 
this form of individualism is problematic. 
THE SOCIAL ASPECT OF THE MIND AND 
PHENOMENOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 
The use of Sellars' notion of the logical space of reasons might cause a tension 
in the account of constitution that I have outlined above; especially with the 
claim that we can master moves in the logical space of reasons only through 
social practices and that consequently one can have mental episodes only if 
one has grown up in a social group. According to this view, positions in the 
space of reasons are shared positions which can be occupied by several persons 
at the same time. This characterization, however, seems to undermine an as-
pect of mental episodes that is quite essential: mental episodes are private, in 
the sense that they are experienced by the person who has them. Moreover, 
this person has a special authority with respect to the mental episodes she ex-
periences. This authority stems from the asymmetry between ascribing men-
tal episodes to oneself and ascribing them to someone else. Yet, if mental 
episodes are shared positions in the space of reasons, it seems to be difficult, 
if not impossible, to explain this asymmetry. 
Burge discusses in several places the connection between Descartes' view 
that we have direct knowledge of our own mental episodes and individualism. 
He points out that Descartes argues that from the fact that he has "a dear and 
distinct idea ofhimself only as a thinking and unextended thing" (Burge 1988, 
650), it follows that the mind can exist independently of the body. 
One can argue in analogy that, since one can 'shut off' these thoughts 
from all corporeal substance, they are independent for their natures from 
physical bodies in the environment, and presumably from other 
thinkers. This line of argument implies that knowledge of one's own 
thoughts guarantees the truth of individualism. (Burge 1988, 651) 
Thus, Burge argues that individualism can be a consequence of first person 
authority. The problem is that Husserl's phenomenological method is also 
based on one's authority of one's own mental episodes. Everything that con-
cerns the physical world, and thus the relation between perceptual experiences 
and perceived objects, are bracketed in the phenomenological reduction. 
Burge even names Husser! in a list of philosophers who hold an individualis-
tic position. 13 It seems, therefore, that there is a tension between the anti-in-
dividualistic account of constitution that I am proposing and Husserl's 
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philosophical method, a tension that might be pressing since I have used some 
of Husserl's results to formulate that account. 
Burge criticizes Descartes' position using an argument that was first 
brought up by Arnauld. 14 He points out that our having a clear and distinct idea 
about our current mental episodes does not necessarily entail individualism be-
cause it does not provide us with "sufficient clarity about the nature of mental 
events to justify him [i.e., Descartes] in claiming that their natures are independ-
ent of relations to physical objects" (Burge 1988, 651). This argument shows that 
Descartes' conclusion does not follow from his premises, but it does not explain 
why many philosophers found individualism appealing. Using Putnam's twin-
earth example15, Burge discusses why we have the strong intuition that by intro-
spection we could not tell the difference between a mental experience about 
water on earth and one about twater on twin-earth. He acknowledges that these 
two episodes are exactly the same with respect to their "pure phenomenological 
feels'' (Burge 1988, 653). We can individuate these episodes, however, by having 
them while we form second order episodes that are directed towards them: 
We 'individuate' our thoughts, or discriminate them from others, by 
thinking those and not the others, self-ascriptively. Crudely put, our 
knowledge of our own thoughts is immediate, not discursive. (Burge 
1988, 656) 
Accordingly, I can individuate the episode about water as the episode that I 
have now, even though I might not be able to distinguish this episode from 
one about twater. Burge holds that knowledge about one's own thoughts is a 
second-order episode that includes a first-order episode. The cognitive con-
tent of the second-order episode "is logically locked (self-referentially) onto 
the first-order content which it contains and takes as its subject matter" 
(Burge 1988, 660). 
Burge holds that even though we are infallible about having a certain 
mental episode, we might not know what this episode is about or how its con-
tent could be explicated: 
One clearly does not have first-person authority about whether one of 
one's thoughts is to be explicated or individuated in such and such a way. 
Nor is there any apparent reason to assume that, in general, one must be 
able to explicate one's thoughts correctly in order to know that one is 
thinking them. {Burge 1988, 662) 
Thus, Burge argues, like Descartes, that we can know our own mental states 
and that this self-knowledge is infallible. Their positions differ, however, in 
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the way they characterize self-knowledge. While Burge holds that this kind of 
knowledge is self-referential, Descartes is "construing self-knowledge as a per-
fected perceptual knowledge" (Burge 1988, 660). For Descartes, episodes that 
lead to self-knowledge are directed towards an object, just like perceptual ex-
periences, with the only difference that the objects that they are directed at are 
mental episodes rather than physical objects. The difficulty of this position is, 
according to Burge, that one has to explain where the infallibility of self-
knowledge comes from. In addition, Burge states that this strategy is miscon-
ceived: "Justification lies not in the having of supplemental background 
knowledge, but in the character and function of the self-evaluating judg-
ments" (Burge 1988, 660). 
The analogy between perception and self-knowledge is the root of 
Descartes' individualism. Descartes argues that we have complete and infalli-
ble knowledge about our mental episodes. The problem arises when anti-in-
dividualists like Burge point out that the content of a perceptual experience 
depends the object that caused it. Accordingly, the experience of water and 
that of twater have different contents, even though we might not be able to 
tell the difference. This example suggests that our self-knowledge, conceived 
in the Cartesian way, might not be as infallible as it first seemed and that we 
need further justification for it. One way to react to these worries is to argue 
that knowing about the relation to the actual object is not relevant for self-
knowledge and to deny that the content of the experience depends on the ob-
ject that is perceived; in other words, to fall back on individualism. 
Burge's account of self-knowledge has striking similarities with 
Brentano's account of inner perception. Brentano distinguishes between inner 
observation and inner perception. 16 Inner observation is a mental episode 
that is directed towards another mental episode that one experiences simulta-
neously. Brentano holds the principle of the unity of consciousness, though, 
according to which we can have only one mental episode at a time. If we are 
directed towards more than one object in different ways, for example if we 
hear a melody and see a violinist at the same time, these mental episodes form 
a unity, they form one single mental episode. 17 Consequently, we cannot have 
an episode of inner observation and another one that is observed at the same 
time. In inner observation we could, thus, only be directed towards past men-
tal experiences. In consequence, one cannot actually observe, but only re-
member one's own mental episodes. Memory, however, is not infallible and 
can therefore not lead to infallible self-knowledge. 18 Hence, Brentano would 
agree with Burge that the Cartesian position according to which self-knowl-
edge is based on mental episodes that are directed towards other mental 
episodes cannot lead to infallible self-knowledge. 
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Inner perception, on the other hand, is infallible. According to 
Brentano, every mental episode is directed towards an object. Besides that, 
however, every mental episode is incidentally also directed towards a second-
ary object, namely itsel£ Brentano explains the notion of secondary object, 
using the example of an auditory experience: 
In the same mental phenomenon in which the sound is present to our 
minds we simultaneously apprehend the mental phenomenon itself. 
What is more, we apprehend it in accordance with its dual nature inso-
far as it has the sound as content within it, and insofar as it has itself as 
the content at the same time. We can say that the sound is the primary 
object of the act of hearing, and that the act of hearing itself is the second-
ary object. (Brentano 1995, 127) 
Thus, Brentano's notion of inner perception is very similar to Burge's notion 
of self-referential self-knowledge, although there is one crucial difference be-
tween the two notions. While Brentano holds that every single mental episode 
has to be directed towards itself as a secondary object, Burge does not state 
that self-knowledge is part of every mental episode. Both philosophers agree 
in denying that infallible self-knowledge can derive from mental episodes that 
have other mental episodes as their objects, though. 
What consequences has this discussion for the phenomenological 
method of describing mental episodes from a first-person point of view? The 
Arnauld/Burge argument shows that from first person authority and the fact 
that we can introspect our own mental episodes, it does not follow that our 
mental episodes can exist independently of our physical environment or other 
thinkers. This shows that phenomenology is not necessarily incompatible 
with anti-individualism. It might seem, however, that Burge's position allows 
only for a very impoverished version of phenomenology: our knowledge 
about our current mental episodes is infallible, but we might not even know 
what they are about nor be able to explicate them. Husserl's phenomenologi-
cal method, on the other hand, is based on the principle that we can describe 
our own mental episodes with a high degree of accuracy. 
I think, however, that the two positions are closer than it might seem 
at first. This becomes clear when we remind ourselves that the phenome-
nologist is interested in the structure of mental episodes, and not in the 
physical objects towards which we are directed in our perceptual experi-
ences. Since self-knowledge, according to Burge, stems from second order 
episodes the content of which is self-referentially locked to that of the 
first-order content, it does not even create a difficulty that we might not 
be able to explicate the first-order episode. We can individuate the episode 
86 The Constitution Of Consciousness 
on the basis of the self-referential relation between the second-order and 
the first-order episode. We might not know whether a specific perceptual 
experience is about water or twater, and still have a second-order episode 
that is about that experience and, thus, indirectly directed towards water 
or twater, respectively. 
In sum, the fact that phenomenological analysis is based on first-person 
descriptions of one's mental episodes does not imply that it is an individual-
istic position or that one could have mental episodes independently of their 
social foundation. Burge's anti-individualism, on the other hand, allows for 
first-person descriptions of one's own mental episodes, as the parallel between 
his account of self-knowledge and Brentano's account of secondary conscious-
ness shows: Brentano's method of descriptive psychology is based on the fact 
that mental episodes are incidentally directed towards themselves. 
Chapter Five 
Constitution and Idealism 
The main problem in adopting the notion of constitution in the context of philoso-
phy of mind is that it can have the flavor of creating or establishing reality; the expres-
sion 'to constitute objects' might suggest that the existence of objects depends on an 
activity of the mind; thus, it might seem that the adoption of this notion invites a 
form ofidealism. Indeed, as I have pointed out above, there is an affinity between the 
notion of constitution and transcendental idealism in the work of Husserl. Kern 
shows that Husserl's turn towards transcendental idealism was made possible by his 
account of genetic constitution. 1 A similar point is made by Ingarden who character-
izes the fundamental thesis of transcendental idealism in the following way: 
what is real is nothing but a constituted noematic unit (individual) of a 
special kind of sense which in its being and quality results from a set of 
experiences of a special kind and is quite impossible without them. 
(lngarden 1975, 21) 
Since the account of constitution that I have outlined above is strongly influ-
enced by Husserl's phenomenology, I will now go on to discuss whether my 
account also implies a form of idealism. I will show that it neither implies nor 
invites idealism; rather it provides an interesting perspective on the realism-
idealism debate. I will try to develop this perspective by considering a late-
Wittgensteinian argument, according to which the position of the idealist or 
idealist sceptic, who has a general doubt concerning the existence of physical 
objects, cannot be formulated meaningfully. 
A LATE-WITTGENSTEINIAN ARGUMENT 
In his last book On Certainty Wittgenstein discusses problems of knowledge. 
He develops an argument against positions that can be characterized by their 
giving different answers to the general question "Do physical objects exist (in-
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dependently of the mind)?," namely metaphysical realism on the one hand 
and idealism or scepticism on the other. Wittgenstein's contention is that 
these positions cannot be formulated meaningfully. He says about the meta-
physical realist's basic assumption: "And yet 'There are physical objects' is 
nonsense" ( OC, §35). The same holds for the negation of this phrase that 
characterizes the idealist's position. In this section I will outline the line of rea-
soning that leads Wittgenstein to this radical conclusion. Wittgenstein pre-
sented his considerations in his characteristic style; he did not try to press 
them into the structure of an argument, they are more like philosophical mus-
ings. My presentation of Wittgenstein's argument in several steps is therefore 
a reconstruction of the argument rather than an outline that inherits its struc-
ture from the original text. 
When Wittgenstein makes scepticism and idealism the main targets of 
his critique, he is really talking about one and the same position. If we char-
acterize metaphysical realism by its basic assumption that physical objects 
exist and that their existence does not depend on the existence of the realm of 
the mental, then idealism can be characterized as the position that rejects this 
claim, thus holding that the existence of the material world depends on the 
existence of a mind. 
It could be said of the latter's [i.e., the idealist's] position that it is scepti-
cal with regard to his opponent's (the realist's) position, and this accords 
with the customary use of the term 'sceptical'. Hence, whoever denies 
our everyday belief in the existence of physical objects, is sceptical with 
regard to this one particular postulation, and Wittgenstein calls this view 
'idealist scepticism'. (Haller 1988, 100)2 
Hence, in the argument that I am going to reconstruct, the words 'scepticism' 
and 'idealism' are used interchangeably. 
The first premise of Wittgenstein's argument is that the truth value of 
any given sentence can be determined only relative to a picture of the world, 
i.e., a background of further assumptions and practices. In order to determine 
the truth value of the sentence "I know that this is my hand," for example, 
one has to understand not only the meaning of the words of which the sen-
tence is composed, one also has to know the truth-criteria of the sentence. 
According to Wittgenstein, the proposition is part of a language-game, which 
determines both the meaning of the words and the truth-criteria. The lan-
guage-game is part of a background or picture of the world. Even though we 
can describe several aspects of that background by making some of our tacit 
assumptions explicit, by stating, for example, "I have two hands," "I have 
never been on the moon," etc., the background is not a clearly defined, ho-
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mogenous set of propositions. It is rather 
an agglomeration of a huge number of sub-systems, each with a fluctu-
ating boundary and a 'mixed' content. These subsystems are related to 
what Wittgenstein calls language-games. One could say that every lan-
guage-game has a foundation which is a fragment of the player's Vor-
Wtssen [pre-knowledge]. (von Wright 1972, 57) 
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Since it is the background that determines the truth value of any given propo-
sition, we cannot meaningfully say about the background itself that it is true 
or false. It is rather a picture of the world that is taken to be accurate. 
Wittgenstein states: 
But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its cor-
rectness; nor do I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it 
is the inherited background against which I distinguish between true and 
false. (OC, §94) 
Even though we cannot attribute a truth value to the background as a whole, 
we can consider each of the tacit assumptions it contains in isolation. If we do 
so, we can attribute a truth value to them. This can eventually lead to one's re-
fining the background or changing it altogether and adopting a different pic-
ture of the world. In order to illustrate this point, Wittgenstein discusses the 
proposition "The earth had existed ... for many years before my body was 
born," which is one of the propositions that Moore added to the 
whole long list of propositions, which may seem, at first sight, such ob-
vious truisms as not to be worth stating: they are, in fact, a set of propo-
sitions, every one of which (in my opinion) I know, with certainty, to be 
true. (Moore 1959, 32) 
Wittgenstein objects that the truth of this proposition is not obvious, it rather 
depends on the language-game which it is part of, like the truth value of any 
other proposition. We can imagine people or communities who have a differ-
ent picture of the world, for whom the proposition is false. Wittgenstein il-
lustrates this point with the example of a king who has been told for all of his 
life that the world started to exist with his birth. All his education was based 
on this assumption, which was compatible with, or even explained by every-
thing he was ever taught. For him, the proposition "The earth had existed for 
many years before my body was born'' is not at all an obvious truism, it is sim-
ply false; it contradicts everything the king has always taken for granted. Due 
to the differences in the background, the king and Moore play different Ian-
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guage-games. In consequence, the words they utter have different meanings; 
different truth criteria are applied. Strictly speaking, the king and Moore seem 
to use the same words, but they really speak two different languages. Moore, 
thus, cannot list this proposition as an obvious truth without specifying the 
role it plays in his language-game. 
What happens if Moore meets the king and tries to convince him of the 
truth of this proposition? The king would not accept any evidence that Moore 
can provide. When Moore points out that there are buildings that are more 
than 100 years old, for example, the king could reply that they obviously have 
been created together with the rest of the world when he was born, and they 
were designed to trick people about their actual age. The only way that Moore 
could convince the king of the truth of the proposition, Wittgenstein claims, 
is to get him to adopt a different picture of the world; the king would have to 
change his background, as it were. "I do not say that Moore could not con-
vert the king to his view, but it would be a conversion of a special kind; the 
king would be brought to look at the world in a different way'' (OC, §92). 
Moore's strategy to show that the idealist or the sceptic are wrong con-
sists in providing a list of sentences that are obviously true. Wittgenstein states 
that this strategy fails because it does not take into account what role the word 
'to know' plays in our language-game. "Moore's mistake lies in this-counter-
ing the assertion that one cannot know that, by saying 'I do know it'" ( OC, 
§521). This move, of course, cannot be very convincing for the idealist scep-
tic. Moore should rather have pointed out what role the expression 'I know' 
plays in our language-game and in which situations one is entitled to use it. 
Providing a list of propositions that seem to be obvious truisms without show-
ing that their truth depends on a background does not help, since for every 
one of these propositions we can imagine a background according to which 
they turn out to be obviously false. This shows that the propositions listed by 
Moore are not obvious truisms; Moore's strategy, thus, misses the point. He 
should have rather pointed out that the king, who claims that Moore does not 
really know (some of) the propositions listed, is obviously applying a differ-
ent set of truth-criteria, and, thus, playing a different language-game. "'I 
know' often means: I have the proper grounds for my statement. The other, 
if he is acquainted with the language-game, must be able to imagine how one 
may know something of the kind" (OC, §18). 
Let us now turn to the question of how this background or picture of 
the world is acquired and what it consists 0£ Wittgenstein describes the ac-
quisition of a background as part of the process of growing up and learning 
to play a language-game. The background is not a set of beliefs that one can 
learn one by one; we rather acquire a whole set of beliefs at once. "When we 
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first begin to believe anything, what we believe is not a single proposition, it 
is a whole system of propositions. (Light dawns gradually over the whole.)" 
(OC, §141). In addition, the background does not only consist of proposi-
tions, it also involves certain forms of behavior and practices. 
But is it wrong to say: 'A child that has mastered a language-game must 
know certain things'? If instead of that one said 'must be able to do cer-
tain things', that would be a pleonasm, yet this is just what I want to 
counter the first sentence with. (OC, §534). 
The basis of the child's background is not her acquisition of the knowledge 
that there are chairs and cups, for example, but her learning that she can sit 
on chairs and drink from cups, etc. She can learn to play a language-game that 
attributes meaning and truth-criteria to propositions like "I know that there 
is a chair" only on the basis of this kind of background that can be described 
as a practice rather than as a set of propositions. "The child, I should like to 
say, learns to react in such-and-such a way; and in so reacting it doesn't so far 
know anything. Knowing begins at a higher level" ( OC, §538). 
Consequently, the basis of every language-game consists in a practice rather 
than a set of propositions: "it is our acting, which lies at the bottom of the 
language-game" ( OC, §204). 
Wittgenstein, thus, allows for a hierarchy of different parts of the back-
ground, some of them being more basic than others; but, as von Wright 
points out, there is "no rigid order among language-games, neither logically 
nor from the point of view of genetic development" (von Wright, 1972, 57). 
In other words, we cannot have a strict and stable hierarchy that describes dif-
ferent levels of the background or oflanguage-games. Even though some lan-
guage-games can be acquired only on the basis of others, this does not mean 
that there is a logical hierarchy between them, nor that the acquisition of a 
specific language-game that is more basic is a necessary condition for the ac-
quisition of a more complex one. 
We have seen that according to Wittgenstein the background is not just a 
set of propositions, it rather reaches down to the actual world: our acting lies at 
the bottom of the language-game, as he puts it. At one point Wittgenstein even 
goes so far as to say that the background contains facts. After pointing out that 
it is hard to imagine that we could be wrong in our knowing that water boils 
and does not freeze under such and such circumstances, he states: "This fact is 
fused into the foundations of our language-game" (OC, §558).3 In another 
place, Wittgenstein states that "the possibility of a language-game is conditioned 
by certain facts. In that case it would seem as if the language-game must 'shouJ 
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the facts that make it possible. (But that is not how it is.)" ( OC, §§61 ?f).These 
passages suggest that Wittgenstein does not accept the view that there is a gap 
between language and reality. World and language rather form one whole, it 
does not make sense to draw a strict demarcation line between the two. 
Wittgenstein, thus, gives up the view that meaning is independent of what in 
fact is the case. Rather he holds that if the facts were completely different from 
what we thought, our language-game would change. 
If we imagine the facts otherwise than as they are, certain language-
games lose some of their importance, while others become important. 
And in this way there is an alteration-a gradual one-in the use of the 
vocabulary of a language. ( OC, §63) 
A few paragraphs later, Wittgenstein adds "When language-games change, 
then there is a change in concepts, and with the concepts the meanings of 
words change" (OC, §65). Hence, according to Wittgenstein's later views, 
language is not merely representing facts that are on the other side of a gap. 
Rather facts determine what language-games we can play; they form the 
very basis of the latter. Hertzberg characterizes this position in the follow-
ing way: "On Certainty emphasizes what we might call the 'this-worldliness' 
of our language: our language-games are tied to the actual world we live in" 
(Hertzberg 1976, 151). 
So far I have shown that according to Wittgenstein we can attribute a 
truth value to a proposition only relative to a background or a picture of the 
world. It would be wrong, however, to characterize this background merely as 
a set of propositions; it also contains actions and facts and, thus, reaches down 
to the physical world. Let us now turn to the question of how this can shed 
light on the realism-idealism debate. 
The idealist's position is characterized by a general doubt concerning the 
question of whether physical objects exist (independently of the mind). 
Wittgenstein argues that this general doubt cannot be formulated meaning-
fully. He claims that in order to doubt any single assumption, one has to ac-
cept a series of other ones. "If you tried to doubt everything, you would not 
get as far as doubting anything. The game of doubting itself presupposes cer-
tainty'' ( OC, § 115). Wittgenstein illustrates this point with the example of a 
pupil who doubts everything the teacher tells him, the existence of physical 
objects, the meaning of words, etc. He would interrupt the teacher in the his-
tory class, for example, and express his doubts whether the world existed a 
hundred years ago. In this situation the teacher can only react by telling his 
sceptical pupil that in this context his doubts do not make sense. First the 
pupil has to learn, he has to acquire a picture of the world in order to play the 
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relevant language-game. Only then he can go on to doubt some of the propo-
sitions he has been taught, one by one. "The child learns by believing the 
adults. Doubt comes after belief" (OC, §160). 
Metaphysical realism, idealism, and idealist scepticism are positions that 
try to come up with an answer to the general question "Do physical objects 
exist?" This question, however, can be understood only if it is part of a lan-
guage-game that determines its meaning. 
The idealist's question would be something like: "What right have I not 
to doubt the existence of my hands?" (And to that the answer could be: 
I know that they exist.) But someone who asks such a question is over-
looking the fact that a doubt about existence only works in a language-
game. Hence, that we should first have to ask: what would such a doubt 
be like?, and don't understand this straight off. (OC, §24) 
Wittgenstein's point is not that the idealist or the metaphysical realist are 
wrong, he rather shows that they cannot even formulate their concerns with-
out undermining the very language-game they play, for the latter is part of a 
bigger background that determines meaning and truth-conditions for the 
statements that characterize their positions. Wittgenstein argues, as we have 
seen above, that this background contains facts, it reaches down to the actual 
world, as it were. The very fact that we are playing language-games, thus, 
forces us to accept the existence of (at least some) physical objects. Hence, the 
general question of whether physical objects exist undermines the basis of the 
language-game which it is part of, in other words, it undermines the back-
ground that determines its meaning. In consequence, this general question is 
meaningless, and so are all positions that try to answer, rather than reject it. 
Therefore, both idealism and metaphysical realism are positions that cannot 
be formulated meaningfully.4 
While it makes sense to question whether a particular object exists, it is 
the generalization of that question that turns doubt into nonsense. I might, 
for example, ask whether the American continent really exists. The answer to 
that question will influence my behavior: if a European reader believes the 
story-teller in Peter Bichsel's short story America Does Not Exist, for example, 
she will go to the travel agency and cancel her trip to New York, etc. The ide-
alist's and the metaphysical realist's answer to the sceptical question, on the 
other hand, does not influence their behavior at all. 
What the realist and the idealist say, whether it be a realism or idealism 
of the transcendental or of the empirical type, differs in toto not only 
from what they do, but also from the ground on which they play out their 
94 The Constitution Of Consciousness 
language game. Accordingly, if either one tries to teach a child the use of 
the expression 'chair', the differences will not be differences between the 
facts that are taught, nor will they be differences oflanguages used; they 
will rather, as Wittgenstein says, be differences between 'battle cries'. 
(Haller 1988, 112)5 
In conclusion, we can reconstruct Wittgenstein's argument in the following 
way: The truth value of any proposition can be determined only in a lan-
guage-game which rests on a background or picture of the world. The back-
ground consists not only of propositions, but also of actions and facts and 
thus reaches down to the actual world. In order to play a language-game, one 
consequently has to presuppose the existence of (at least some) objects. The 
general doubt concerning the existence of physical objects undermines this 
presupposition and thus undermines the very basis of the language-game of 
which it is part. Both metaphysical realism and idealism have this general 
doubt as a starting point, but react to it in different ways. Therefore, both po-
sitions cannot be formulated meaningfully. Thus, if Wittgenstein's argument 
is correct, the "problem of the existence of the external world ... is in fact 
solved, before it can be raised" (von Wright 1972, 53). 
CONSTITUTION AND THE REALISM-IDEALISM DEBATE 
There is a parallel between Wittgenstein's late theory of meaning and the ac-
count of constitution I am proposing. While Wittgenstein argues that the 
meaning of words depends on their use in language-games which rest on a ho-
listic background, I have claimed that the constitution of objects depends on 
a retentional background. Perceptual experiences undergo retentional modi-
fication and, eventually, become part of the retentional background. In con-
sequence, the latter contains retentionally modified experiences that stood in 
direct contact to the object towards which they were directed. Thus, the re-
tentional background reaches down to the actual world. Accordingly, there is 
no gap between mind and world; we can rather speak of the 'this-worldliness' 
of mental episodes. 
The thesis that perceptual experiences stand in direct contact to phys-
ical objects has an important implication for the question of whether my 
account of constitution entails a form of idealism. If what I have said so far 
is right, having mental episodes presupposes that there are (at least some) 
physical objects that exist independently of our having mental episodes. 
Thus, the account of constitution that I have outlined above is incompat-
ible with the main thesis of idealism, according to which the existence of 
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the physical objects towards which we are directed depends on the exis-
tence of mental episodes. 
We can even go a step further and argue with Wittgenstein that ideal-
ism and metaphysical realism are positions that cannot be formulated mean-
ingfully or better-to put it into the context of the account of 
constitution-that are unintelligible. Since the retentional background con-
tains retentionally modified episodes, in which we were immediately directed 
towards actual objects, it reaches down to the actual world. Consequently, 
when the metaphysical realist or idealist consider the general question of 
whether physical objects exist, they undermine the basis of the retentional 
background. Thinking about the sceptic's challenge, thus, is a mental episode 
that questions the basis of the retentional background which is a necessary 
prerequisite for having mental episodes; in other words, if there were no phys-
ical objects, we could not have mental episodes and consequently could not 
come to wonder whether physical objects exist. Mimicking Wittgenstein's 
way of speaking, we can state that the question whether physical objects exist 
cannot be meaningfully thought. The very fact that we have mental episodes, 
thus, renders the realism-idealism debate unintelligible. 
A short look at the history of philosophy, however, should make us sus-
picious about whether these few remarks can actually silence both the meta-
physical realist and the idealist. In fact, we do not have to go further than 
considering some interpretations of Wittgenstein's argument to find out that 
this suspicion is justified: Wittgenstein's position, it has been argued, does not 
reject, but rather implies a form of idealism. Let us have a closer look at the 
line of reasoning that was proposed by Bernard Williams.6 In his early philos-
ophy Wittgenstein stated that the "limits of my language mean the limits of my 
world" ( TLP 5.6). Williams argues that there is continuity in Wittgenstein's 
thought with respect to this statement. He acknowledges that Wittgenstein 
turned away from the solipsistic aspects of the Tractatus in his later work, but 
still holds that the limits of our language mean the limits of ourworld.7 In his 
later philosophy Wittgenstein claims, according to Williams, that "what the 
world is for us is shown by the fact that we can make sense of some things and 
not of others" (Williams 1974, 84). And a few lines later Williams states: 
Since the fact that our language is such and such, and thus that the 
world we live in is as it is, are, as presently construed, transcendental 
facts, they have no empirical explanation; anything that can be empir-
ically explained, as that certain external features of the world are this 
way rather than that, or that we (as opposed to Hopi Indians, or again 
as opposed to cats) see things in a certain way, or deal with things in 
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one way rather than another - all these fall within the world of our 
language, and are not the transcendental facts. (Williams 1974, 84) 
Our language, according to this line of reasoning, determines how we see 
certain facts. People who grow up in other cultures might see the world in 
a completely different way. However, we cannot step outside of language, 
we cannot explain why the structure of our language is how it is; it might 
be completely different, as are the structures of languages of different cul-
tures, like that of Hopi Indians. Even if we learn to speak the language of 
the Hopi Indians, our picture of the world is still determined by a language 
(just that it is now determined by a different language with a different 
structure). In other words, we can never know whether language provides 
an accurate picture of the world because we cannot compare the world as 
we refer to it in our language-games to the world as it is independently of 
language; we can see the world only through the lenses of a language, so to 
speak. By learning another language we could learn to see the world 
through different lenses, as it were, but, according to this picture, we can 
never see the world directly; we must always wear some sort oflenses when 
looking at it. On the basis of these observations, Williams draws the con-
clusion that Wittgenstein held a form of idealism not only in the Tractatus, 
but also in his later work: 
The fact that in this way everything can be expressed only via human in-
terests and concerns, things which are expressions of mind, and which 
themselves cannot ultimately be explained in any further terms: that pro-
vides grounds, I suggest, for calling such a view a kind of idealism. 
(Williams 1974, 85) 
Williams' argument, if successful, equally applies to the account of consti-
tution that I am proposing. The constitution of objects depends on the re-
tentional background that one has established, i.e., it depends on one's 
constitutive commitment. One could, thus, say with Williams chat we can 
know objects only as they are constituted in our mental episodes; we see 
the world only through the lenses of constitution, as it were. If somebody 
has a retentional background that is sufficiently different from ours be-
cause, for example, she grew up in a different culture, this person would 
constitute objects in a different way. However, we cannot step outside of 
constitutive commitment to compare the object as it is in itself with the 
constituted object. Even if we try to have an empirical or scientific under-
standing of why we constitute objects in the way we do, every explanation 
we could come up with would lie within the limits of our constitutive 
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commitment8, it could be argued. To use Davidson's metaphor, "we can't 
get outside of our skins to find out what is causing the internal happen-
ings of which we are aware" (Davidson 1986, 312). Moreover, we seem to 
be trapped in this position for, as I have argued above, we are not even free 
to give up constitutive commitment, but are rather forced to carry on. 
Once we have put on some sort of lenses, we cannot take them off any 
more; we could only improve or change them, but we are no longer in a 
position to get rid of them altogether. 
Williams' argument is based on what I will call the "transcendental 
assumption" that we can distinguish between the (raw, unstructured) 
world, the world as it is in itself, on the one hand, and the world as it fig-
ures in our language-games or in our mental episodes, on the other. 
Williams does not provide any textual evidence, however, that 
Wittgenstein shared this transcendental assumption. In addition, this as-
sumption is based on the premise that "there are physical objects independ-
ently of how we refer to them in our language-games" which, for 
Wittgenstein, is a proposition that cannot be formulated meaningfully. 
Rather than arguing for or against transcendental idealism, Wittgenstein 
would rather point out that this problem is a nonsensical one. Williams, 
thus, cannot prove that Wittgenstein held a form of idealism. 
These considerations only show, however, that Wittgenstein did not 
draw the conclusion that his position implies a form of idealism. Williams 
could still argue that he should have drawn this conclusion, and that his later 
philosophy in fact does imply transcendental idealism. On similar lines it 
might also be argued that the account of constitution that I am proposing im-
plies this kind of idealism. Whether the idealistic interpretation of 
Wittgenstein and of the account of constitution that I have outlined is con-
vincing depends on whether the transcendental assumption is correct or not. 
In other words, it depends on whether we can meaningfully distinguish be-
tween the constituted object (or, in Wittgenstein's case, the object as it is given 
in the language-game) on the one hand, and the object as it is in itself, on the 
other. Once one has accepted this distinction, it can be argued that the struc-
ture of empirical reality, i.e., the reality we experience, is a product of subjec-
tivity, and that the raw, unstructured world is not accessible to us. McDowell, 
who calls that perspective the sideways-on picture9, describes its basic as-
sumption in the following way: 
We are asked to suppose that the fundamental structure of the empirical 
world is somehow a product of subjectivity, in interaction with supersen-
sible reality, which, as soon as it is in the picture, strikes us as the seat of 
true objectivity. (McDowell 1996a, 42) 
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The transcendental assumption has been subject of extensive discussions in 
the history of philosophy; hence this is not the place to show that a position 
with that historical dimension is wrong. However, since Wittgenstein's later 
philosophy, as well as the account of constitution that I have outlined above, 
only imply transcendental idealism if one accepts the transcendental assump-
tion, I will draw attention to an alternative that can do without that assump-
tion. I will not argue for or elaborate on this position. The mere fact that there 
is an interesting alternative to both idealism and metaphysical realism-one 
that even has affinities to some of the major assumptions of the account of 
constitution sketched-shows that the account of constitution that I have 
sketched can not only avoid idealism and metaphysical realism, but can also 
be combined with positive claims concerning these questions. 
According to this position the structure of the empirical world is not a 
product of subjectivity that is imposed on a supersensible reality, but rather a 
feature of the world that exists independently of human beings. The basic 
idea, thus, is to reject the distinction between constituted object and the ob-
ject as it is in itself A position that holds this view has been proposed recently 
by Hilary Putnam under the title 'natural realism' and by John McDowell, 
who calls his position 'naturalized platonism.' We find expressions of a posi-
tion along these lines also in Wittgenstein's later philosophy, e.g. in 
Philosophical Investigations, where he says: "When we say, and mean, that 
such-and-such is the case, we-and our meaning--do not stop anywhere 
short of the fact; but we mean: this is so" (PI, §95). 
The main assumption of this modest form of realism is that there is no 
raw, unstructured reality; the world rather consists of objects and facts to-
wards which we are directed immediately in our mental episodes. Perceptual 
experiences, thus, do not impose a structure on the world as it is in itself, but 
rather provide 'glimpses of reality,' as McDowell puts it. Putnam characterizes 
natural realism in the following way: 
A natural realist, in my sense, does hold that the objects of normal, 
'veridical' perception, are usually 'external' things .... The natural real-
ist ... holds that successful perception is just a seeing, or hearing, or feel-
ing, etc., of things 'out there,' and not a mere affection of a person's 
subjectivity by those things. (Putnam 1994, 454) 
Accordingly, we can stand in direct cognitive contact to the actual objects of 
our perceptual experiences. This position rejects, of course, the old empiricist 
picture according to which we perceive, or better: our perception is mediated 
by sense data, impressions, or other representations of the objects, but not the 
objects themselves. When Putnam states that we perceive 'things out there' he 
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rejects the claim that "perception involves an interface between the mind and 
the 'external' things we perceive" (Putnam 1994, 488) and that our percep-
tion has to be mediated by a causal relation between the object and the per-
ceptual experience. Putnam argues that the fact that we can describe the world 
differently in various language-games does not mean that objects are different 
from how they are described in these language-games. Different descriptions 
of one and the same object or event can be true, given that their meaning and 
truth criteria are determined by different backgrounds. 
Earlier in this chapter I argued that idealism and metaphysical realism are 
unintelligible positions. Now I am using natural realism to show that consti-
tution does not necessarily imply transcendental idealism. This might create 
the impression that I am accepting an unintelligible position to avoid another 
one. Hence, it is important to point out that there is a crucial difference be-
tween natural and metaphysical realism. The former is the attempt to acknowl-
edge the fact that in some of our mental episodes we are immediately directed 
towards physical objects, it is, in other words, "insisting that 'external' things, 
cabbages and kings, can be experienced" (Putnam 1994, 464). Unlike meta-
physical realism, it is not a reaction to the general doubt whether physical ob-
jects exist. Rather than theorizing about the ontological dependence between 
mental episodes and physical objects, it contents itself with showing the role 
physical objects play in the process of constitution. Hence, the 
natural realist account urged on us by Austin and Wittgenstein, is, in the 
end, not an 'alternative metaphysical account,' ... Winning through to 
natural realism is seeing the needlessness and the unintelligibility of a pic-
ture that imposes an interface between ourselves and the world. 
(Putnam, 1994, 487) 
This short discussion shows, as I hope, that natural realism provides an inter-
esting alternative to those ontological positions that presuppose the transcen-
dental assumption. Even though I could not provide a knock-down argument 
to the effect that the transcendental assumption is false or untenable, the very 
fact that we do have a convincing alternative allows us to dismiss positions 
that rest on this problematic assumption. 

Conclusion 
In the preceding pages I sketched a theory of constitution that takes up ele-
ments ofHusserlian phenomenology to address problems that are discussed in 
analytic philosophy of mind. I started out by showing that the great influence 
of Descartes' ontological distinction between res extensa and res cogitans has cre-
ated a gap between the realm of the mental and the realm of the physical that 
has become unbridgeable. Two dominant strategies in philosophy of mind in 
the twentieth century, reductionism and eliminativism, are only reactions to, 
rather than rejections of, Descartes' distinction. In consequence, they cannot 
explain the relation between mind and world other than by denying that there 
is a fundamental difference between the mental and the physical. I suggested 
that by adopting the notion of constitution we can develop a perspective that 
acknowledges the difference between the realm of the mental and the realm of 
the physical without creating an unbridgeable gap between them. 
In order to introduce the notion of constitution I showed how it was 
used by philosophers in the past. I concentrated on the accounts of Husserl 
and Haugeland, two philosophers from very different backgrounds who de-
veloped a notion of constitution to explain the relation between mind and 
world. Both Husserl and Haugeland agree that constituting an object does 
not mean creating it, nor does it mean interpreting an object as something 
else. While Husserl explains the process of constitution by analyzing the par-
tial intentions of our mental phenomena, Haugeland's account is closely re-
lated to the notion of rule following. Husserl, who used constitution as a basic 
notion in his philosophical system, argued that we constitute both the objects 
towards which we are directed and the mental episodes in which we are di-
rected towards them. Haugeland, on the other hand, analyzed different as-
pects a theory of constitution has to account for by distinguishing rules that 
describe the constitutive process and abilities one has to master in order to 
constitute objects; he distinguishes constitutive regulations, constitutive stan-
dards, constitutive skills, and constitutive commitment. 
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After contrasting these two positions I outlined an account of constitu-
tion that adopts relevant aspects of Husserl's and Haugeland's theories and 
puts them into the Sellarsian/McDowellian framework based on the distinc-
tion between the logical space of reasons and the logical space of nature. This 
account, which is motivated by the insight that causal theories cannot suffice 
to explain the content of our perceptual experiences, shows how a holistic 
background can achieve this task In order to describe the relation between 
holistic background and an occurrent mental episode I adopted the 
Husserlian notion of a holistic retentional background. Husser! argued that 
mental episodes do not disappear from consciousness once they are over. 
Rather they undergo retentional modification, which makes them "sink down 
into the past," gradually losing clarity and liveliness, until they become part 
of the retentional background. 
The actual process of constitution takes several steps. At the lowest level, 
we have partial intentions which are intentional (in a pre-objective sense) and 
undergo temporal modification. Due to passive association, which is based on 
the regularities of similarity, continuity, and contrast, these partial intentions 
form affective unities. In order to constitute objects, we have to establish a 
connection between the occurrent affective unity and the retentional back-
ground, which functions like a reservoir of objects from which we draw in the 
process of constitution; this feature can be described on the basis of associa-
tion. The constitution of the object establishes the intentional relation of the 
mental episode to the actual object. In the case of perceptual experiences, it 
establishes a direct, intentional relation between the episode and the physical 
object (in a broad sense). 
According to this account, every mental episode requires a retentional 
background of past mental episodes. In order to have one's first episodes, one 
has thus to develop a first, minimal background, which is based on three ele-
ments: primal impressions and the laws of association; our biological makeup 
and physical environment; and the social group in which we are acculturated. 
Moreover, when growing up, we learn to constitute not only objects, but also 
the mental episodes in which we are directed towards these objects. I showed 
that due to the laws of association we constitute sensory fields, which eventu-
ally allow us to constitute objects in different ways as seen objects, heard ob-
jects, etc., in our perceptual experiences. By our being initiated to the social 
practices of the group in which we grow up, especially by acquiring language, 
the most complex and subtle of our social practices, we learn to constitute a 
large variety of mental episodes. 
In the remainder of the book I discussed some of the consequences of 
this account of constitution. First I turned to its social aspect. Since we learn 
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to constitute various kinds of mental episode through social practices, we have 
to conclude first that different cultures might have (some) different kinds of 
mental episode; and second that there cannot be ineffable mental episodes-
we can always express them in language or some other social practice, in virtue 
of their rational relations to other mental episodes. If we characterize mental 
episodes through their rational relations to other episodes, however, we have 
to have a broad understanding of "rational relation." Moreover, the social as-
pect of the account of constitution presented entails an anti-individualistic 
position. A comparison of the views of Burge and Brentano has shown, how-
ever, that this does not create a tension for the account offered, for phenom-
enology is compatible with anti-individualism. 
Since the charge of idealism was brought up against two philosophers 
who have adopted the notion of constitution, most importantly against Kant 
and Husser!, I have argued that constitution does not entail a form of idealism. 
I used a late-Wittgensteinian argument to show that metaphysical realism and 
idealism are unintelligible positions. My account of constitution might still be 
charged with implying transcendental idealism-as it happened also in the 
case of Wittgenstein's later philosophy-but I showed that an argument along 
these lines rests on the problematic assumption that we can meaningfully dis-
tinguish between the object as it is in itself and the constituted object. 
With the account of constitution sketched I tried to pursue two goals: 
first, I tried to systematically approach a central question in the philosophy of 
mind by developing a perspective that acknowledges, but does not overempha-
size the differences between the realm of the mental and the realm of the phys-
ical; and second, by combining the work of philosophers who come from very 
different backgrounds, most importantly of Husserl, Haugeland, Sellars, 
McDowell, and Wittgenstein, I aimed to demonstrate that Husserlian phe-
nomenology and analytic philosophy of mind are not two incompatible and 
mutually repellent traditions, but can rather be combined in an approach that 
we might call "analytic phenomenology." And while there might be other ways 
to bring the two traditions closer together, e.g. by focusing on the work of 
other phenomenologists and analytic philosophers-some of which may prove 
equally fruitful-I hope to have achieved at least the modest goal to demon-
strate that the results ofHusserlian phenomenology can warrant new perspec-
tives and interesting insights on some of the central problems of analytic 
philosophy of mind, which shows that it is not only an interesting chapter in 
the history of philosophy; it can also become a most valuable ally when system-
atically addressing problems of contemporary analytic philosophy of mind. 

Notes 
NOTES TO INTRODUCTION 
1 Dummett, for example, points out that in 1903 Frege and Husserl would 
have appeared to any German student of philosophy who knew their work 
"not, certainly, as two deeply opposed thinkers: rather as remarkably dose 
in orientation, despite some divergence of interests" (Dummett 1993, 26). 
Mohanty explores the relation between the Frege and Husserl in his (1982), 
and F0llesdal's groundbreaking comparison of Frege's philosophy and 
Husserl's position at the times of Ideas (1913) in his article "Husserl's 
Notion ofNoema'' (1969) has started an extensive debate on the parallels in 
the work of the two. 
2 For the relation of Anglo-Saxon analytic philosophers to phenomenology 
c£, for example, Simons (1992), Thomasson (2002), and Brandl (2002); for 
the relation between the Vienna Circle and the phenomenological move-
ment, c£, for example, Mayer (1991), Schmit (2000), Piazza (2002) and 
(2004), and Huemer (2002). 
3 There are several, often ignored, points which a historical comparison 
would have to take into account. It is quite interesting, for example, that 
Sellars, who hardly refers to Husserl in his philosophical texts, mentions in 
his intellectual autobiography that Husserl had a strong influence on his 
work. He writes that in his years in Buffalo he was influenced by Marvin 
Farber "whose utter respect for the structure of Husserl's thought with the 
equally firm conviction that this structure could be given a naturalistic in-
terpretation was undoubtedly a key influence on my own subsequent philo-
sophical strategy'' (Sellars 1975, 283). In addition, Sellars gave a paper at a 
symposium of the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy, 
where he explicitly stated that "for longer than I care to remember I have 
conceived of philosophical analysis (and synthesis) as akin to phenomenol-
ogy" (Sellars 1978, 170). In this paper Sellars takes the phenomenological 
reduction as his starting point, without, however, referring to Edmund 
Husserl. Sellars' paper is replied by Mohanty (1978) and Sukale (1978). The 
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relations between Sellars and Husser! are (to my knowledge) not often stud-
ied in the secondary literature. There are, however, exceptions: cf., for ex-
ample, Soffer (2003) and Thomasson (forthcoming), for recent 
contributions both of which give a clearer perspective on the parallels, but 
also on the differences between the positions of Husserl and Sellars. 
4 A similar project has been pursued with a collection of articles compiled 
by Hubert Dreyfus and Harrison Hall, which demonstrate the relevance 
of Husserl's thought for cognitive science, and by Eduard Marbach, who 
has made an impressive case for the significance of Husserl's work in phi-
losophy of mind in his Mental Representation and Consciousness (1993). 
There are also examples of philosophers who have relied on non-
Husserlian phenomenology to address problems in the philosophy of 
mind, most recent examples are-apart from John Haugeland (cf. espe-
cially his collection Having Thought)-Sean Kelly (2001) and Gregory 
McCulloch (2003). My goal is to situate results of Husserlian phenome-
nology in a discussion that has its roots in the work ofWilfrid Sellars and 
John McDowell. 
NOTES TO CHAPTER ONE 
1 The other criteria are: psychological phenomena-and only those-are pre-
sentations or phenomena based upon presentation; seem to have no spatial 
extension; are objects of inner perception; have not only intentional, but 
also actual existence; and always appear as a unity (cf. Brentano 1995, 77-
100). Brentano actually never used the term "intentionality," but rather 
speaks of"intentional inexistence." The prefix "in" does not stand for nega-
tion; it rather means existing in something. 
2 When I quote Husser!, I will add the reference to the original German text. 
Whenever possible, I will quote from the Husserliana edition, henceforth 
Hua, followed by volume and page number. 
3 For a discussion ofBrentano's later account of intentionality c£, e.g., Kraus 
(1924/95) or follesdal (1978). For an overview of his early accounts of in-
tentionality, c£ Chrudzimski (2001). 
4 This standard interpretation of Descartes' position is not without difficul-
ties. For a critique cf. Baker and Morris (1996) who conclude that Descartes 
actually held a form of occasionalism. Even they acknowledge, however, 
that Descartes typically uses causal idioms to describe the relation between 
mind and body. 
5 Cf. McDowell 1996a, xiv: " ... to coin a phrase that is Sellarsian at least in 
spirit". 
6 For a discussion of this point cf. Sedivy (2004), who provides an interesting com-
parison of Sellars' adverbial theory of sense-data with Wittgenstein's analysis. 
7 I will say more about Sellars' distinctions and discuss the question whether 
it does have any ontological implications below. 
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8 In the introduction that was added to the second edition McDowell writes 
that the point could as well be made against Sellars: "For these purposes, 
Sellars and Davidson are interchangeable" (McDowell 1996a, xvi). 
9 C£ Brandom (1996, 245). 
10 McDowell is, of course, aware of these parallels. Pointing out the similari-
ties between his position and Hegel's absolute idealism he contends that 
with his apparatus he is able "to domesticate the rhetoric of that philosophy 
[i.e., absolute idealism]" (McDowell 1996a, 44). He also explicitly states that 
he does not want to be called a Pittsburgh Neo-Hegelian, a label occasionally 
used by Robert Brandom to refer to McDowell and himself: "I am resisting 
being cast as the hind legs of a pantomime horse called 'Pittsburgh neo-
Hegelianism"' (McDowell 2002, 98). 
11 Frege develops his critique of psychologism in The Foundations of 
Arithmetic, Husserl in his Logical Investigations, vol. 1. 
12 I am not thinking of social structures that we find in some species of ani-
mals other than humans, e.g., in ant colonies. From all we know these ani-
mals do not have the tools to reflect or reorganize the social structure they 
live in. And while this might not be necessary for forming a social structure, 
it certainly is for forming a social structure of a certain complexity or even 
a culture. 
NOTES TO CHAPTER TWO 
1 For a concise overview of the use of the notion of constitution in the history 
of philosophy c£ Hogrebe (1976). 
2 C£ Hogrebe (1976, 993f). 
3 Di.fferentiae constitutivae. In medieval philosophy, this expression is replaced 
by the term 'di.fferentia specifica. ' 
4 "Der eigentliche Durchbruch von Wort und Problem erfolgte aber zweifel-
los erst bei E. Husser!" (Hogrebe 1976, 1002). 
5 The way Husser! developed his notion of constitution over the years, how-
ever, was influenced by his reading of Kant. For a detailed discussion of. 
Kern (1964, 246-75). 
6 " ... ein spezifisch Husserlscher Begriff, den Husser!, in dem von ihm ver-
wendeten Sinn, nicht der philosophischen Tradition verdankt." 
7 Mayer points out that there are significant parallels between Husserl's and 
Carnap's notion of constitution (cf. Mayer (1991) and (1992)). Mayer, how-
ever, discusses mainly Husserl's Ideas (vols. 1 and 2). She does not point out 
that for Husser! there are no basic objects that form the basis of the system but 
she rather states that the basis of constitution is (for both philosophers) the 
stream of consciousness. Husser! explicitly argues, however, that the stream of 
consciousness is constituted (c£ Husser! 1991, 77 [Hua X 378)). C£ also 
Kung who points out that "it seems, in principle, impossible, that the train of 
definitions of some constructional system [like Carnaps] could be an adequate 
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representation of the progression of transcendental constitution" (Kling 
1975, 73). Kiing goes on to argue that the comparison between Carnap and 
Husserl can be helpful for an understanding of the higher levels of constitu-
tion, i.e., the ones that Mayer is focusing on. 
8 I have slightly changed the translation. The translator of the English edition 
translates "Konstitutionssystem" as "constructional system" and "konstitu-
tieren'' as "construct." For my point it is important, however, that in the 
original German version Carnap actually uses the words "Konstitution" and 
"konstituieren." 
9 Cf., for example, Simons (1987). 
10 Cf. Fink (1976, 203). 
11 For a detailed historical study on Husserl's notion of constitution of. 
Sokolowski (1964) and Stroker (1993). 
12 Cf. Husserl (1969, 87 [HuaXVII, 90f]). 
13 A similar position is also held by Biemel (1959, 195) and Sokolowski (1964, 
35). 
14 I am not suggesting that Husserl actually did subscribe to psychologism 
(at least not to the problematic form of psychologism he criticized in 
Logical Investigations) in his early work. This widespread view has recently 
been challenged by a number of scholars; for a discussion of. Mohanty 
(1982, 18-42) and (1997). I do not want to settle this question here. I do 
want to point out, however, that Husserl definitely did change his views 
on logic between Philosophy of Arithmetic and Logical Investigations. In the 
foreword of the latter, the first part of which appeared in 1900, Husserl 
mentions that the part that deals with psychologism goes back to a series 
of lectures given at Halle in 1896, i.e., two years after Frege's review. 
Alluding to his alleged psychologism in Philosophy of Arithmetic he re-
marks, quoting Goethe: "There is nothing with which one is more severe 
than the errors that one has just abandoned" (Husserl 1970, 43 [Hua 
XVIII, 7]). Apart from Frege, also Bolzano and Lotze had a strong influ-
ence on the development of Husserl's views on logic between 1891 and 
1900; cf. Beyer (1996), F0llesdal (1982a) and (19826); for the signifi-
cance of Husserl's move for his relation to Franz Brentano and his school, 
of. Huemer (2004). 
15 Cf. Sokolowski (1964, 54ff). 
16 "Diese kategoriale Formung oder Erzeugung der Sachverhaltsform bedeutet 
also, daB der Sachverhalt seine Form, seine gegliederte Struktur nicht unab-
hangig vom pradikativen Akt hat, sondern sie erst durch diesen konstruiert 
oder konstitutiert wird." 
17 The last part of Husserl's course Hauptstiicke aus der Phiinomenologie und 
Theorie der Erkenntnis from 1904/05 was On the Phenomenology ofTime. It 
was published, with some changes and additions in 1928. Even though 
Edith Stein did most of the editorial work, the text was published under the 
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name of Martin Heidegger who only proofread the text (cf. Boehm 1966, 
XXIV). It is reprinted together with other texts on the same topic in Hua X. 
The English translation was published in 1991. 
18 The later part of Husserl's course Hauptstiicke aus der Phiinomenologie und 
Kritik der Vernunft from 1907 which is often referred to as Dingvorlesung 
[thing-lecture] is published in Hua XVI. The English translation was pub-
lished in 1997. 
19 In his course on time consciousness in 1905 Husser! distinguishes objective 
time, "the time of nature in the sense of natural science" (Husser! 1991, 5 
[Hua X, 4]) and immanent time, time as it is experienced. For methodolog-
ical reasons, Husser! suspends all questions concerning objective time, 
which is why he speaks of pre-empirical time in the following quotation. 
Sokolowski points out that the strategy of suspending objective time "fore-
shadow[s] the phenomenological reduction of his later philosophy" 
(Sokolowski 1964, 74). 
20 Cf. Mohanty (1995, 57ff). 
21 Husser! continued to refine and revise his phenomenological reduction 
throughout his lifetime. Iso Kern distinguishes three major ways how 
Husserl introduces the phenomenological reduction: the way via inten-
tional psychology, the way via ontology, and the Cartesian way, cf. Kern 
( 1977). In his later work, especially in Crisis, Husser! criticizes the Cartesian 
way because it is characterized by its loss of the external world. I discuss 
Husserl's phenomenological reduction in more detail in my (2003). 
22 In the more recent translation (1982) this passage is translated quite differ-
ently and, as I think, wrongly. An even clearer statement of this idea can be 
found in Formal and Transcendental Logic, where Husser! says in retrospect 
that he did not discuss the topics of time consciousness in Ideas I for peda-
gogical reasons, cf. Husser! (1969, 286 [Hua XVII, 292]). 
23 For a more detailed discussion of the retentional background cf. below, 
chapter 3. 
24 "BewuBtsein besteht durch und durch aus BewuBtsein, und schon 
Empfindungen so wie Phantasma ist 'BewuBtsein'". 
25 Cf. Holenstein (1972, llOff). 
26 C£ Holenstein (1972, 27). 
27 At a later stage Husserl mentions that the difference between active and pas-
sive is only a gradual one and that no strict borderline can be drawn. This 
is because he holds at this time that there are no processes where the ego is 
not involved; it is, however, involved to a greater or lesser degree. 
28 In what follows I am referring to Dretske (1981, 153-68). 
29 I profited from a discussion with John Haugeland in my formulation of this 
point. 
30 Haugeland argues that being committed to constitutive standards does not 
even require language capacities, but it does require the having of concepts. 
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This argument is based on the assumption that having concepts does not re-
quire language (cf. 1998a, 255ff). Haugeland tries to support this assump-
tion with a rather adventurous thought experiment about super-monkeys 
that do not master a language but play chess and thus apply concepts. He 
does not, however, explain what exactly concepts are. Since this argument is 
not central for the present point, I will not discuss it in more detail. 
31 Cf. Haugeland (19986, 348). 
32 Haugeland distinguishes between two notions of 'possible': 'possible' in 
the narrow or strict sense "includes only that which would accord with the 
constitutive standards, were it to occur" (Haugeland 19986, 332). 
'Possible' in the wider sense, or 'conceivable,' "comprises everything that 
the players, qua players, would have the resources to recognize or other-
wise cope with, were it to occur" (Haugeland 19986, 332). The excluded 
zone is "that zone of the conceivable that lies 'out of bounds' for some do-
main-that which, though conceivable, is impossible in the strict sense" 
(Haugeland 19986, 333). 
33 We have seen above that in Logical Investigations Husser! allows for excep-
tions from this principle: he argues that categorical objects come to exist in 
the process of constitution. These objects, however, are based on other ob-
jects that have to exist independently of the process of constitution. The cat-
egorical object or state of affairs that the book lies on the table, for example, 
depends on a book and a table the existence of which does not depend on 
the constitution of the categorical object. 
34 "Kein gewohnlicher 'Realist' ist je so realistisch und so concret gewesen als 
ich, der phanomenologische 'Idealist' (ein Wart, das ich iibrigens nicht 
mehr gebrauche)". It seems quite important that Husser! made this remark 
in 1934 and thus in the last period of his work for sometimes it is argued 
that Husserl's early philosophy tends to be realistic, while after the publica-
tion of the Ideas I in 1913 (or after the transcendental turn in 1905/06) it 
tends towards idealism. Cf., for example, Ingarden (1998a, 183). 
35 Cf., e.g., Ingarden (I 975), or Philipse (1995). Ingarden states explicitly that 
there is a connection between the development of Husserl's notion of con-
stitution and that of his transcendental idealism, cf. (1975, 2lff). 
36 Cf. Ameriks (1977). 
37 Cf. Holmes (1975). 
38 Cf. Hall (1982). 
39 I am referring here to changes that do not need intellectual skills in order to 
be effected, even when the people who effect those changes are able to per-
form those skills. Since, for Haugeland, having constitutive standards re-
quires the having of concepts, there needs to be a minimum degree of 
complexity to one's mental life in order to be able to effect changes in one's 
constitutive standards. Consequently, this argument is not about newly-
born babies or animals. 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER THREE 
1 For a discussion of this point cf., for example, Chisholm/Sellars (1958). 
2 It is not exaggerated to state that Sellars' philosophy has shaped a good part of 
the discussion in the philosophy of mind of the second half of the twentieth 
century. This fact is worth mentioning, for Sellars' name is hardly mentioned 
by authors who advocate a Sellarsian position. Daniel Dennett notes this re-
grettable omission in his paper "Mid-term Examination: Compare and 
Contrast," where he states: "Sellars's influence has been ubiquitous but almost 
subliminal (if one judges by the paucity of quotations among functionalists). 
It is clear that Putnam, Harman, and Lycan ... have been quite directly influ-
enced by Sellars, but Dennett, Fodor, Block, and Lewis show the Sellars influ-
ence largely at second hand, and mainly via Putnam's very influential series of 
papers reprinted in [Mind, Language, and Reality]" (Dennett, 1987, 341). In 
his introduction to the new edition of Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind 
Richard Rorty explains Sellars' invisibility with the fact that his interest in the 
history of philosophy was the main obstacle for a wider reception of his work. 
"Sellars believed that 'philosophy without the history of philosophy is, if not 
blind, at least dumb,' but this view seemed merely perverse to much of his au-
dience" (Rorty, 1997, 3). 
3 Cf. McCulloch (2003, 2ff). 
4 Cf. Davidson (1980). 
5 Davidson's theory even allows for the extravagance that every event can be de-
scribed as a physical or a mental event. Due to his monism, he has to accept that 
any event that can be described as a mental event can also be described as a phys-
ical event. In "Mental Events" he states that his criterion for mental events al-
lows us to conclude that every event that can be described as a physical event 
can also be described as a mental one. He explains this consequence with the ex-
ample of a collision of two stars in distant space that can be described with the 
purely physical predicate 'Px,' which is true only at the time when the collision 
occurs. "This particular time, though, may be pinpointed as the same time that 
Jones notices that a pencil starts to roll across his desk. The distant stellar colli-
sion is thus the event such that Px and x is simultaneous with Jones' noticing 
that a pencil starts to roll across his desk. The collision has now been picked out 
by a mental description and must be counted a mental event. This strategy will 
probably work to show every event to be mental" (Davidson 1980, 21 lf). 
Davidson shows, however, that this consequence is not harmful for his distinc-
tion between mental and physical events. 
6 Davidson changes his position regarding the ontological status of the 
events. In "Mental Events" he seems to suggest that events are bare, i.e., they 
are neither physical nor mental, but open to be described in both ways-
and once they are described, they count as mental or as physical events, re-
spectively. This view, however, embraces a dualism of scheme and content, 
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"of organizing system and something waiting to be organized" (Davidson 
1984, 189), a view which Davidson harshly criticizes in his later philosophy. 
As a consequence, he replaces his early notion of events in later texts with 
one according to which events are individuated by their spatio-temporal lo-
cations, cf. (I 985, 175). According to this notion, however, all events are 
primarily physical events. It could thus be argued that with this move 
Davidson silently changes position, trading monism for materialism. 
7 McDowell, for example, suggests dropping the principle that he calls the 
"fourth dogma of empiricism" (McDowell 1985, 398). 
8 Cf. Dretske (1981, 153-68). I have discussed this argument in chapter 2. 
9 I should mention that Husserl does not use this example to present a cri-
tique of causal theories. On the basis of his methodological principle, the 
phenomenological reduction, he brackets the realm of the physical alto-
gether. 
10 Cf. Haugeland (1998a, 242-6). I discuss Haugeland's argument in chapter 
2. 
11 Searle first developed the background hypothesis in the context of philoso-
phy oflanguage, cf. Searle (1978). For his discussion of the background of 
intentional experiences cf. (1983, esp. 141-59) where he distinguishes be-
tween a background of non-intentional capacities and a holistic network of 
other intentional states. In The Rediscovery of the Mind ( 1992, esp. 175-96) 
he modifies his background-hypothesis, arguing that the network is part of 
the background of non-intentional capacities. For my point, these details of 
Searle's account are not relevant. 
12 Cf. Searle (1983, 144-53). 
13 Cf. Sellars (1997, 39f, §16). 
14 Most of the texts that I am consulting are from the early 1920s. My inter-
pretation ofHusserl is based on his rejection of the matter-form schema that 
he developed from 1907 on. 
15 Cf. chapter 2. For a more detailed discussion cf. Holenstein (1972, 86-117) 
and Sokolowski (1964). 
16 Holenstein develops a similar distinction between two meanings of'passive' 
in (1972, 193f). 
17 This point was not at all obvious at the time. Husserl contradicts his teacher 
Brentano, for example, whose theory of time-consciousness had a great in-
fluence on the development of Husserl's position. 
18 Cf. esp. Hua X and Hua XI. 
19 Brentano develops the notion of original association in the early 1870s. 
From 1890 on he calls these phenomena "proteraestheses." For an overview 
of the development ofBrentano's theory of time-consciousness, cf. Huemer 
(forthcoming). 
20 I have taken these diagrams from Husserl (1991, 376 [Hua X, 365]). 
21 Cf. Husserl (1991, 28, 32, and 372 [Hua X, 26, 31, and 362]). 
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22 Translation slightly altered. "Jedes konkrete Datum der lebendigen 
Gegenwartssphare versinkt, wie wir wissen, in die phanomenale 
Vergangenheit, unterliegt der retentionalen Wandlung und filhrt dabei 
notwendig in das affektive Nullgebiet, dem es sich einverleibt und in dem 
es nicht nichts ist." 
23 Husserl stresses that no part of the background can be understood in isola-
tion, but only in its being intertwined with the rest of the background, cf. 
(Hua XI, 101). 
24 Cf. (Hua XI, 128): ''Aber was dem jeweiligen Gegenstand inhaltliche 
Einheit gibt, was Unterschiede des einen und anderen inhaltlich ausmacht, 
und zwar fur das BewuBtsein und aus seiner eigenen konstitutiven Leistung, 
was Teilung und Teilverhaltnis bewuBtseinsmaBig moglich macht u. dgl. -
das sagt uns die Zeitanalyse nicht, da sie ja eben von dem Inhaltlichen ab-
strahiert." 
25 "Die primitivsten Gegebenheiten des Bewusstseins konstituieren sich als as-
soziative Verschmelzungen, die dank ihres Kontrasts gegeniiber einem an-
dersartigen Hintergrund das Ich zu affizieren vermogen." 
26 "eine Funktion der drei Assoziationsgesetze der Ahnlichkeit, des Kontrasts 
und der Kontiguitat". 
27 Cf. Holenstein (1972, 88f). 
28 This critique is not immediately reflected in his writing, however. In Ideas 
I, published in 1913, he still holds up the distinction between matter and 
form. I say more about the development of Husserl's critique of his early 
matter form schema above, cf. chapter 2. 
29 Cf. Holenstein (1972, 107): ''An keiner Stelle ... sagt er sich entschieden 
von der Annahme von Empfindungsdaten los." 
30 Cf. Holenstein (1972, 11 Off.). 
31 Cf. Holenstein (1972, 107ff.). In his analyses of time consciousness, 
Husser! presents other arguments against the matter-form schema that cen-
ter around the temporal structure of mental episodes. As I have pointed out 
earlier in this section, Husserl does not make the move to apply these argu-
ments to the constitution of objects. 
32 "It is due to the three constitutive laws of similarity, contrast, and continu-
ity that every affection has gestalt-structure" (Holenstein 1972, 50 [my 
translation: ''An diesen drei konstitutiven Gesetzen der Ahnlichkeit, des 
Kontrastes und der Kontinuitat liegt es, dass jede Affektion eine 
Gestaltstruktur aufweist. "] 
33 "Gleichsam unter der Hand lost Husser! damit in seiner Phanomenologie der 
Assoziation den Empfindungsbegriff durch gestaltpsychologische Termini ab". 
34 Husser!, manuscript C 16 IV, p. 23 (March 1932), quoted in Holenstein 
(1972, 112) [my translation: "die Uraffektion von Nicht-Objekten, von 
intentionalen Einheiten (vor-objektiven) und die spatere Affektion von ap-
perzipierten und schlieBlich von Objekteinheiten." 
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35 I have slightly altered the translation. In this place Steinbock's {generally very 
good) translation does not render perfectly the meaning of the German text. 
Steinbock has "Affective unities are constituted," which does not express the 
idea that they constitute themselves. The German original is: ''Affektive 
Einheiten miissen sich konstituieren, damit sich in der Subjektivitat iiberhaupt 
eine Gegenstandswelt konstituieren kann" {my italics). 
36 C( Husserl 2001, 227 [Hua XI, 177]: "It is the constant reservoir of objects 
that have achieved living institution in the process of the living present." 
37 This point was made by Goodman in his article "Seven Strictures on 
Similarity." Goodman argues that "similarity, ever ready to solve philosoph-
ical problems and overcome obstacles, is a pretender, an impostor, a quack. 
It has, indeed, its place and its uses, but is more often found where it does 
not belong, professing powers it does not possess" (Goodman 1972, 437). 
38 Even though this modification undermines the main principle of phe-
nomenology, there are some places where Husserl makes a similar move, 
as Holenstein points out. He refers to a quotation of Ideas II where 
Husserl writes "Sense data can occur only if there are sense organs, nerv-
ous systems, etc. in objective reality" (Hua IV, 289 [my translation: 
"Empfindungsdaten kiinnen nur auftreten, wenn in objektiver Wirklichkeit 
Sinnesorgane sind, nervose Systeme usw. '1). Holenstein points out, however, 
that already a few years later, in Formal and Transcendental Logic, Husserl 
calls these considerations a "perfect countersense" fperfekter Widersinn] 
(Husserl 1969, 230 [Hua XVII, 238]) because it requires us to combine 
results that can be achieved only in the phenomenological attitude, with 
others that one can have only in the natural attitude, cf. Holenstein 
(1972, 99). 
39 Moreover, he concentrates on two aspects of this book only. He refers to 
Husserl in his discussion of the mathematization of nature and quotes his 
"important idea that the 'primary qualities' of physics are not a set of 'prop-
erties' that we have discovered things to have, but a set of idealized abstrac-
tions" (Putnam 1994, 469). 
40 I have outlined Dretske's problem concerning causal theories of perception 
above, chapter 2. 
41 James develops this example in a letter to Dickinson S. Miller, dated August 
5, 1907, printed in James (1920, 295f). 
42 In this passage, Sellars does not talk about acquiring a background, but of a 
battery of concepts that we need in order to have observational knowledge. 
43 There might be some cases of severe brain damage that do not allow one to 
carry on with one's constitutive commitment. One cannot, however, decide 
to look around and not constitute objects for a couple of days or so. 
44 "Ausbreitung und Zusammenschluss zu Feldgestalten [werden von Husser/J 
als eine besondere Art intentionaler Konstitution analysiert, als passive 
Assoziation. Die 'Sinnesdaten' breiten sich aus und verschmelzen zu 
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Einheiten, weil es offensichtlich zu ihrem Wesen als Affektion gehort, in-
tentional Uber sich hinauszuweisen." 
45 In this context, Holenstein points out that Husserl's contention that affec-
tive unities constitute sensory fields-a process that requires that affective 
unities are intentional-was one of the reasons that made Husser! give up 
the notion of raw sense data; cf. Holenstein (1972, lOlff.). 
46 Learning to move in the space of reasons goes, as Haugeland has pointed 
out, hand in hand with acquiring constitutive skills, i.e., the ability to dis-
tinguish correct from incorrect moves and to point out errors, e.g. criticize 
false beliefs, when committed by others. 
47 Cf. Sellars (1997, 78, §38). 
NOTES TO CHAPTER FOUR 
1 I am assuming here that their language can be translated into ours. For a dis-
cussion on that topic and a rejection of the distinction between conceptual 
scheme and empirical content, which he calls the third dogma of empiri-
cism, cf. Davidson (1984). 
2 For a similar distinction between feelings and mental episodes cf. McDowell 
(1989, 288). 
3 Sellars distinguishes between intralinguistic moves, language entry transi-
tions and language exit transitions in (1963). 
4 Cf. Sellars (1997, 73ff, §35). 
5 Sellars develops his notion of material inference in his (1953). 
6 A similar point is made by Brandom, cf. (1997, 192f, fn. 3). 
7 Cf. Searle (1983, 7ff). 
8 This example was made famous by Wittgenstein, cf. (PI 194, xi) who gives 
reference to Jastrow's Fact and Fable in Psychology. 
9 This debate followed the publication of their books, Mind and World and 
Making it Explicit, respectively, in 1994. It started out with a Symposium in 
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (McDowell (1995) and Brandom 
(1995)), continued with several Book Symposia on their books that contain 
a review article and the author's reply (McDowell (1996b), (1997), (1998b) 
and Brandom (1996), (1997), (1998)), and was dosed (for the moment, at 
least) with an article by John McDowell (2002), in which he replies 
Brandom's critiques. 
10 Brandom uses the expression "Pittsburgh Neo-Hegelians" to refer to both 
McDowell and himself. McDowell, as I have mentioned above, explicitly re-
jects this label as a description of his own position (cf. 2002, 98). Nonetheless, 
both Brandom and McDowell do hold a conceptualist position. 
11 Cf. Brandom (1995, 904). 
12 In the (so far) last article of his exchange with Brandom, McDowell responds to 
the charge of individualism in a similar way. ''A rational animal could not have 
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acquired the conceptual capacities in whose possession its rationality consists ex-
cept by being initiated into a social practice. But as I see things, the capacities 
transform their possessors into an individual who can achieve standings in the 
space of entitlement by her own efforts" (McDowell, 2002, 105). 
13 C£ Burge (1986, 117). 
14 C£ Burge (1988, 651), for Arnauld's argument c£ (1641/1984, 141ff.) 
15 C£ Putnam (1975, 223ff.). 
16 C£ Brentano (1995, 29ff.) and (1995, 127ff.). 
17 C£ Brentano (1995, 94ff.). 
18 C£ Brentano (1995, 34ff.). 
NOTES TO CHAPTER FIVE 
1 C£ Kern (1964, 276ff.). He points out, however, that the account of genetic 
constitution was not the only aspect of Husserl's thought that lead to his 
transcendental idealism. 
2 Wittgenstein uses the expression 'idealist scepticism' in (OC, §37). 
3 It seems that the full impact of this passage is not always appreciated among 
Wittgenstein scholars. Even Georg Henrik von Wright, co-editor of 
Wittgenstein's posthumously published On Certainty, distorts this sentence 
when he quotes it in his article on On Certainty. Von Wright quotes this sen-
tence in the following way: "Their truth 'is fused into the foundations of 
our language game' (§558) ... " (von Wright 1972, 167). Wittgenstein, 
however, is not writing about the truth-value of some description of a fact, 
but the very fact itself being fused into the foundations of our language 
game. 
4 I should mention at this point that Wittgenstein's argument does not show 
that all forms of idealism and realism are nonsensical. I will show in the next 
section that his position allows for natural realism. 
5 Haller refers to Wittgenstein (Z, §414). 
6 C£ Williams (1974). 
7 Cf. Williams (1974, 82). 
8 I am paraphrasing Williams: "such an explanation would, once more, have 
to lie within the limits of our language" (Williams 1974, 93). 
9 C£ McDowell (1996a, 34f). 
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